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ABSTRACT 
Much research has been carried out to evaluate the impact of strategic alliance 
membership on the performance of airlines. However it would be of interest to 
identify how airlines perceive this impact in terms of branding by each of the three 
global alliance groupings. It is the purpose of this paper to gather the opinion of 
airlines, belonging to the three strategic alliance groups, on the impact that the 
strategic alliance brands have had on their individual brands and how do they 
perceive that this impact will change in the future. To achieve this, a comprehensive 
survey of the alliance management and marketing departments of airlines 
participating in the three global strategic alliances was required. The results from this 
survey give an indication whether the strategic airline alliances, which are often 
referred to as marketing agreements, enhance, damage or have no impact on the 
individual airline brands. 
 
Konstantinos Kalligiannis is a Ph.D. candidate at Cranfield University (on Airline Branding 
inconsistencies within the Airline Alliances) and holds a M.Sc. in Airport Planning and 
Management from Loughborough University, a M.Sc. in Air Transport Management from 
Cranfield University and a B.A. in Business Administration from Luton University. 
Konstantinos is also working as an aviation consultant and airport planner.  His key areas of 
expertise include air traffic forecasts, airport planning, feasibility studies and business plans for 
start up airlines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alliances are generally a strategy that companies use when the 
acquisition of another company or internal development as means of 
growing is not possible. Sometimes even if internal development is possible, 
alliances are preferable as they provide quicker access to new markets. 
Alliances vary in degree of commitment from simple marketing cooperation 
to more advanced co-operations that could eventually lead to complete 
mergers or acquisitions (although that at this point they could hardly be 
classified as alliances anymore).  
According to Kleymann and Seristo (2004), the strategic global alliances 
that have been formed in the last decade in the airline industry are primarily 
marketing alliances, involving common branding strategies to promote them. 
Branding is a crucial element of marketing and makes a product or service 
distinctive by its positioning relative to the competition and by its 
personality (Hankinson & Cowking, 1993).   
Co-marketing alliances are contractual relationships entered into by 
firms that are at the same level in the value-added chain and that have 
complementary products (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1992). According to this 
definition, the same level of value-added is required by all airline brands 
when entering an alliance and a complementary service offering is required 
by them. Since not all airlines that participate in a specific alliance have the 
same value to add and their services are not complementary in all routes 
since in many cases they is competition among them, some issues that could 
damage these alliances may exist. Moreover, coherence and consistence are  
___________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Kostas Iatrou works as an air transport consultant, Partner of AirConsulting Group and is 
Secretary General of the Hellenic Aviation Society. He holds a Ph.D. from Cranfield University, 
UK. He has participated as instructor of the International Airline Training Fund of the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA). He is Editor of AirTransportNews.aero. He has 
presented his work in several Air Transport Research Society, International Civil Aviation 
Association and IATA conferences and his research articles in air transport journals: the Journal 
of Air Transport Management, the Annals of Air and Space Law, Journal of Air Transportation, 
and Aerlines. 
Dr. Keith Mason is the Director of the Business Travel Research Centre and is a Senior 
Lecturer in the Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University. He lectures on airline 
economics, airline business models, airline marketing and market research. His research focuses 
on the business travel market and low cost airlines, and he has had over 30 articles, papers, and 
reports published. Dr. Mason has been involved in a number of major consultancy projects for 
airlines, airports, civil aviation authorities, airplane manufacturers, and the EU and has given a 
number of invited presentations. Dr. Mason is a Committee Member of the Air Transport 
Research Society and holds degrees in Business and Marketing from Leicester Polytechnic, and 
Airline Marketing from the University of Plymouth. His Ph.D., a market segmentation of the 
business travel market, was sponsored by Air UK where he spent secondment periods in their 
market research department.  
 Kalligiannis, Iatrou and Mason 5 
 
 
presumed as a necessity for a strong corporate brand identity (Balmer & 
Greyser, 2002; Morsing & Kristensen, 2001). 
Each airline alliance has its own brand which is used in each airline’s 
member marketing promotion together with the airline’s individual brand. A 
recent research has revealed that the individual airlines viewed the alliance 
brand as little more than a sub-brand (He and Palmer, 2004). A question that 
could be raised at this point is how each alliance brand affects its members’ 
brands. This paper identifies how this effect is perceived by the airlines 
participating in the three major alliances.     
Among the first major airline alliances that were formed historically was 
Wings in 1989, but it no longer exists since it did not progress further and its 
main players have now joined one of the remaining alliances. The three 
major airline alliances that currently exist are Star Alliance, which was 
formed in 1997; oneworld, which was formed in 1999; and SkyTeam, which 
was formed in 2000. Star Alliance is by far the biggest alliance in terms of 
members consisting of 16 airlines, whereas oneworld and SkyTeam have 
fewer members, 8 and 9 airlines, respectively. 
This paper will attempt to address followings questions: 
1. How do airlines perceive the impact of alliance branding 
on their individual brand? 
2. Whether airlines believe that it is possible to have both a 
strong airline and an alliance brand or whether you have to focus on 
one brand at the expense of the other? 
3. Whether airlines consider that their brand value categories 
are similar to their alliance brand value categories? 
4. Whether there are differences in the above perceptions 
according to the specific alliance that an airline belongs to, the size 
of the airline, its region, and the timeframe of joining an alliance. 
 
To address the above question, a comprehensive survey of airlines 
participating in the three global strategic alliances was carried out between 
March and May 2005. 
APPROACH 
The heads of the alliance and marketing departments of all airlines—that 
is 33 carriers at the time of the survey—belonging to the alliance groupings 
of Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam were contacted to participate in a 
questionnaire survey. Although marketing managers are a single target 
group, they are the most appropriate to comment on the branding issues 
created with the use of both an alliance and an airline brand at the same time. 
The questionnaire focused on the impact of the alliances on airlines’ 
branding as this impact is perceived by the heads of the relevant 
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departments. It should be noted that 27 carriers participated in the research 
giving the survey an 82% response rate. The airlines that did not want to 
participate in the survey are the followings: Aer Lingus, Aeromexico, British 
Airways, LAN, Qantas and Singapore Airlines.  
In assessing the impact of alliances on airlines’ individual branding the 
following criteria were taken into account: 
1. The global alliance groupings (Star Alliance, oneworld and 
SkyTeam); 
2. The size of carriers measured by their annual input 
[Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK)]; 
3. The region where the carriers come from (America, 
Europe, Asia/Oceania); 
4. The duration that an airline is an alliance member [how 
many years after the alliance formation (t), the airline had joined]. 
RESULTS 
In this section, the overall findings of the survey will be presented, 
highlighting the alliance branding effect on their airline members’ brands 
without examining potential differences between the alliances, the airlines’ 
size, their region or their timeframe in joining these alliances that will be 
presented in the next section.  
Figure 1 summarises all findings related to the alliance brand equities. 
Figure 1. Airline strategic alliances brand equities  
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A crucial finding of the survey is that the great majority of the airlines 
(89%) perceive that, in general, their alliance branding affects their 
individual brands either positively or very positively. This contradicts a 
previous survey finding from the business travellers’ point of view, who do 
not perceive any benefits from the airline alliances (Goh & Uncles, 2002). 
Only (11%) of the respondents expressed some reservations and preferred to 
take a neutral stance and no carrier considered this effect as being negative. 
This finding is of extreme significance since the reservations expressed in 
the industry of potential damage of the powerful brand airlines from their 
alliance brand is not shared by the airlines themselves.  
This is also supported by the fact that the great majority of the 
respondents (78%) agreed that there are benefits in promoting the alliance as 
a single brand. This result also demonstrates the importance of the alliance 
branding and that the participating airlines do not fear branding cooperation.  
The major benefit that the airlines perceive to gain from their alliance 
membership in terms of branding is the brand power in markets that would 
normally experience little or no brand equity, taking advantage of the 
alliance brand values and global recognition.  
Other non branding-related benefits that were often quoted from the 
airlines include larger network, an increase in their frequent flyers’ 
programmes validity around the globe, and an increase in their purchasing 
power. These demonstrate that the alliances are not just a marketing 
cooperation but a strategic cooperation. Despite the importance that these 
non-marketing benefits have for the airlines, they are outside the scope of 
this paper and will not be examined. 
The disadvantages most often mentioned include passengers’ confusion 
over expectations of a more harmonised service from all airlines 
participating in the same alliances; that the alliance brands are strongly 
influenced by the dominant airlines’ brands; that the airlines lose a part of 
their individuality; and that their image could be damaged. 
The findings of the survey demonstrate that the respondent airlines are 
currently satisfied by their respective alliance brand equity (74%) but also 
believe that it should be reinforced further (81%). Most airlines agreed that 
this brand reinforcement will be achieved mainly by increasing their alliance 
promotion, since nine respondents mentioned it as the most appropriate tool 
for achieving greater alliance brand equity. The establishment of a more 
standardised quality of service between all alliance members was also 
mentioned as assisting in the achievement of this objective. The addition of 
new partner members was also identified as being capable of reinforcing an 
alliance brand. 
Although respondent airlines want their alliance brand to be reinforced 
further, most of them (89%) do not want that their alliance brand equity to 
overtake their individual brand equity. This demonstrates that no airline is 
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willing to be sacrificed for the benefit of the alliance. Another finding 
validates this statement since nearly all airlines (89%) do not want their 
individual brands to get absorbed by their alliance brand, signalling that the 
strategic alliances are the final destination of these co-operations and not an 
intermediate step for their merger (Iatrou, 2004). 
Another crucial finding from this survey is that most airlines (79%) 
believe that there are other airline members in their alliance that have to 
catch up with their alliance brand’s standards. Therefore, although they 
consider that being promoted under the alliance brand is beneficial to them, 
they still believe that the harmonisation of all members under the same 
quality standards and brand values will segment their alliance. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that an airline’s branding is not a determinant 
factor when deciding upon its admission in one alliance and that other 
factors may be more important, such as its route network. Taking into 
consideration the number of airlines participating in the three alliances, Star 
Alliance (16), SkyTeam (9), and oneworld (8), it seems as unrealistic for all 
of them to have a same brand acceptance. 
An additional important finding is that all respondent airlines (except 
one) believe that it is possible to maximise at the same time both their 
individual and alliance brands without having to maximise one at the 
expense of the other. The only airline which supported that it is not possible 
to achieve the simultaneous enhancement of both but it is necessary to 
maximise the one at the expense of the other has currently been undergoing a 
re-branding process and suffered from financial constraints. For these 
reasons, their distinctive answer could be understood. 
Figure 2 presents the brand values that the airlines have defined as 
important in promoting their airline and alliance brands. Since it was an 
open-ended question many similar values were grouped together, given 
fifteen different categories. The brand values were recorded in order of 
importance and therefore a weighted score was then calculated. Since five 
brand values were asked to be stated, the most important values were given a 
five-point score, reducing by one point in each subordinate category of 
importance. Then a percentage was calculated for each category. 
The greatest difference between the airline and the alliance brand values 
are related with the importance that they place on their network size, which 
is far more crucial (30%) for the alliances than it is for the airlines 
individually (11%). This makes sense, since one of the most important 
reasons why these strategic alliances were formed was to offer a global 
network with many destinations to their customers. The importance of a 
seamless travel for the alliance as a brand value (5%) in comparison with its 
importance for the airline as a brand value (0%) reinforces this conclusion. 
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Figure 2. Airline and alliance brand values categories 
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The importance of a carrier’s nationality is also an important value 
(11%) for them but has no value at all for the multinational alliances. 
Erickson, Johansson and Chao (1984) have suggested that the effect of the 
country of origin variable appears to have direct effects on customers’ 
beliefs. Customers may have a bias against a foreign country, which has 
effective implications for products and services from that country. Hong and 
Wyer (1989) argued that a service’s nationality influence is dependent on the 
recency with which it is presented. On the one hand, many airlines 
participating in the alliances are strongly associated with their country of 
origin, many of whom are known as their country’s flag carriers and have 
their nation’s name as part of their brand, for example, Air France, British 
Airways, Alitalia, etc. On the other hand, the alliances have a global 
character and therefore have no association with any particular country or 
nation, although the oneworld alliance has most of its members (five out of 
eight) coming from English speaking countries.   
The reassurance related feature, has almost identical results with the 
nationality results, implying that the airlines want to maintain a closer 
relationship with their own customers and are not willing to give it away. 
This effect possibly was influenced by the events of 11 September 2001, 
since all carriers focused on their own survival and therefore had their 
alliance advancement as a secondary priority, which is also supported by the 
fact that after 11 September 2001 it took nearly two years for the next entry 
in an alliance. Another possible explanation why the alliance brand is 
perceived to be associated only with a marginal reassurance value (2%) is 
that it has not yet developed the brand equity required for it. The role of 
reassurance has being identified as crucial for the effectiveness of a 
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marketing alliance (Smith & Barclay, 1995) and therefore should be 
reinforced as an alliance brand value. The results for the safety-related brand 
values which are double in importance for the airline (8%), as compared to 
the alliance (4%), reinforce the conclusion above.  
This result contradicts to some extent the finding for the power feature 
as a brand value since the airlines perceive it as important for their alliance 
brand (7%) but not for their own brand (0%). All other brand value 
categories are quite closely rated for both the airlines and the alliances and 
therefore will not be commented upon. It should be noted that the most 
important brand value category for the airlines is image-related (27%) and 
although that this category is secondary for the alliances it still has a very 
high score (24%) which is very close to the one of the airlines. 
Figure 3 presents the survey results regarding the importance that the 
airlines place on three important elements. 
Figure 3. Important brand promoter elements 
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Respondents were asked to rate each of the following three elements 
(quality of service, service features and brand image) according to their 
importance in promoting their airline and their alliance brand values. Quality 
of service was the highest rated for both airlines (4.81) and alliances (4.38). 
The slightly higher importance of this element for the airlines in comparison 
with the alliances can be explained by the fact that the airlines understand 
that although consistency in the service quality offered from an alliance is 
very important, they understand that it is extremely difficult for this to be 
achieved and are willing to accept potential small variations. 
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Airline-specific image is the second most important element among the 
three for the airlines with a high score (4.58), but are the least important for 
the alliances with the lowest score (3.88). This result reinforces the 
conclusion that the airlines’ images are not so important for promoting the 
alliance brand values and therefore their diversity and distinctiveness is 
acceptable under the single alliance brands. Nevertheless, research has 
highlighted the importance of forming alliances with suitable partners for 
their success (Spekman and Sawhney, 1990) and therefore particular 
attention should be paid when accepting a new member.  
Although service features are the third most important element in 
promoting an airline’s brand values, their score is also very high (4.27) 
signalling their importance for the airlines. Their score is marginally higher 
for the alliances (4.31) and is placed second in terms of importance for 
promoting the alliance brand values. This marginal difference may be 
explained by the fact that there are noticeable differences between the 
service features between airlines belonging in the same alliance and some 
measures to reduce them or at least to control them would add to an 
alliance’s coherence. 
The survey participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they 
perceive that a brand conflict exists between the airlines and their alliances 
in the same three elements. A five-point scale was used for this purpose. No 
perception of significant brand conflict in any of these categories has been 
identified. The results are presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Potential brand conflicts  
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Although the highest brand conflict between the airline and the alliance 
brands was identified in the service features (1.69), it is still quite a low 
score and therefore insignificant. This does not necessarily mean that the 
airlines see it as a damaging conflict, since it may be intentional in order to 
have a certain degree of differentiation between them. All alliances have 
established a minimum standard of service (seat pitch, lounge, meals, in-
flight entertainment, etc.) so as to ensure product conformity. Beyond that 
minimum standard, the airlines have the possibility to differentiate and to 
improve further the service already provided based on the culture and policy 
of each airline (Iatrou, 2004). 
The second highest conflict score was recorded for the airline image 
(1.31), which is even smaller and more trivial. Although each alliance 
consists of many airlines with diverse images, no conflict is perceived by the 
airlines reinforcing the previous conclusion that all alliance members are 
willing to maintain and are encouraging their diversity. 
A smaller conflict was recorded in the quality of service element (1.23), 
highlighting that the airlines do not perceive that there is a significant 
difference between the level of service quality offered by the same alliance 
carriers. 
THE IMPACT OF ALLIANCE BRANDING BY GROUPING 
In this section, the survey findings are examined by looking at different 
groupings (alliance group, airline size, region, and date of entry) in order to 
identify potential differences between them that will assist further to 
understand the alliance branding impact. 
The Star Alliance members seemed to be the most satisfied from their 
alliance branding since five members identified this impact as very positive 
in comparison to only one member from the SkyTeam and none from 
oneworld. Figure 5 presents the analytical results for this question. 
Almost all members of oneworld (3 out of the 4 respondents) stated that 
they do not believe that there are airlines in their alliance that have to catch 
up with their alliance brand. This could be potentially explained by three 
facts. First, oneworld is the smallest alliance in terms of members and 
therefore it is easier to establish and maintain similar standards; second, they 
seem to be less diverse than the other airlines at least in terms of common 
communications since five out of the eight members come from English 
speaking countries; and third, their alliance has not yet progressed as far as 
the other two. 
 Kalligiannis, Iatrou and Mason 13 
 
 
Figure 5. Alliance brand effect by alliance groupings  
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In terms of airlines’ satisfaction from their alliance brand equity, there 
are different trends for each of them. The Star Alliance members seemed to 
be the most satisfied with their alliance brand equity, which can be 
understood by the fact that it is this alliance that until now has placed a 
greater emphasis in promoting their alliance brand. A typical example of 
their dedication to promoting the alliance brand is that it is the only alliance 
which each member is obliged to paint at least one of its aircraft with the 
Star Alliance logo. 
The majority of the SkyTeam members are also satisfied but to a much 
smaller extent than the Star Alliance members by their alliance brand equity, 
possibly explained by the fact that it is the youngest alliance and has not yet 
established a central management function. In contrast, half of the oneworld 
members are satisfied and half are not satisfied by their alliance brand equity 
resulting in a neutral position. This could explain the reason why in this 
survey oneworld had by far the smallest response rate (50%). oneworld has 
been historically developed and currently still is highly dominated by its two 
core and largest members, British Airways and American Airlines, without 
establishing a powerful and more independent brand. The fact that this 
alliance has not been granted approval by the authorities to progress to the 
extent that the other alliances have, is understood to have created reluctance 
for the oneworld members to invest in increasing their alliance brand equity. 
This is confirmed by another finding, which identifies that the majority of 
the oneworld respondents (75%) believe that there are no benefits in 
promoting the alliance as a single brand. 
When looking at potential brand conflict differences among the three 
alliances, it can be identified that oneworld members feel that their alliance 
suffers the least from potential brand conflicts between the individual airline 
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and the alliance brands. Since the oneworld brand has limited brand equity, it 
makes sense that the possibilities of conflicts are insignificant. 
Figure 6. Brand conflict elements by alliance groupings 
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The highest scores of brand conflicts for all three elements were 
recorded for the SkyTeam Alliance. When this finding is combined with the 
importance that these alliance members place at these elements in promoting 
both their airline and the alliance brand values, it can be concluded that more 
effort should be placed in them to reduce the perceived conflicts in these 
areas. 
When looking for potential significant differences between the 
importance of different brand value categories that alliance members 
associate with themselves, both as an independent airline and as an alliance, 
some important findings are identified. 
Star Alliance members consider their network as having greater 
importance (31%) in promoting their alliance brand values in comparison to 
the SkyTeam members (29%) and the oneworld members (25%). This makes 
sense since this order of importance is the same with the relevant size order 
of the alliances’ networks in terms of number of destinations. 
Oneworld members are more eager in promoting their quality of service 
as a brand value both as airlines individually (14%) and as an alliance (9%), 
in comparison to the Star Alliance members (5% and 7%, respectively), and 
the SkyTeam members (3% and 0%, respectively). This is in accordance 
with the previous results concerning oneworld members and the importance 
that they place on service quality in promoting their airline and alliance 
brands. 
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Star Alliance members place higher importance in their nationalities as 
airline brand values (13%) compared with the SkyTeam members (9%) and 
the oneworld members (5%) and have no importance at all (0%) as brand 
values for any of the alliances which makes total sense since they are 
multinational co-operations. 
Oneworld members feel stronger in promoting safety as an airline brand 
value (17%) than the SkyTeam members (14%) and the Star Alliance 
members (2%), whereas this category is not considered so important to their 
alliance brands.  
The image-specific airline brand values are rated higher by the Star 
Alliance members (33%) than they are rated by the SkyTeam members 
(23%) and the oneworld members (16%). Again membership number may 
be an important factor in explaining this result. Another important finding is 
that when looking at the image-specific alliance brand values, the Star 
Alliance members place again the highest importance (30%), but here the 
oneworld members have the second highest score (26%) and the SkyTeam 
members the lowest score (10%). This might be explained by the fact that 
the SkyTeam Alliance has recently grown significantly with the addition of 
three large airline members and therefore their alliance brand image has been 
modified recently. 
 
The impact of alliance branding by airline size 
Large carriers seem to have a more neutral opinion about the alliance 
brands’ effects than the medium and small carriers. This can be explained by 
the fact that it is mainly the large airlines in each alliance which influence 
the alliance brands and therefore regard themselves more as the alliance 
brand shapers than as being influenced by them. Moreover, their airline 
brand equity is much stronger than their alliance brand equity and therefore 
the alliance brand has not yet enough power to be able to influence the large 
airlines’ brands. The neutral opinion could be explained by the fact that large 
airlines believe more strongly than the medium and small airlines that brand 
conflicts have an effect and therefore are the least satisfied by their brand 
alliance effect. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that large airlines are 
the least satisfied by their alliance brand equity. 
Figure 7 shows that the larger the carrier is then the larger the brand 
conflict is perceived to be no matter which category we look at, except in the 
image category where medium carriers have recorded a smaller conflict than 
small carriers. This can be explained by assuming that the larger the carrier 
the more it has developed its brand equity and the less willing it is to have it 
unprotected by many small carriers. 
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Figure 7. Brand conflicts by airline size 
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Only two small and one medium airline are willing to have their alliance 
brand equity grow greater than their own airline brand equity and finally 
become absorbed by them.  
When investigating for potential differences among the airline and 
alliance brand value categories according to the airline sizes, new findings 
emerged. As is expected, small airlines place a much smaller emphasis on 
their network in promoting their airline brands (3%) in compared to the 
medium (16%) and large carriers (11%) and for this reason they place a 
much higher importance on this feature (32%) in promoting their alliance 
brand. It is interesting that large and medium carriers also place significant 
importance on their alliance network in promoting their alliance brands, 
which is by far the most important element from all categories mentioned by 
the respondents, emphasizing the main reason behind the formation of the 
alliances. 
Small carriers place a much smaller importance on service quality (2%) 
when promoting their own brand when compared to the medium (7%) and 
large carriers (7%), but when looking at service quality in promoting their 
alliance brand, small carriers place higher importance (7%) than both 
medium (4%) and large carriers (5%). According to this result small airlines 
believe that they gain a quality of service value from their alliance brand. 
The country of origin effect as an airline brand value has been identified 
in this survey as diminishing as airline size increases, since it has a very 
important value for the small carriers (24%), a much smaller but still 
important value for the medium carriers (8%) and has a trivial value for the 
large carriers (1%). 
 Kalligiannis, Iatrou and Mason 17 
 
 
Small carriers are also significantly affected by their alliance brand 
gaining a frequent flyer reward value attached to their brand, since they 
consider this feature as having no value for their airline brand but having an 
important value for their alliance brand (6%). 
Finally, small airlines perceive that their alliance brand conveys a brand 
value related to power and dominance (24%) which they do not consider as 
having any value at all for their own airline brand (0%). 
 
The impact of alliance branding by region 
When examining differences between the brand value categories 
according to the airlines’ regions, some important conclusions can be drawn. 
American airlines place a much higher importance on their network 
(24%) in promoting their airline brands in compared to Asian (7%) and 
European (5%) airlines, which can be assumed is related to the fact that the 
American domestic air market is much greater in size than all other domestic 
air markets. Nevertheless, network size is extremely important in promoting 
their alliance brand for all carriers no matter which region they come from. 
When looking at the magnitude of this benefit, European carriers gain more 
since they place (31%) a much higher importance in their alliance network as 
an alliance brand value, followed by the Asian carriers (25%). Although the 
American carriers place the highest importance (32%) on network as their 
alliance brand value, based on the importance that they place on this feature 
of their airline brand the increase from a network is the smallest of all 
regions investigated. 
Asian airlines place by far the highest importance on service quality as a 
brand value for both their own airline (16%) and their alliance (13%) than 
their European and American counterparts (2% and 3%; and 4% and 3%; 
respectively). 
Another important finding from this survey is that the European airlines 
place by far the most importance on their nationality in promoting their 
airline brands in comparison to their American counterparts (4%), whereas 
Asian carriers do not place any value in their nationality when promoting 
their brand. Therefore a potential brand conflict may exist between the 
multinational and global alliance brands and the national European brands. 
Asian airlines consider their image specific brand values far more 
important (39%) than the American (27%) and European (21%) airlines. A 
typical example of this image-specific brand values for the Asian carriers is 
the Singaporean girl of Singapore Airlines, whose importance was 
recognised by the Madame Tussauds Museum in London which had the 
figure exhibited there, as the first commercial statue in the exhibition. 
A significant proportion of the European airlines are not currently 
satisfied by their alliance brand equity. This explains why the same airlines 
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consider that there are no benefits in promoting their alliance as a single 
brand.  
Although the great majority of the American airlines believe that there 
are benefits in promoting their alliance as a single brand, a significant 
proportion of them (38%) are not currently satisfied by their alliance brand 
equity. This highlights the American airlines’ willingness to enhance their 
alliance brand equities.  
Figure 8. Satisfaction in promoting the alliance brand by region  
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All Asian airlines are satisfied with their alliance brand equity and 38% 
of them do not want their alliance brand equity to be reinforced. The entire 
sample of Asian carriers rated as very important (highest score of 5) their 
airline image. Consequently, they may reckon that this image will be diluted 
if the alliance brand grows stronger than the airline brand. 
 
The impact of alliance branding by date of entry 
When looking at the results according to the duration of airlines’ 
alliance participation, it is apparent that the alliance inauguration airlines 
placed a much higher importance (31%) on their alliance image-specific 
brand values than did the airlines that joined subsequently (16%) and the 
ones that joined at the latest stage (14%), highlighting a continuous reduction 
on the image-specific attributes of the alliance brands. It is reasonable that 
the more airlines with different images joined each alliance and the more 
diverse that these images are, the alliance brands will lose their capabilities 
of being associated with some specific images. 
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The latest group of alliance entrants considers the highest conflicts 
among the three groups. This can be explained by the fact that it is them that 
most recently had to adapt their service specifications to be able to conform 
to the alliance standards.  
A significant proportion of the founder alliance members (31%) are not 
currently satisfied with their alliance brand equity. Their expectations at the 
formation may not have been realised. As opposed to airlines that joined an 
existing alliance that have a clearer picture of what the alliance brand is. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this survey investigated potential brand conflict between 
alliance brands and their airline members’ brands according to the airlines’ 
perceptions. The survey’s findings highlighted that airlines do not perceive 
that any major brand conflict exists.  
Marketing managers were selected for this research as the most 
appropriate persons from the airlines participating in the airline alliances to 
comment on the issue. The very high response rate of the questionnaire 
survey 82% increases the research findings’ validity.  
The majority of the respondent airlines believe that there are many 
benefits in promoting the alliance as a single brand. Most airlines also 
believe that there are other alliance members that have to catch up with the 
remaining carriers’ brands. The great majority of airlines are currently 
satisfied by their alliance brand equity but still believe that it should be 
reinforced further but without exceeding their own brand equity since they 
are against being absorbed in the future by their alliance brands. 
An alliance’s network has been identified as being by far the most 
important brand value in promoting the alliance brand. 
The Star Alliance seems to be the most successful alliance in terms of 
branding followed by SkyTeam and oneworld. 
Further research is required to investigate for potential brand conflicts 
between the alliance brands and their members’ brands according to 
passengers’ perceptions. This research will be more valuable since the 
success of branding is measured by customers’ acceptance and not airlines’ 
own perceptions. However this research was the first investigating for 
potential brand conflicts within the alliances and could lead the way to 
further research on the topic. 
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APPENDIX 
Description of airline alliances 
 
Star Alliance  
The Star Alliance was launched in May 1997, by Air Canada, Lufthansa, 
SAS, Thai and United airlines to create a global airline network. Varig, the 
sixth member, joined the alliance in October 1997, with Ansett Australia and 
Air New Zealand in March 1999. Ansett subsequently left as it ceased 
operations in March 2002. All Nippon Airways joined the Star Alliance on 
31 October 1999, Austrian Airlines Group including Lauda Air and Tyrolean 
Airways joined in March 2000 and Singapore Airlines on 7 April 2000. 
British Midland and Mexicana joined on 1 July 2000. In October 2000 the 
European Commission indicated it would not allow full codesharing between 
Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines in order to safeguard market competition on 
the routes. Asiana Airlines formally joined on 1 March 2003 and became the 
fifth member in the Asia-Pacific region. On 1 April 2003, SAS Group carrier 
Spanair officially joined its parent in the Star Alliance.  
The Star Alliance has a total of almost 2,000 aircraft, serves around 800 
destinations in 130 countries worldwide and transports more than a quarter 
of a billion passengers annually, through extensive codeshare agreements, 
with "'round the world" fares for global travellers. The alliance allows access 
to over 500 Star Alliance lounges around the world, reciprocal frequent flier 
programs (FFPs), through check-in, streamlined airport operations, cargo co-
operation, joint purchasing, advertising and promotions.  
 
oneworld  
A global marketing alliance announced in September 1998. American 
Airlines, British Airways, Canadian, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia and 
Qantas offer closer linking of FFPs, reciprocal access to airport lounges, 
smoother transfers between carriers and a range of global products including 
"oneworld Explorer" fares. After the takeover by Air Canada, Canadian 
Airlines left oneworld on June 1, 2000, while Lan Chile and Aer Lingus 
joined on the same date. 
 
SkyTeam  
Strategic alliance between Aeromexico, Air France, Delta Air Lines and 
Korean Air, offering codesharing, joint marketing and reciprocal frequent 
flyer programs. Cargo cooperation is also part of the alliance. CSA joined in 
March 2001, and Alitalia in July 2001. Continental Airlines, KLM Royal 
Dutch Airlines, and Northwest Airlines joined the SkyTeam alliance on 13 
September 2004. 
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AIRLINE CHOICE FOR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS IN 
SÃO PAULO METROPOLITAN AREA: 
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ABSTRACT 
Using the conditional (multinomial) LOGIT model, this paper addresses airline choice in 
the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. There are two airports in this region, where two, three or 
even four airlines compete for passengers flying to an array of domestic destinations. The 
airline choice is believed to be a result of the tradeoff passengers face among flight cost, 
flight frequency and airline performance. It was found that the lowest fare better explains 
airline choice than the highest fare, whereas direct flight frequencies give better 
explanation to airline choice than indirect (connections and stops) and total (direct plus 
indirect) ones. Out of 15 variables tested, the lowest fare was the variable that best 
explained airline choice. However, its signal was counterintuitive (positive) possibly 
because the cheapest airline was offering few flights, so passengers overwhelmingly failed 
to choose the cheapest airline. The model specification most adjusted to the data 
considered the lowest fare, direct flight frequency in the travel day and period (morning or 
afternoon peak) and airline age. Passengers departing from São Paulo-Guarulhos 
International Airport (GRU) airport make their airline choice in terms of cost whereas 
those from São Paulo-Congonhas Airport (CGH) airport do not. Finally, senior passengers 
place more importance on airline age than junior passengers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite incidents related to air transport security such as the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, and seasonable widespread infectious 
diseases such as SARS in China and elsewhere, air transport demand has a 
long-term rising trend as a result of world population increase and industry 
development. 
As a result of deregulation in many countries worldwide, airlines are 
now facing a different competitive condition, with new airline entrants; some 
of them employing a low-cost/low-fare strategy that has changed air travel 
from expensive and elitist to more affordable and for a wider population. 
In this scenario, airlines are searching eagerly to enhance their market 
share not only in the routes they already operate but also in new potential 
markets. Therefore the way passengers choose airlines for their desired 
flights constitutes both crucial information for the airlines’ strategic plans 
and a relevant subject of research for transportation engineers. 
To describe the airline choice process, the majority of researchers have 
used at least a variable accounting for the cost of the flight, generally the 
fare, and another variable accounting for the flight frequency. This paper 
goes further by using a variable of airline performance. 
This paper aims at determining from a set of candidates the variables 
that have the best explanatory power on airline choice made by the 
passengers whose travel starts in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. This 
region is well served by two airports: São Paulo Guarulhos International 
Airport (GRU) and São Paulo-Congonhas Airport (CGH), which are 
outstanding countrywide in terms of embarked and disembarked passengers. 
This paper extends the research on airline choice by presenting and 
discussing results achieved in the analysis of airline choice in other regions 
of the world and bringing about results for the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. 
BACKGROUND 
Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995) analyzed airline choice made by 
passengers originating in Dallas and Chicago, in the US. Multinomial 
LOGIT was used as a modeling tool, and the passenger market was 
segmented according to travel frequency, travel purpose and experience with 
traveling to different destinations. It was found that the probability of 
choosing a carrier increases with an increase in the level of service (share of 
the carrier flights in the origin-destination city pair), the square of this 
variable has a negative signal, the effect of origin market presence is positive 
but unexpectedly not significant, frequent flyer program (FFP) membership 
and most active membership are positive and highly significant, the carrier’s 
attractiveness and its market share are positively affected by FFP 
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membership, the most active membership reflects incremental effect of 
participation in a FFP, therefore those who actively participate are more 
likely to choose the carrier of this program than those who just participate, 
showing the loyalty-inducing effect of FFP membership. Finally, relevant 
scenarios were built. The carrier choice probability increases from 50% to 
72% for travelers who become members of that carrier FFP and to 92% for 
frequent travelers who actively participate in that carrier’s FFP. 
Yai, Takada, and Okamoto (1997) examined the travel characteristics of 
international passengers traveling to the Asian region as well as their choice 
of air carrier for international flights at Tokyo New International Airport 
(Narita) in Japan, using ordered LOGIT model. Residents in Central 
America traveling on sightseeing were the ones who visited more countries 
in the current trip to Asia, whereas residents in East Asia were those who 
visited fewer countries. Japan, Singapore and. Hong Kong are considerably 
used as transit ports for passengers traveling elsewhere within Asia. 
Moreover, would a travel pattern be defined, it would involve visiting 
countries located near each other. Regarding parameter estimations for 
passengers preferring economy class, for the US, Canada and Europe 
passenger signals were intuitive for fare (negative), travel time (negative), 
frequency (positive) and airline nationality (positive). For passengers from 
Korea, China and Southeast Asia, airline nationality was negative. For 
travelers from Southeast Asia time was positive. US passengers 
demonstrated the highest willingness to pay for national carrier, whereas 
Canadian passengers placed the highest value on travel time and finally 
Southeast Asian passengers placed the highest importance on flight 
frequency.  
Pels, Nijkamp, and Ritveld (1998) studied the conjoint choice of airport 
and airline in the San Francisco Bay Area, using a nested LOGIT model, 
building two situations of sequential choice: (a) first airport choice and then 
airline choice; and (b) first airline choice, followed by airport choice. There 
was not an expressive difference in the estimations of the utility function 
between business and non-business passengers. These parameters seemed to 
vary more across time than across market segments. Anyway, they 
concluded that the estimated parameters were rather robust. Moreover, they 
concluded that airport choice happens first, and then airline choice, with 
them not being simultaneous choices. 
Using an aggregate-level Markovian type model, Suzuki (2000) 
proposed a method to model the relationship between on-time performance 
and market share in the airline industry. The model incorporates the idea that 
passengers who experienced flight delays are more likely to switch airlines 
in their subsequent flights than those that did not face delays. A delay was 
considered if it surpassed 15 minutes from schedule time. The paper 
concludes that on-time performance affects a carrier’s market share primarily 
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through the passengers’ experience not though the advertisement of 
performance. 
Mason (2001) analyzed business travel decision making within the UK, 
interviewing both individual travelers and their corporate travel managers. 
Eighty percent (80%) of the companies used only one travel agent.  Eighty-
five percent (85%) of the travelers and their travel managers used phone 
calls as a booking channel. The traveler selects his or her own flights 52% of 
the time, the traveler’s secretary selects it 25% of the time and the travel 
department makes the selection 23% of the time. While travel managers 
think corporate travel policies (CTP) make travel easier, travelers are less 
convinced about this. Unlike travelers, travel managers think that CTP 
reduce traveler uncertainty. Travel managers disagree that CTP put a 
constraint on travel planning, while travelers were neutral. Both travelers and 
travel managers agree that CTP reduce travel choice, furthermore travel 
managers agree more strongly than travelers that CTP save the company 
money. Forty-seven percent (47%) of the travel managers see consolidated 
spending with one alliance as beneficial. In addition, 37% of them see that 
alliance development has a neutral effect on the company travel expenditure. 
Sixty-five (65%) of travel managers have a positive attitude towards low 
cost airlines, whereas only 32% of travelers do. Price is clearly seen by both 
travelers and travel managers as the main advantage of low cost airlines. 
Finally, 70% of the travel managers and travelers believe that video 
conference technology and the Internet did not have a substantial effect on 
the number of trips taken. 
Hensher (2001) contributed to the literature of discrete choice models by 
considering structures for the specification of unobserved effects in the 
utility function. Using data from the non-business market for the Sydney-
Canberra corridor served by car, the conclusion was that past research has 
under valued travel time savings. 
Suzuki and Walter (2001) presented a framework that investigates how 
frequent flyer miles can be used in the most effective way to reduce air travel 
costs by companies that are considering the use or are already using mileage 
redemption strategies. Among three candidate methods, the conclusion is 
that the mileage optimization method is the best one, followed respectively 
by the lowest fare redemption method and the lowest fare method. 
Armstrong, Garrido, and Ortúzar (2001) studied the choice of urban 
trips in Chile. Although it does not analyze airline choice, this paper 
contributes to the literature of discrete choice models in the sense that it 
focus on the subjective value of time (SVT), which is the marginal rate of 
substitution between travel time and cost. Since the SVT point estimate 
follows an unknown distribution a priori, this paper proposes two forms for 
building confidence intervals for a certain probability level: the t-test and the 
LR-test, constructing Multinomial Logit, Hierarchical Logit and Box-Cox 
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Logit. The conclusions are that the interval’s mid-point is greater than the 
SVT point estimate, and smaller confidence intervals should be derived from 
more significant parameters. Both the t-test and the LR-test provided an easy 
and practical way to obtain good confidence intervals for the SVT. Finally, 
as trip maker income increases, the SVT point estimates also grow, but the 
variation of the intervals’ mid-point is much more drastic and the range of 
values increases considerably. 
Using ANOVA, Yoo and Lee (2002) studied airline choice for 
international flights made by Korean air passengers departing from Incheon 
International Airport, which is an off-shore airport that serves Korea’s 
capital, Seoul. The most important airline service attributes were, 
respectively, air fare, convenience of flight schedule, on time performance, 
and seat availability. People who have less than a college education placed 
higher importance on in-flight service. Travelers in their thirties or forties, 
and individual enterprisers placed higher importance on air fare. Passengers 
in their twenties and fifties, professionals and individual enterprisers, and 
less educated people placed higher importance on tour information and extra 
service from airlines. Travelers with higher income, professionals, 
passengers with less than a college degree, and those participating in group 
tours and people traveling more than 11 times a year placed higher 
importance on reputation and image of airlines. Passengers with middle 
income and office workers placed higher importance on safety. Females and 
older travelers placed higher importance on recommendations and 
experiences. When travelers and relatives paid for the ticket, they placed 
more importance on safety. Finally, business travelers and those visiting 
friends and relatives placed more importance on scheduling and on-time 
performance. 
Turner (2003) analyzed the profile and airline choice of passengers 
departing from London Gatwick Airport in England to Amsterdam Schiphol 
Airport in the Netherlands. Passengers of two airlines were surveyed, 
EasyJet (EZ, a no-frills carrier) and British Airways (BA, a network carrier). 
EZ flyers fly mostly on leisure, are younger, come from a diversity of 
occupations, do not participate so much in FFP and are less frequent flyers, 
whereas BA passengers fly mostly on business, are older, are businessmen, 
participate in FFP and are extremely frequent flyers. Ninety-seven (97%) of 
EZ passengers rated price as important, 75% indicated flight timings and 
33% said frequency. Eighty-five (85%) of BA passengers rated flight 
timings as important, 33% did not know how much the ticket cost, 26% rated 
FFP points as important, ahead of reliability/punctuality (25%) and 
frequency (17%). Regarding airline choice, 47% of EZ passengers 
considered another carrier for the trip, while 44% of BA passengers did. The 
trip purpose influenced the access mode: business travelers accessed the 
airport by taxi whereas leisure passengers accessed by bus/coach or train. 
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Finally, some EZ passengers rated 30 pounds as more than expected for the 
ticket price while others rated 60 pounds as a lot less than expected. 
Lijesen (2006) conducted a stated preference survey with Dutch 
respondents, who were exposed to 16 choice problems each. These choices 
mimic a trip from Amsterdam to New York. Estimating a mixed logit model, 
it was found that westbound long-haul leisure passengers in general prefer 
flights with afternoon arrivals and that the majority of these travelers prefer 
arriving before their desired arrival time than arriving after their desired 
arrival time, implying that flights should not be spaced equally over time, but 
be biased towards arriving earlier. 
METHODOLOGY 
The LOGIT model has been the most widely used approach to cope with 
multiple-choice situations in transportation engineering, especially in the 
majority of the papers analyzed in the previous section. To build the LOGIT 
model, some considerations related to the passengers’ choice process are 
imperative. 
Each passenger presents a consistent structure of preferences, based on 
the utility each alternative choice can provide, in a way that the passenger 
chooses the option (airline) whose utility is the maximum among the 
available choices. This choice behavior can be expressed mathematically by 
the following equation: 
 
zjjallforUU jnin ≤≤≥ 1,           (1) 
Where: Uin is the utility that passenger n obtains by choosing airline i, 
Ujn is the utility that passenger n obtains by choosing airline j, z is the 
number of airlines (alternatives) available for choice. 
Since the perception of the attributes that each alternative offers may 
vary widely from passenger to passenger, and even the characteristics 
usually measured being constant for two different passengers, the utility of 
each alternative airport is not regarded from the same standpoint, therefore it 
is wise to include a random element to the travel choice, that is added to the 
deterministic one, forming the theoretical basis for the stochastic choice. The 
stochastic formulation of the utility function is expressed as: 
 
ziiallforVU ininin ≤≤+= 1,ε              (2) 
Where: Uin is the utility that passenger n obtains by choosing airline i, 
Vin is the deterministic part of the utility function for alternative i chosen by 
passenger n, εin is the random part of the utility function for alternative i 
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chosen by passenger n, z is the amount of choices considered available for 
passenger n. 
The LOGIT model assumes that the random components of the utility 
function are independent and identically distributed with a Gumbel function 
(double exponential) as Kanafani (1983) explains. The probability function 
that denotes the choice of an alternative made by one passenger is given by: 
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     (3) 
Where: pin is the probability of passenger n choosing alternative i (each 
alternative is an airline in this paper), among the j alternatives (airlines); Vin 
is the deterministic part of the utility function of alternative (airline) i. 
Vin enhances parameters αk whose estimation has been accomplished 
using NLOGIT 3.0 (Econometric Software, Inc., 2002). Multinomial LOGIT 
models are classified as follows: (a) models whose variable values are input 
the same across all alternatives for the same observation (passenger), as they 
are individual characteristics; and (b) models whose variable values are 
attributes of the alternatives (perceived by passengers), and variable values 
that remain constant across alternatives (for the same passenger) are also 
allowed. 
The latter is the model that this paper employs, also known as the 
conditional LOGIT model, which estimates variable parameters using the 
Maximum Likelihood Method. For the iterations, the Newton Method was 
used since it produced quick convergence for most calibrated models. As a 
measure of goodness-of-fit, the average probability of a correct prediction 
was generated. 
 
Sampling 
Although the São Paulo Metropolitan Area groups several towns, seven 
of them (São Paulo, Guarulhos, Santo Andre, São Bernardo do Campo, São 
Caetano do Sul, Diadema and Osasco) have been chosen to represent the trip 
origins in this region, because of two reasons: (a) they represent 79% of the 
electric power consumption in the region; and (b) the data was primarily 
collected for an airport choice experiment, and in that case the calculation of 
the access time from the other towns was not likely to lead to sound values. 
For airport choice analysis we used Moreno and Muller (2003, 2004). 
The analyzed airports were São Paulo-Congonhas Airport (CGH), 
located in São Paulo) and São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport (GRU), 
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located in Guarulhos, a city neighboring São Paulo. The criteria for 
destination selection were that: (a) there must have been departures to these 
destinations from both airports; (b) flights supplied by plural airlines; and (c) 
observed traffic must have surpassed 100,000 passengers. This number, as 
Windle and Dresner (1995) explain, prevents small sample bias that is 
usually associated with less popular destinations. 
The first and third requisites were evaluated through the last statistical 
report of the Department of Civil Aviation available to the date of data 
collection, the report of the year 2000. If this survey had been designed only 
for airline choice analysis, the first requisite could have been waived. The 
second requisite was evaluated through airlines’ websites.  
Therefore 21 airports (corresponding to 19 cities, since there are 2 
multiple-airport destinations) were studied in this paper, as follows: (a) BPS 
(Porto Seguro); (b) BSB (Brasilia); (c) CGR (Campo Grande); (d) CNF 
(Belo Horizonte); (e) CWB (Curitiba); (f) FLN (Florianopolis); (g) FOR 
(Fortaleza); (h) GIG (Rio de Janeiro); (i) GYN (Goiania); (j) IGU (Foz do 
Iguacu); (k) JOI (Joinville); (l) LDB (Londrina); (m) NVT (Navegantes); (o) 
PLU (Belo Horizonte); (p) POA (Porto Alegre); (q) RAO (Ribeirao Preto); 
(r) REC (Recife); (s) SDU (Rio de Janeiro); (t) SSA (Salvador); (u) UDI 
(Uberlandia); and (v) VIX (Vitoria). 
The number of competing airlines ranged from 2 to 4 depending on the 
destination, herewith denoted by Airline 1, Airline 2, Airline 3 and Airline 4. 
The passenger profile was obtained by revealed preference (RP) survey 
carried out at the departing lounges of GRU and CGH during the weekdays 
of two consecutive weeks [February 18 to March 1, 2002, during the peak 
hours of access to airports, i.e., from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. (morning peak) 
and from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. (afternoon peak)]. 
Since these data were collected primarily for an airport choice 
experiment, these periods were chosen because the average vehicle speeds in 
São Paulo have been measured during these peak periods by CET, a traffic 
engineering company, enabling the calculation of access time to the airports. 
Aiming at a maximization of the explanatory power of the collected data 
and a minimization of time and cost of data collection, compilation and 
analysis, 1,923 passengers were interviewed: 897 at GRU and 1,026 at CGH. 
This amount of observed data has been considered satisfactory taking into 
account Koppelman and Chu (1985) who calculated the amount of 
observations required for relatively simple disaggregate choice models. 
However, some observations have been excluded for the airline choice 
analysis. The passengers from a fifth airline were removed from this analysis 
because the ticket fare could not be obtained for the period in question. This 
did not pose a problem because this airline had few flights and covered few 
destinations. The passengers whose declared airline operated only part of the 
itinerary to the chosen destination (e.g., one leg), but not it completely, were 
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removed because the flight frequency could not be input. Therefore the final 
number of observations for the airline choice experiment was slightly less 
than that for the airport choice experiment, 1,900 passengers. 
The literature tends to classify the passenger market in a way that 
enables inferences on the airline choice made by homogeneous passenger 
segments. Table 1 presents the results of the interviews according to market 
segmentation criteria. 
Table 1. Results of the interview with passengers 
Sample segmentation criteria Number of  
passengers 
Passenger market segments 
844 Morning peak Period of departure 1056 Afternoon peak 
879 GRU Airport of departure 1021 CGH 
1387 Business Travel purpose 513 Non-business 
926 Residents Place of residence 974 Visitors 
963 Junior (up to 36 years old) Passenger age 
937 Senior (over 36 years old) 
357 Lower income (up to R$ 3k) 
1150 Middle income (between R$ 3k and R$ 10k) Household monthly Income 393 Higher income (over R$ 10k) 
385 Occasional flyers (up to 1 flight) 
502 Fairly frequent flyers (between 2 and 6 flights) 
Flying frequency (departures 
from CGH and GRU in the 
previous year) 1013 Flyers extremely frequent (over 6 flights) 
100 Car ride-and-park (paid parking) 
716 Car ride-and-kiss 
864 Taxi Access mode 
123 Bus 
793 Short-haul flights (up to 1 hour) Flight duration 1107 Long-haul flights (over 1 hour) 
817 Airline 1 
615 Airline 2 
445 Airline 3 Air carrier 
23 Airline 4 
392 Closer to GRU Proximity to airports (1) 1436 Closer to CGH 
954 Extremely closer to one airport 
388 Rather closer to one airport Proximity to airports (2) 
178 Fairly equidistant to both airports 
331 Flying to the most popular destination Popularity of the destination 1569 Flying to other destinations 
435 Loyal to CGH 
1020 Disloyal to both airports 
247 Non-experienced with airports Loyalty to airports 
198 Loyal to GRU 
Note. GRU = São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport;  CGH - São Paul-Congonhas Airport 
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Variable selection 
Three types of variables were chosen to be tested: (a) those associated 
with flight cost; (b) those related to flight frequency; and (c) those associated 
with airline performance. 
Using the conditional LOGIT model, the utility function of an 
alternative was designed as the summation of the effects of the variables pre-
multiplied by a parameter whose estimation is one of this paper’s goals. The 
model built was abstract, for example, the coefficients of the variables were 
the same for all alternative airlines. 
According to the flight destination, each passenger n, 1≤ n ≤ 1900, has 
been represented by two, three or even four generic decision functions. 
AIRLINE was a variable denoting the airline in question, ranging from 1 to 
4. COUNTER was a variable denoting the amount of airlines available for 
choice for each passenger, ranging from 2 to 4. Listed below are the utilities 
for a passenger who could choose among the four airlines: 
 
nAnAnAnA EPERFORMANCFREQUENCYCOSTV 1312111 ααα ++=   (4) 
nAnAnAnA EPERFORMANCFREQUENCYCOSTV 2322212 ααα ++=   (5) 
nAnAnAnA EPERFORMANCFREQUENCYCOSTV 3332313 ααα ++=   (6) 
nAnAnAnA EPERFORMANCFREQUENCYCOSTV 4342414 ααα ++=   (7) 
 
Listed below is the choice probability of airline 1 (A1) for this 
passenger: 
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Where: COST is a variable associated with the flight cost; 
FREQUENCY is a variable associated with the flight frequency; 
PERFORMANCE is a variable related to the airline performance in the 
market; pA1 n is the probability that passenger n chooses airline 1 (A1); αk is 
the parameter (coefficient) related to the variable k, being k = 1 for COST, k 
= 2 for FREQUENCY and k = 3 for PERFORMANCE. 
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Variables associated with cost 
 It is unconceivable to model airline choice without a variable associated 
with flight cost, since the fare is part and parcel of an airline’s marketing 
strategy. In this paper the lowest fare (LFARE) and the highest one 
(HFARE) were tested, their values expressed in Brazilian currency [Real 
(R$)] and obtained from Panrotas (2002a, 2002b).1 
 
Variables associated with flight frequency 
To portray the airlines’ level of service, twelve variables of flight 
frequency have been tested. These variables were built in terms of the 
following criteria: (a) the existence of connections or stops (direct flights, 
indirect flights and the sum of the two); (b) the travel period (morning peak 
or afternoon peak); and (c) the day of the week. In terms of the second 
criterion, the passengers were interviewed at the moments prior to their 
departure, either at the check-in lounge or at the waiting lounge. The 
morning peak was considered from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and the afternoon 
peak from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The flight frequencies across periods of the 
day and across days of the two weeks when the interviews took place were 
determined through the websites of the airlines that offer regular flights and 
operate at the analyzed airports. Only flights available at the chosen airport 
were considered for each passenger. Although the interviews had taken place 
during the weekdays, weekend flight frequency was also accounted for since 
it increases the utility associated with the alternative airline. 
For each of the built variables of frequency, its value was collected for 
the chosen airline and the airlines not chosen, using the following variables:  
1. DDPF: Direct flight frequency in the travel day and period; 
2. DDF: Direct flight frequency in the travel day; 
3. DPF: Direct flight frequency in the travel period (morning or 
afternoon peak) in all days of the week when the passenger 
traveled; 
4. DWF: Direct flight weekly frequency irrespective of day and 
period; 
5. IDPF: Indirect flight (with connections or stops) frequency in 
the travel day and period; 
6. IDF: Indirect flight frequency in the travel day;  
7. IPF: Indirect flight frequency in the travel period in all days of 
the week when the passenger traveled;  
8. IWF: Indirect flight weekly frequency irrespective of day and 
period;  
9. TDPF: Total flight (direct plus indirect) frequency in the travel 
day and period;  
                                                 
1 The exchange rate to US dollars at the time of the survey was US$ 1.00 = R$ 2.50. 
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10. TDF: Total flight frequency in the travel day; 
11. TPF: Total flight frequency in the travel period in all days of 
the week when the passenger traveled; and 
12.  TWF: Total weekly flight frequency irrespective of day and 
period. 
 
Variables related to airline performance 
It is recognized that there is a myriad of variables that serve as 
candidates to represent airline performance. However, some of them require 
a specific question in the RP survey, such as rating airline overall image 
according to each passenger. Since the sample of this paper was primarily 
collected for an airport choice experiment, variables requiring a question 
could not be tested. To portray the airline performance, the airline age 
(AGE) was tested. This variable is easy to get even after the passenger 
survey took place, and it represents the number of years the airline has been 
in the market. This variable is able to portray recognition, image or simply 
market habit. 
 
Considerations for the models 
The value of the variables was input directly in the decision function, 
without any mathematical modification, enabling the immediate analysis of 
the tradeoffs between the variables pertaining to the same model (what 
happened in the models with 3 variables). To begin with, 39 models were 
calibrated. Variables belonging to the same category did not take part of the 
same model. 
Supposing a model considering three variables, Table 2 presents the 
values of these variables, which a fictitious passenger may have faced. It is 
also supposed that he or she flew Airline 1 from CGH to PLU, departing in 
the afternoon peak of February 25, 2002. 
Table 2. Variables of lowest fare, direct flight frequency in the travel day and period and 
airline age for a fictitious passenger 
CHOICE AIRLINE COUNTER LFARE DDPF AGE 
1 1 4 372 3 75 
0 2 4 480 3 41 
0 3 4 337 1 69 
0 4 4 184 1 1 
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RESULTS 
Models containing one explanatory variable 
Fifteen models belonging to this category were built, using one by one 
the 15 variables selected in the previous section of this paper. The 
comparison among these models brings out the variable with the best 
explanatory power on airline choice in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. 
Table 3 presents the calibration results of these models. 
The signals for the coefficients were positive as expected in the case of 
FREQUENCY and PERFORMANCE. Indeed a higher supply of flights and 
a longer airline are desired and their increase increases airline choice. 
However, in the case of COST the signals were positive while negative was 
expected. A possible explanation for this outcome is that the cheapest airline 
was offering few flights, so passengers overwhelmingly failed to choose the 
cheapest airline. 
Table 3. Models with one explanatory variable 
Model Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Average 
probability of 
correct 
prediction 
Average 
probability of 
the alternative 
not chosen 
1 LFARE 0.0059 16.531 0.3609 0.2791 
2 HFARE 0.0020 10.083 0.3307 0.2923 
3 DDPF 0.2547 11.620 0.3364 0.2898 
4 DDF 0.0530 10.821 0.3341 0.2908 
5 DPF 0.0395 11.445 0.3358 0.2900 
6 DWF 0.0090 10.971 0.3349 0.2904 
7 IDPF 0.0808 7.850 0.3240 0.2952 
8 IDF 0.0164 7.318 0.3224 0.2959 
9 IPF 0.0135 7.904 0.3241 0.2951 
10 IWF 0.0030 7.567 0.3229 0.2957 
11 TDPF 0.0841 10.814 0.3320 0.2917 
12 TDF 0.0174 10.303 0.3297 0.2927 
13 TPF 0.0138 10.817 0.3321 0.2917 
14 TWF 0.0031 10.607 0.3307 0.2922 
15 AGE 0.0183 15.200 0.3497 0.2840 
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The t-Student statistics were satisfactory, presenting a modulus higher 
than 2, whereas the null p-value in all the cases also indicated satisfactory 
participation of the variables in the models. The calibration of the models 
with one variable revealed an average probability of correct prediction 
between 0.3224 and 0.3609, an average probability of the alternative not 
chosen between 0.2791 and 0.2959. The average probability of correct 
prediction was 2.65% to 8.18% higher than the average probability of the 
alternative not chosen, what is least desired. There was little likelihood that 
the average probability of correct prediction would be higher than 50% since 
the airline market in the region is very much competitive and all airlines 
have desired attributes from the passenger point of view. Since in most cases 
there are 3 or 4 airlines competing, an acceptable value should be higher than 
33% or 25% respectively, what was found in fact. 
The extremes of associability with the dependent variable were the 
model with the best associability (LFARE – lowest fare) and the model with 
the worst associability (IDF – indirect flight frequentcy in the travel day). 
Indeed the lowest fare is an essential tool the airlines use to attract the 
passengers, whereas indirect flights are poorly regarded by passengers. 
Regarding the variables associated with the flight cost, the lowest fare 
(LFARE) was the most significant one, possibly because it means saving 
money to a higher extent than the highest fare, and this does not appeal to the 
passengers who are choosing an airline for their flights.  
Among the variables of frequency, direct flight frequency in the travel 
day and period (DDPF) showed the best explanatory power on airline choice 
in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. From the point of view of a connection 
or a stop on the way to the destination, the supply of direct flights better 
explained airline choice. It is evident that delays produced by a connection 
or a stop are undesired due to the loss of time, since rapidity is the main 
advantage of choosing the air mode of travel. Since total frequency of flights 
enhances the number of direct flights, it occupied second place in the 
ranking, better explaining airline choice than the variables of purely indirect 
flight frequency. 
Among the variables of direct flight frequency, ranging from the one 
which best explains the airline choice to the one that has the lowest 
explanatory power, it was found: frequency in the travel day and period 
(DDPF), frequency in the travel period in all days of the week when the 
passenger traveled (DPF), frequency irrespective of day and period (DWF) 
and frequency in the travel day (DDF), respectively. The difference among 
the quality of the adjustment found was not significant, albeit perceivable. It 
was found that passengers are more prone to shift their departure date than 
their departure period of the day. Moreover, the departure period of the day 
(represented by DPF) was more significant than the day of departure itself 
(represented by DDF). 
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A possible explanation for the better adjustment of frequency of the 
departure period in all days of the week when the passenger traveled (DPF) 
in comparison to frequency in the travel day (DDF) is that passengers may 
show availability along the week to make their trips, but appointments with 
which they fulfill their schedule along the day may be regarded as a priority. 
For instance, on the one hand consider a businessman that must depart in the 
early morning from São Paulo to participate at a meeting at 10:00 a.m. in 
Belo Horizonte. On one hand there are plural options of days along the week 
when this meeting could be held; on the other hand, there is only one option 
of the period of time during the day which the meeting could be held. As 
another example, consider a worker living in São Paulo that decides to spend 
one week in the seaside of Rio de Janeiro beaches. To vary the period of 
departure along the day may mean poor scheduling of his trip, whereas it 
would not differ much if his trip were scheduled in the first or in the second 
week of his one month vacation. 
Among the variables of indirect flight frequency, ranging from the one 
which best explains airline choice to the one that has the lowest explanatory 
power, it was found: frequency in the travel period in all days of the week 
when the passenger traveled (IPF), frequency in the travel day and period 
(IDPF), frequency irrespective of day and period (IWF) and frequency in the 
travel day (IDF), respectively. In this group the difference was not that big. 
On the other hand, the frequency along the week keeping the period of 
departure was more significant probably because the activities to be held at 
destination are scheduled in certain periods of the day. 
Among the variables of total flight frequency, ranging from the one 
which best explains airline choice to the one that has the lowest explanatory 
power, it was found: frequency in the travel period in all days of the week 
when the passenger traveled (TPF), frequency in the travel day and period 
(TDPF), frequency irrespective of day and period (TWF), and frequency in 
the travel day (TDF), respectively. In this group the difference was not 
significant. Once again the frequency along the week of the period of 
departure was more important probably as a result of activities to be 
accomplished at destination occurring in certain periods of the day. 
Finally, the airline age (AGE) was the second variable best explaining 
airline choice process, only loosing to the lowest fare (LFARE). The airline 
age represents the length of time of the airline's presence in the market, the 
result of airline marketing strategies and the perseverance of a company 
which may have faced difficulties but succeeded in staying longer and is 
probably well-known by the majority of the nationals who usually rely on air 
transportation to develop their activities. 
 Moreno 37 
 
 
Models containing three explanatory variables 
Among the models with three variables, 24 models have been tested, 
using all combinations of three variables among the 15 variables selected in 
the previous section, paying attention not to include in the same model 
variables of the same type. Therefore, for instance, total weekly flight 
frequency irrespective of day and period (TWF) and direct weekly flight 
frequency irrespective of day and period (DWF) were not tested in the same 
model specification because both of them are variables of the same flight 
frequency. 
The models considering three variables enable the evaluation of the 
tradeoffs passengers face between the best choice variables of their airline 
selection. The best model for the entire sample considered the lowest fare 
(LFARE), the direct flight frequency in the day and period of departure 
(DDPF) and the airline age (AGE). This model was selected for further 
analysis of passenger market segments. The result of its calibration is shown 
in Table 4. 
Table 4. Calibrations of the best model across market segments 
Market segments Lowest Fare 
Direct Flight 
Frequency in 
the Travel Day 
and Period 
Airline Age 
Entire Sample 0.0067 0.1103 0.0227 
Passengers departing from GRU - 0.0006 0.5110 0.0211 
Passengers departing from CGH 0.0072 0.0664 0.0228 
Junior passengers 0.0053 0.1483 0.0207 
Senior passengers 0.0084 0.0648 0.0253 
 
It was also verified that in the models with three variables the signals of 
FARE were positive, and the explanation for this outcome is that passengers 
failed to choose the low-cost/low fare airline which was offering few flights 
but exhibited a great potential for expansion, what is now verified at the time 
of this publication, three years after the survey. Besides, the signals of the 
variables of indirect flight frequency were unexpectedly negative in the 
models where they appeared with LFARE. This did not pose a problem 
because these models did not present the highest average probability of the 
chosen alternative. Lastly, the signal of AGE was positive as expected in all 
the models of three variables, possibly as a result of a passenger preference 
for airlines longer in the market. 
The t-Student statistics (whose presentation was omitted) were 
satisfactory in the case of the models containing variables of direct flight 
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frequency, presenting a modulus higher than 2. However, the models 
considering variables of indirect and total flight frequency, when associated 
with LFARE and AGE, produced t-Student statistics lower than 2 in 
modulus. Likewise, the p-value was somewhat high for the variables of 
frequency pertaining to these models. Therefore these models were regarded 
of lower reliability. The calibration of the models with three variables 
revealed an average probability of correct prediction between 0.3577 and 
0.3899, an average probability of the alternative not chosen between 0.2664 
and 0.2805. The average probability of correct prediction was 7.72% to 
12.35% higher than the average probability of the alternative not chosen, 
what meant a reasonable improvement compared to the models of one 
variable. Once again, there was little likelihood that the average probability 
of correct prediction would be higher than 50%, even in a model of three 
variables, since the airlines face tight competition, each one specializing in 
one asset, be it the flight cost, the flight frequency or the airline performance. 
Since in most cases there are 3 or 4 airlines competing, then an acceptable 
value should be higher than 33% or 25% respectively, what happened in fact. 
The best associability with the dependent variable was the model 
considering lowest fare (LFARE), frequency in the travel day and period 
(DDPF) and airline age (AGE). While the least associability with the 
dependent variable was the model considering highest fare (HFARE), 
frequency in the travel day (DDF) and airline age (AGE). Indeed having the 
lowest fare is an essential tool the airlines use to attract passengers, as 
opposed to the highest one. What was unexpected was that the worst model 
did not contain a variable of indirect flight frequency. 
To analyze the tradeoffs between the variables of the best model, it is 
verified that the coefficient of direct flight frequency in the travel day and 
period (DDPF) is 16.46 times higher in modulus than that of LFARE. 
Therefore, through this model it is inferred that passengers pay R$ 16.46 to 
bear the absence of each direct flight in the travel day and period to the 
desired destination supplied by this airline. This result is counterintuitive, 
albeit explained by the fact that the airline offering cheaper tickets had few 
flights so few passengers could actually choose this airline. 
Moreover, the coefficient of AGE is 3.39 times greater in modulus than 
LFARE. Therefore, through this model it is inferred that passengers agree to 
pay R$ 3.39 more for the travel ticket for each year the chosen airline is 
younger. This result is also counterintuitive, albeit explained by the fact that 
the airline offering cheaper tickets was the youngest (a new entrant) and few 
passengers actually chose this airline. 
Last but not least, the coefficient of direct flight frequency in the travel 
day and period (DDPF) is 4.86 times higher in modulus than that of AGE. 
Therefore, through this model it is inferred that the chosen airline may be 
five years younger than the passenger desires in exchange for each direct 
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flight in the travel day and period to the desired destination supplied by this 
airline. This result is expected and intuitive. 
 
Analysis of models in terms of passenger market segments 
Having found the model with higher probability of the chosen 
alternative, which considered the variables the lowest fare (FARE), direct 
flight frequency in the day and period of departure (DDPF) and airline age 
(AGE), the passengers were segmented by airport of departure and passenger 
age, as Table 4 shows. 
The signal of the coefficient of LFARE is negative, as expected for 
passengers departing from GRU (the expected passenger behavior is to select 
the airline with lower fares). Moreno and Muller (2004) showed that airport 
choice performed by passengers from GRU is not well explained by access 
time savings, so what really counts for these passengers is saving money 
with air fares. Moreover, the low-cost/low fare airline was not operating in 
GRU at the time of the interview with passengers; therefore, the fares 
offered to passengers in GRU were rather similar across airlines. This is 
interesting because at CGH there was the low-cost/low fare airline, but it 
offered few flights, so there was the possibility of flying this airline, but few 
passengers could do this in fact. On the other hand, passengers departing 
from CGH may also have been somehow careless about saving money with 
air tickets, probably because they are more worried about choosing the closer 
airport and end up choosing more expensive airlines. 
Passengers from GRU place eight times more importance on direct 
flight frequency in the day and period of departure than those from CGH. 
This fact shows that passengers from GRU care very much about airline 
level of service and are aware of airline competition. However, Moreno and 
Muller (2004) showed that passengers probably do not consult flights from a 
competing airport, since their airport choice is not based on the rationality of 
an increase of flight supply. 
Following on, passengers from CGH place more importance on airline 
age. CGH is also the older airport in the region, now aged more than 65 
years old, whereas GRU is only 20 years old. Airline age is the result of 
succeeding in the market for several decades, and this is more promptly 
recognized by passengers departing from the oldest airport.  
Senior passengers (over 36 years of age) are more careless about ticket 
price but place more importance on airline age. Senior passengers may have 
started flying late in life, so they are less concerned about prices of air 
tickets, but as a result of having lived longer, they may be more aware of 
airline marketing and announcing efforts than junior passengers (up to 36 
years of age), so they are more worried about the variable of airline 
performance. 
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Finally, junior passengers place more importance on direct flight 
frequency in the day and period of departure. One easy way of consulting 
flight frequency is through the Internet, which appeals more to younger 
travelers, what can explain this result. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Aiming at analyzing airline choice carried out by passengers departing 
the São Paulo Metropolitan Area, conditional LOGIT model was used as a 
modeling tool. Decision functions for each passenger were built, one for the 
chosen airline and one for each airline not chosen. Several specifications for 
the decision function were tested. These specifications enhanced 
independent variables pertaining to 3 groups: (a) variables related to flight 
cost; (b) variables accounting for flight frequency available at the analyzed 
airports; and (c) one variable associated with airline performance. The 
decision functions were built considering one or three of the variables 
described above, taking care not to mix variables of the same group in one 
model. The specification that produced the model most adjusted to the data 
(evaluated in terms of the highest average probability of the correct 
prediction) enhanced the following variables: lowest fare; direct flight 
frequency in the day and period of departure; and airline age. 
Using the variables obtained from the best model, airline choice was 
analyzed segmenting the passenger market by departure airport and 
passenger age. From the analysis of the results achieved with the data 
collected for this work and for the region treated in this paper, it is possible 
to affirm the following: 
1. The lowest fare is the factor that can best explain airline choice, 
despite its positive signal. 
2. The variables of direct flight frequency exhibit better explanatory 
power on airline choice than variables of total flight frequency and 
the variables of total flight frequency exhibit better explanatory 
power on airline choice than variables of indirect flight frequency. 
3. Airline age is the second best factor explaining airline choice. 
4. Airline choice made by passengers departing from GRU is well 
explained by money savings, as opposed to airline choice made by 
passengers from CGH, which is not. 
5. Airline age is more important for senior passengers, whereas the 
direct flight frequency in the day and period of departure is more 
important for junior passengers. 
 
The recommendations are addressed to each group connected directly or 
indirectly with air transport activity. These recommendations were made up 
from this work, being restricted to its characteristics, such as seasonality of 
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the interviews along the year, the existing politic and economic scenario, 
delimitation of the trip origin region, studied destinations, model 
specifications and variables employed in the modeling. It is recognized that 
to put into practice any of these recommendations, caution is necessary as is 
validation of the conclusions of this work through periodic evaluations 
(studies) of airline choice in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. 
Since the airline choice at GRU is the result of money savings while at 
CGH it is not, this paper highlights that airline managers should have 
implemented a policy of higher fares in CGH and lower fares in GRU at the 
time of the interviews. Moreover, passengers departing from CGH and 
senior passengers should be focused by airline marketing strategies, as they 
are the market segments that most recognize airlines' efforts to stay longer in 
the market and airline performance, denoted by the variable airline age. 
Finally, airport managers should encourage airlines to schedule regular 
flights in the passengers’ preferred day and period of departure, because at 
both airports airline choice is the result of an increase in the airline's level of 
service, denoted by the variable flight frequency. 
Three alternatives are proposed to extend the research on airline choice 
in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area: (a) analyzing the importance of the 
variables pertaining to the best model across market segments according to 
other relevant criteria; (b) exploring other variables that may influence 
airline choice, such as the overall image of each airline according to 
passengers’ opinions and a variable accounting for the flight schedule; and 
(c) carrying out airline choice research for international flights departing 
from GRU. 
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ABSTRACT 
Due to existing slot and infrastructure constraints at international hub-and-spoke 
airports, an increase in feeder traffic seems only possible if larger feeder aircraft are 
used. Using a case study of Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt International 
Airport, three possible A380 routes (Beijing, Tokyo-Narita, Los Angeles) were 
examined to assess the extent to which delays of feeder traffic may impact the 
economic performance of very large aircraft. On the basis of today’s delays and 
anticipated traffic growth in the future, we found that between 9.5% and 13.5% of 
connecting passengers are unable to transfer to their respective intercontinental 
flights. In addition, the results demonstrate that a further increase in delays can be 
detrimental to the profitable operation of very large aircraft, as demonstrated by two 
out of three simulated routes. We suggest options for airlines operating very large 
aircraft to counteract the negative impacts of feeder delays. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction of the A380, airlines need to fill a larger plane 
with more passengers to achieve profitability (Pilling, 2005a; Thompson, 
2005a). Due to existing slot and infrastructure constraints at international 
hub-and-spoke airports, an increase in feeder traffic only seems possible if 
larger feeder aircraft are used. Delays of these larger aircraft and, thus the 
possibility of missing a connecting A380 flight, could impact profitability. 
Since traffic volume at secondary feeder airports and air route congestion are 
likely to increase, the risk of delays is expected to grow. 
Recent research into delays in air transportation has identified: (a) 
reasons behind air traffic delays (Mayer & Sinai, 2003); (b) reasons behind 
airport delays (Hansen, 2002; Reynolds-Feighan & Button, 1999); (c) airline 
recovery policies (Rosenberger et al., 2002); and (d) implications for 
policymakers (Golaszewski, 2002). However, the impact of feeder delays on 
airline profitability has not been a prominent topic in the literature so far. We 
argue that for airlines operating very large aircraft, such as the A380 in a 
hub-and-spoke environment, the increasing level of air traffic delays may 
become a critical issue in terms of scheduling and profitability. 
In this paper, we simulate the effects of feeder delays on A380 
operations using a case study of Lufthansa German Airline (LH) at Frankfurt 
International Airport (FRA) to assess implications on load factors and 
profitability. Based on our findings, we suggest a set of possible 
countermeasures which may alleviate the negative effects of feeder delays. 
THE ROLE OF FEEDER DELAYS FOR THE SUCCESS OF MEGA-
CARRIER OPERATIONS 
The hub-and-spoke philosophy 
To a large extent air traffic on intercontinental routes is organized 
according to the hub-and-spoke system. Instead of having several point-to-
point connections, a hub-and-spoke network is based on the idea of 
bundling. All connections are routed over the respective airline hub in order 
to bundle incoming and outgoing airline passengers and to reallocate them 
via the hub airport. This technique enables the airlines to cover significantly 
more markets with the same amount of flights than would be covered within 
a point-to-point network structure (Auerbach & Delfmann, 2005). In 
addition, a hub-and-spoke network leads to economies of scope and, 
consequently, to cost savings arising from increased load-factors between the 
hub-to-hub connections (Pompl, 2002). The downside of the hub-and-spoke 
philosophy is the higher complexity in terms of scheduling feeding flights to 
and connecting flights from the hub airport. Since incoming and outgoing 
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patterns at hubs are organized in highly complex and interdependent waves,1 
the minimum connecting time (MCT) becomes a highly relevant issue. The 
MCT specifies the period of time that is allowable at the airport to transfer 
passengers and luggage between flights.2 Thus, incoming traffic which does 
not meet the MCT will not be available to fill the aircraft of the outgoing 
wave. Given this situation, it becomes obvious that major airline hubs rely 
heavily on punctual feeding traffic to be able to profitably organize their 
scheduled operations. 
On most routes, the new Airbus A380 will require an efficiently 
operating hub-and-spoke network since the local traffic is insufficient to fill 
planes at profitable levels. The efficiency of such a hub-and-spoke system is 
challenged for two reasons: (a) massive increase in capacity through A380 
operations, and (b) rising level of traffic delays. The combination of both 
factors will have negative impacts on A380 operations. 
 
The capacity issue 
Depending on the outlay, an A380 aircraft may provide 130 more seats 
than an average Boeing 747-400 aircraft.3 With a seating capacity of 550 
seats and an average break-even load factor of 70%, 385 seats need to be 
filled in order to reach profitability. Thus, a load factor of 70% for the new 
mega-carrier A380 is equivalent to a 100% load factor of the current 
flagship, the B747-400, with about 390 seats. 
A distinction can be made between three sources of additional passenger 
volume (in a hub-and-spoke network). The first and most likely option is the 
utilization of larger feeder aircraft coming from destinations with higher 
passenger potential (e.g., for the Frankfurt case from other major airports 
such as Amsterdam, Paris or Madrid). Thus, these origin and destination 
(O/D) pairs will become increasingly more important as they provide a 
larger percentage of feeding traffic to the hub. Consequently, a cancellation 
or delay of one of these major feeders causes a profitability problem for the 
airlines since a significant portion of passengers for the outgoing A380 
aircraft is missing. 
                                                 
1  The term wave or bank describes the bundled incoming or outgoing traffic (i.e., 
group of flights), which is designed to allow for a seamless and efficient transfer 
between flights, whereas the combination of an incoming and the following outgoing 
wave is referred to as a complex (Holloway, 2003).  
2  The minimum connecting time differs from airport to airport depending on various 
criteria such as airport layout, capacity, congestion levels, etc. (Hanlon, 1999). 
3  See Pilling, 2005b, p. 44. Compared to the planned LH configuration with 550 
seats (see Thompson, 2005b, p. 11) an A380 provides additional capacity for even 
160 passengers. 
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The second option would be to increase frequencies and, thus, to bring 
in a larger number of feeder flights before the departure of the mega carrier. 
The implications of this alternative are twofold. First, scheduling and 
coordination complexity increases as the new flights have to be linked with 
the overall schedule and the additional passenger and baggage volume must 
be handled accordingly. Second, the connectivity ratio4 decreases as the 
waiting time for those passengers who arrive in earlier waves becomes 
longer compared to the existing status quo. Probably the strongest arguments 
against this option are the existing slot scarcity and capacity constraints at 
major hub airports. 
The last option would be to increase the catchment area of the respective 
hub, that is, its originating traffic. For example, FRA is trying to attract more 
passengers by linking the airport to the German high-speed train network. 
This seems to be a very reasonable option as the originating traffic is usually 
less vulnerable to punctuality issues. However, this option leads to a 
significant financial investment compared to its observable impact on 
passenger numbers.  
Due to the problems described above, airlines at major hub airports will 
probably need to rely on the option of larger aircraft to feed their flights. 
 
Effects of air traffic delays on airline profitability 
Accurate data on delays became widely available in the late 1990s 
when the Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA) at EUROCONTROL 
was established. CODA publishes monthly delay reports.5 However, the 
available data does not reveal a clear long-term trend as the statistics have 
been strongly influenced by various external factors.6 Referring to the data 
from the past two years—which can be considered as being relatively 
unbiased—there is strong evidence that the level of delays will increase in 
the future. Compared to 2003 the average delay per movement (ADM) used 
as an indicator for the overall level of delays, increased by 4.9% to 10.4 
minutes for arrivals in 2004 (CODA, 2004). The data from the first eight 
                                                 
4   The connectivity ratio refers to “the degree to which linkages are more than purely 
random” at hub airports (Doganis, 2002, p. 258). 
5  These reports are mainly based on data reported by the Association of European 
Airlines, by the Central Flow Management Units at EUROCONTROL, and by the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
6  Among these effects was the Balkan war in 1998/99 which contributed to a 
significant increase in air traffic delays due to severe military action in Europe 
(+29.2% in 1999). In contrast, other incidents with global implications such as the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 (-27.0% in 2002), and the SARS epidemic in 2003 (-7.0% in 
2003) which lead to a major decrease in air traffic delays since the overall traffic 
volume decreased drastically. 
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months of 2005 shows an ADM of 10.8 minutes for arrivals, which represent 
an increase of 3.8% compared to 2004 (CODA, 2005). 
Each passenger who misses a connecting flight due to delays of feeding 
aircraft reduces the profit of an airline.7 In the worst case scenario, the 
number of delayed passengers is so high that the outgoing aircraft does not 
reach its break-even load factor.8 
In summary, the combination of both the capacity increase due to the 
introduction of the A380 and the increasing level of flight delays have 
significant effects on the overall profitability of airline operations. Although 
not all of the described effects are unique to the A380 case, the mega carrier 
takes the stated problem areas into another dimension compared to the B747 
level. 
SAMPLING AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The data 
Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt International Airport as a case 
study 
LH is the largest carrier in Germany and one of the leading carriers in 
Europe. With a total order volume of 15 A380 as of 2005, LH is currently 
the second most important customer for the new Airbus A380—topped only 
by Emirates Airlines of Dubai. LH’s main home base is FRA in Germany, 
Continental Europe’s largest airport. In 2004, FRA served over 51 million 
passengers, handled about 1.8 million tons of cargo and operated 
approximately 480,000 aircraft movements. It currently ranks number seven 
among the world’s largest passenger airports and is one of the world’s most 
important intercontinental hubs. This traffic was achieved with the help of a 
three runway system.9 FRA is operating almost entirely at congestion levels, 
which makes it one of the most slot constrained airports in Europe.  
                                                 
7   Experts already claim that due to the high level of delays a reliable operation of 
European hubs cannot be ensured (Klingenberg, 2001). 
8  The respective no-show passenger due to feeder delays leads to compensation 
payments and reduces the number of available seats on later flights to the respective 
destination. 
9  Of the currently available three runways one is only open for take-offs, which 
results in bottlenecks during peak-hours for landing aircraft. The construction of a 
fourth runway, which would be open only for landings, has been slowed-down by 
long-term political and security discussions. 
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The demand data 
A selection of the most probable routes has been chosen on which LH 
plans to operate the A380.10 For these routes historic demand figures were 
analyzed and projected for the first year of permanent operation of the A380 
in 2008. 
The data set was mainly compiled from booking data from the airline 
Global Distribution Systems, which was then adjusted with various 
correction factors to account for missing bookings (e.g., own sales of the 
airline) as well as for itineraries not flown. These calibration processes 
resulted in true passenger demand figures for 2004, the total being 
approximately 73,000 passengers. All analyses were performed on a true 
O/D basis. A total of 4,587 itineraries were considered. All data was 
analyzed for a typical week, that is, a week that did not show specific peaks 
or off-peaks due to major sports events, vacation traffic or holiday 
downturns. Weekday specific variations were balanced out by including all 
traffic days and by not neglecting the typically higher (e.g., Monday) or 
lower (e.g., Thursday) traffic days. 
Demand for 2008 was forecasted by applying country-related specific 
forecasts to each sector covered in the data set. Thus, the current IATA 
international passenger forecasts were applied to each single relation (e.g., 
Germany-to-Japan or South Africa-to-United States), resulting in a 
calculated demand for each relation.11 The result is a forecast demand table 
for the potential A380 routes, reflecting not only the expected future traffic 
development of the German market, but also of each respective single 
country-to-country market. In total, 1,188 country pairs were analyzed and 
projected to 2008 demand levels, resulting in a total demand of about 90,000 
passengers for the sample week. 
 
The supply data 
For the selected routes an evaluation of the current LH operating 
patterns was performed. Also, for a set of 8 routes—covering several Asian 
and North American destinations, as well as Johannesburg—a deeper 
analysis was performed covering several weeks in 2004. Thus, the past 
passenger numbers on the specific flights were evaluated to again verify the 
general demand data generated in an earlier step. This made it possible to 
determine real load factors during the research period, which have been used 
to develop possible operating patterns for 2008. We presuppose that the 
                                                 
10  Currently, about 15-20 potential destinations are being discussed as potential 
A380 destinations from FRA. These include airports in Asia, the Middle East, North 
America and South Africa. 
11   For those country pairs that were not covered in the IATA forecast, an average 
growth rate for the respective regions was applied. 
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current load factors are a benchmark which will also be reached by the 
A380. 
We discuss the results of our study for three of those eight routes, 
namely FRA-to-Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK), FRA-to-Tokyo 
Narita International Airport (NRT) and FRA-to-Los Angeles International 
Airport (LAX). These destinations do not only represent routes to different 
geographical regions, they are also representative of fast developing markets 
such as East Asia and China as well as the more saturated North American 
market, and are therefore the best examples for further discussion within the 
context of this paper. Based on the previous findings, several potential 
operating patterns were evaluated, using typical service patterns as a basis 
and the identified past seat load factors. 
Table 1. Case study base data, Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt 
International Airport (FRA) to three destinations 
Number of itineraries considered 4,587 
Number of country pairs analyzed and projected to 2008 1,188 
Total number of feeder origin airports 166 
Total number of analyzed feeder flights 97,035 
To Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK): 
To Tokyo-Narita International Airport (NRT): 
To Los Angeles International Airport (LAX): 
15,678 
17,892 
16,039 
 
To distribute the forecasted passenger demand—which in our case study 
accounts for the demand of a total week—amongst a specific number of 
flights within this week, it was necessary to define the operational pattern for 
the destinations in question. This allows us to evaluate respective load 
factors and the profitability situation of each single flight. 
It was assumed that any operation below 7/7 (daily flights) would be 
inadequate, while any pattern above 14/7 (twice daily) for the A380 seemed 
unrealistic. Additionally, patterns of 10/7 and 12/7 were analyzed, both of 
which reflect typical standard operational models in the industry. A 12/7 
pattern reflects daily flights accompanied by second flights each working 
day, while the 10/7 operational pattern consists of a daily flight along with a 
second flight every other weekday. For these calculations, the expected 
capacity of the A380 of 550 in the standard LH layout was used.12  
                                                 
12  It is important to realize that five A380 flights account for the same number of 
capacity offered per week as a daily B747-400 flight with 390 seats per flight. Thus, 
from a capacity point of view the 12/7 scenario is equivalent in terms of offered 
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A scenario combining two A380 flights on peak days with one A380 
flight and one B747-400 flight on low-demand days has not been considered 
due to the operational complexity and costs of such an operational pattern. 
The flight deck and cabin crews do not usually hold the type rating for such 
different aircraft types but operate either the Boeing or the Airbus fleet. A 
mixed operation based on an alternation of both aircraft types therefore 
results in the need to account for longer layovers for the crews at the 
destination and thus considerably higher crew costs. These are accompanied 
by the need to provide technical crews and spare parts for both aircraft types 
at each destination—directly or indirectly by using partner companies. 
Nevertheless, both approaches of guaranteeing reliable operations from the 
technical point of view result in additional costs. In sum, the mentioned facts 
seem to make a mixed operation an unfavorable option which has therefore 
been disregarded in our analyses. 
Based on the current operations as offered by LH on the FRA-to-PEK 
and FRA-to-NRT routes, we feel that the 12/7 pattern of A380 operations is 
the preferred option for analyzing the situation in 2008. The generated 
demand figures for 2008, reflecting the high-growth markets in South-East 
Asia, support that decision. For FRA-to-LAX, one of the gateways to the far 
more saturated North American air transport market, a 7/7 operational 
pattern was considered, offering a single daily A380 flight. 
 
The delay data 
While the route specific traffic forecasts are a means of identifying 
potential A380 markets, this study focuses on an analysis of the impact of 
delays of feeder flights on the success of such operations. Thus, to provide a 
basis for our scenarios a comprehensive analysis of past delays at FRA was 
undertaken. All relevant feeder flights, identified in the booking data as 
linking the true origins of the passengers with FRA, were selected for the 
year 2004. For the three chosen destinations, a total of 166 origin airports 
had to be considered, leading to a total of 97,035 flights from these airports 
to FRA in 2004. For those flights the respective actual delays for each single 
day of the year were collected.  
Only those flights which had a scheduled arrival time of between 2 
hours and 45 minutes before the scheduled time of departure of the long-haul 
flight were selected for our simulation. The total number of feeder flights 
relevant for these analyses was 15,678 for FRA-to-PEK, 16,039 for FRA-to-
LAX and 17,892 for FRA-to-NRT. We assume that existing waves and bank 
patterns will also be kept for the introduction of the A380. We also assume 
that it will be possible to maintain the current minimum connecting time of 
                                                                                                        
capacity to the combination of a daily A380 flight with a daily B747-400 flight on the 
same route or the currently used 14/7 pattern employing B747-400. 
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45 minutes at FRA and that every itinerary including a missed connection 
time of more than 2 hours is not likely to experience critical delays in terms 
of missed connections.13 If a feeder connection had more than one feeding 
flight, we thus attributed 50% of the respective passengers to the last arriving 
feeder flight. The remaining 50% were equally distributed between the 
earlier flights. 
A distinction can be made between two classes of feeder flights. The 
first class is typical short- and medium-haul flights within Germany and 
Europe, of up to 2.5 hours of total flying time. These account for the 
majority of feeder flights in any typical hub structure. The second class is 
intercontinental feeder flights. These long-haul flights serve passengers who 
have to transfer at the hub between two intercontinental flights, thus only 
remaining on the European continent for a change of aircraft, for example, a 
connection from Dubai-to-LAX. Table 2 summarizes the data taken into 
account for our analyses. 
However, the descriptive data also reveals that the proportion of 
simulated feeder passengers differs for the selected destinations. While 
92.2% (FRA-to-PEK) and 83.9% (FRA-to-NRT) of all feeder passengers are 
included in the simulation, for the FRA-to-LAX connection only 68.5% of 
the feeder passengers will be simulated. This shows that a large percentage 
of passengers connecting to LAX arrive at FRA early enough to allow for 
delays of their respective feeder aircraft, thus they do not miss connecting 
flights. Hence, it can be expected that the FRA-to-LAX flight tends to be 
less affected by profitability problems which may arise due to feeder delays. 
The results are previous punctuality patterns for each feeder flight 
within 2 hours and the minimum connecting time before the A380 departure 
for the three selected routes. Together with the demand data which was 
developed earlier, these results form the basis of our scenarios for the 
evaluation of changes in the delay situation and their impact on the 
operations of the A380. Differentiating between level 1 (non-coordinated 
airport), level 2 (schedules facilitated airport), and level 3 (fully coordinated 
airport) airports,14 our analysis shows varying levels of delays for feeders 
coming from these destinations. We see an ADM of 9.96 minutes for level 1, 
9.32 minutes for level 2, and 12.13 minutes for level 3 airports, that is, the 
                                                 
13  Experience shows, that almost 95% of all flights are booked from the first screen 
on the computer reservation systems, which are arranged by total travel time. With 
longer transit times at hub airports, the flights switch to the following screen pages 
and thus are more unlikely to be booked. 
14  The basis for our classification is the structure used by IATA in their World 
Scheduling Guidelines. Thus, we distinguish between fully coordinated (level 3), 
schedule facilitated (level 2) and non coordinated (level 1) airports. See IATA, 2005. 
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delays at hub airports (level 3) are 2.17 and 2.81 minutes higher compared to 
lower level airports, respectively. 
Table 2. Descriptive data of chosen flights analyzed for case study: Lufthansa German 
Airlines at Frankfurt International Airport (FRA) to 3 destinations 
 FRA-to-Beijing 
Capital 
International 
Airport (PEK)  
FRA-to-
Tokyo-Narita 
International 
Airport (NRT) 
FRA-to-Los 
Angeles 
International 
Airport (LAX) 
Passengers per week 5214.7 5369.6 3142.8 
Chosen operating patterns 12/7 12/7 7/7 
Envisaged load factor 79.0 % 81.4 % 81.6 % 
Percentage of connecting passengers 55.1 % 63.1 % 63.2 % 
Total feeder passengers 239.29 282.22 283.72 
Simulated feeder passengers 220.60 236.81 194.47 
Proportion of simulated feeder 
passengers 
92.2% 83.9% 68.5% 
Number of simulated feeding flights 164 171 146 
Time of departure 4:20 pm 11:45 am 11:30 am 
 
 
The simulation model 
The number of transported passengers for each A380 flight is the sum of 
all connecting passengers arriving prior to a specified minimum connecting 
time of 45 minutes and the passengers originating at the hub airport. The past 
delays are incorporated into the model by constructing empirical delay 
distributions. Our model uses these empirical delay distributions and 
attempts to determine whether feeder flights transfer their respective 
connecting passengers to one single A380 flight, the same being repeated for 
j simulation runs with j=1,…..,M. We then calculate the difference between 
the potential transferring passengers and the average simulated amount of 
passengers boarding the A380 as well as the percentage of simulated flights 
not reaching the break-even load factor. 
Each feeder flight is scheduled to arrive at a particular time hi of the day, 
with i=1,…,N representing the set of feeder flights.15 The number of 
connecting passengers pi is deterministic, derived as described in the 
                                                 
15  Arrival times were taken from current schedules, which are timed to feed the 
current B747-400 operations on the routes analyzed. 
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paragraph above. Frequencies for A380 legs were determined by comparing 
total traffic demand per week with resulting estimated load factors of a 
chosen frequency, as well as with current frequency levels of B747-400 
operations. This led to the aforementioned operating pattern of 12 flights per 
week to the Asian destinations (PEK and NRT) analyzed and a daily flight to 
LAX. 
Given a departure time HA380 for one A380 operation, we can then 
calculate individual cut-off times ti in minutes for each feeder flight after its 
scheduled arrival time:  
 
iAi hHt −−= )45( 380 .    (1) 
We introduce the delay time jid ,  which represents the number of 
minutes feeder flight i arrives after its scheduled arrival time hi at run j with j 
= 1,…..,M and 0, Ν∈jid  . We assume that delays jid , are independent of 
each other. Thus we can define an index variable for each feeder flight, 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>
≤=
iji
iji
ji td
td
y
,
,
, 0
1
    (2) 
 
giving us connecting passengers pi if iji td ≤, , or resulting in the loss of 
connection, if iji td >, . 
As delay times vary significantly for each feeder flight depending on 
the airport of origin (hub, secondary, regional) and stage length, we find 
different empirical distributions )~(~ ii dF , with id
~
 as the observed past 
delays for each feeder carrier i. These were then transferred into discrete 
empirical distribution functions to facilitate further programming. Class 
width was chosen to be 5 minutes and total number of classes is 21. The 
upper limit of 120 minutes of delay was set for the last class as well as the 
larger class width of 25 minutes to represent an upper bound. 
We use the Monte Carlo simulation to make inferences about the 
number of people reaching the specified A380 at one single flight by 
simulating a random number ui,j, which is uniformly distributed between [0, 
1]: 
]1,0[,1,1 ,....., Uuu MjNiji ←====    (3) 
 
and gives us the simulated delay time 
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jijii duF ,,
1 ˆ)(~ =−    (4) 
for any feeder flight i for run j. Hence, the number of passengers which 
reaches the specified A380 flight at one single run j: 
)(ˆ
1
,
380 ∑
=
⋅=
N
i
jii
A
j ypp         (5) 
The number of simulated runs M was chosen to be 5000 to gain robust 
results for the A380 distribution, which resulted in 
 
)()(ˆ~)ˆ,.....,ˆ( 3803803805000
380
1
AASimAA pFpFpp ≈  (6) 
 
for each destination. 
This approach simulates the status quo delay scenario with today’s delay 
patterns when applied to feeders with forecasted passenger numbers. 
However, this does not incorporate an expected further tightening of the 
congestion situation, due to airport and air route congestion which will 
ultimately result in higher delays for feeder carriers. Therefore we assume 
different growth rates for the different classified IATA types of airports. 
Adjustments to the empirical delay distributions were performed as depicted 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Adjustments to the empirical delay distributions for the different classified types 
of airports  
Scenario 
Fully Coordinated 
Airports 
(Level 3) 
Schedules 
Facilitated Airports 
(Level 2) 
Non Coordinated 
Airports 
(Level 1) 
Status Quo Current status Current status Current status 
Most likely + 4 minutes / flight + 2 minutes / flight Current status 
Worst Case + 8 minutes / flight + 4 minutes / flight + 2 minutes / flight 
 
For example, past observations of d~ for Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 
airport, a level 3 airport, were adjusted in the most likely scenario by adding 
4 minutes to each observation CDGd
~
. This, in turn, leads to a right-hand shift 
of the empirical density functions for each feeder. This approach is an 
attempt to adjust the assumed growth rates of congestion at different types of 
airports which ultimately leads to a further delay of the feeder to the A380 
outgoing airport. The most likely scenario shows our hypothesis for 2008 
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under the assumption that no policy changes and/or schedule measures are 
made. The worst case scenario is fairly unrealistic, as it is merely supposed 
to represent the ultimate upper limit. 
The exact figures in table 3 are based on the following logic: 
Extrapolating the last available full year ADM data16 to 2008 with a yearly 
increase of the aforementioned 4.9%, we would arrive at 12.6 minutes of 
ADM for arrivals. Compared to the figures from 2004 (10.4 minutes ADM), 
this represents an absolute increase of around 2 minutes per flight by 2008. 
This figure is indicated in the table for level 2 airports as the most likely 
scenario. Based on the aforementioned findings another 2 minutes of delay 
per flight were added for level 3 airports (i.e,. 4 minutes in total) since hub 
airports tend to show higher levels of delays. These additional 2 minutes for 
hubs are fully consistent with the results of the study by Mayer & Sinai 
(2003) which indicate a range of 1.5 to 4.5 minutes of extra delays per 
arriving flight at hub airports.17 
The most important analysis in respect to profitability is to test the 
percentage of flights which are not filled above the break-even load factors. 
As described above we suggest break-even load factors for A380 operations 
to be in the region of 70% or 385 passengers respectively. Therefore the 
percentage of unprofitable flights is: 
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Furthermore, we calculate the average percentage of passengers missing 
their A380 flight: 
 
                                                 
16  Calculations are based on CODA Annual Report 2004. It expels 10.4 minutes 
ADM for arrivals which represents an increase of 4.9% compared to 2003 (CODA, 
2004). 
17  Although the study is mainly based on US domestic traffic data, there is evidence 
that the findings are at least in tendency applicable to European feeder networks. 
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The average load factor (L) for the A380 is: 
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RESULTS 
 Figures 1-3 reveal the simulated distributions for the chosen A380 
flights. The expected break-even barrier was graphed accordingly, showing a 
certain number of losses for the airline due to incidental delays. Table 4 
shows the statistics for these three flights. 
The results demonstrate that delays have a significant effect on the 
profitability situation of an airline. We can observe that there was a large 
discrepancy between expected demand and simulated transferring passengers 
from feeder carriers for all three flights. The average percentage of feeder 
passengers not being able to transfer is high in the status quo scenario with 
13.42% for PEK, 13.94% for NRT and 9.49% for LAX. Since these figures 
represent today’s congestion levels, this situation also applies to current 
jumbo operations with lower passenger numbers. Since flights are still 
generally profitable, compared to the break-even barrier of 385 passengers, 
the airline might not consider this situation sufficiently threatening to be 
willing to make structural changes to wave design or to take other actions. 
The existing delay consequences might be accepted as a type of background 
white noise. 
However, this situation changes as we apply different congestion 
scenarios. Out of the three flights, two of them, FRA-to-NRT and FRA-to-
PEK, would experience considerable losses in the most likely and worst case 
scenarios. For FRA-to-NRT, our results indicate that 12.78% of all flights 
would fly with less than break-even load factors in the most likely scenario 
while for FRA-to-PEK this figure stands at 19.04%. This would possibly 
question the overall success of these flights. For FRA-to-LAX, however, this 
is not the case. Although to a large extent feeder flights and therefore the 
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resulting delays are also the same for FRA-to-NRT, the distribution of 
passengers from the feeding flights for this destination seems to ensure 
reliable results with respect to the simulated load factor. Therefore, we find 
that the timing of important feeders at incoming waves proves to be a crucial 
issue for successful operation of intercontinental flights. 
The simulation results for the three routes indicate that delays at the hub 
airport FRA might harm the profitable operation of the A380 in the year 
2008. The status quo scenario already shows fairly high discrepancies 
between expected demand and transferring passengers for all observed 
flights. We also see that a further worsening of delays in the upcoming years 
would result in a very questionable financial operation of A380 flights with 
today’s existing wave patterns. Therefore, airlines as well as infrastructure 
operators and policymakers will have to pay greater attention to delays than 
they have done in the past. 
 Figure 1. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Tokyo-Narita International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs) 
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Figure 2. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Los Angeles International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
 
Figure 3. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Beijing Capital International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
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Table 4. Analysis of simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International 
Airport to 3 destinations, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
 Basic scenario Most Likely Worst Case 
 TOKYO-NARITA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (NRT) 
Mean 408.13 397.36 392.65 
Load factor (L) 74.20 % 72.25 % 71.39 % 
Standard Deviation 10.971 10.671 11.232 
Kurtosis -0.1395 -0.2561 -0.3122 
Asymmetry -0.2781 -0.2593 -0.1931 
Min 363.26 357.46 356.24 
Max 439.28 422.37 421.49 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  2.30 % 12.78 % 25.38 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  13.94 % 17.68 % 19.42 % 
 LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (LAX) 
Mean 422.05 412.57 408.53 
Load factor (L) 76.74 % 75.01 % 74.28 % 
Standard Deviation 8.017 8.167 8.607 
Kurtosis 0.0440 0.0928 0.2436 
Asymmetry -0.3425 -0.3971 -0.3587 
Min 385.07 376.07 362.62 
Max 444.12 434.23 431.20 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  0.00 % 0.20 % 0.78 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  9.49 % 12.90 % 14.25 % 
 BEIJING CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (PEK) 
Mean 402.44 392.22 385.77 
Load factor (L) 73.17 % 71.31 % 70.14 % 
Standard Deviation 8.847 8.153 7.135 
Kurtosis -0.1820 -0.1673 -0.0719 
Asymmetry -0.0260 0.0183 -0.0508 
Min 369.49 364.05 356.70 
Max 430.14 417.79 407.08 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  2.28 % 19.04 % 45.92 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  13.42 % 17.82 % 20.41 % 
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DISCUSSION 
Implications for further research 
In order to counteract the significant effects of air traffic delays, we 
suggest several domains of action. Some aim to reduce the impact of delays 
on airline operations and others aim to reduce the delays themselves. 
The first option would be to improve the schedule so as to make it more 
resilient to delays, that is, reducing the direct implications of delays on the 
hub-and-spoke operations. This could be accomplished by spreading the 
feeder traffic. A disadvantage of this measure, however, is the increase in 
travel time for preferred flights and thus a possible loss of demand. 
Slot swaps of feeder flights could also provide substantial 
improvements. It is important here to know which flights could be shifted 
within the current wave pattern. Going back to the empirical results, we can 
observe different delay distributions for each feeder flight. One possible 
solution would be to pre-schedule those feeder flights which are delayed in 
most cases but which are also important due to their feeding passenger 
volume. Another solution could be to reschedule the departure of the A380. 
These solutions obviously depend on slot availability at the origin airport as 
well as at the destination airports. 
Airlines can also try to shift feeding traffic to alternative modes of 
transportation that is usually not affected by air traffic delays, although close 
cooperation with the involved airports is necessary. LH’s AIRail approach 
can serve as a prime example (Fakiner, 2005). 
A different approach to mitigating the delay issue is to reduce delays 
themselves. Critics of the air traffic control system claim that its current 
capacity shortage is responsible for the dramatic delay situation. They 
demand a coordinated European solution to the problem. In 2004, however, 
airlines were also responsible for a certain share of the delays recorded by 
CODA. Possible solutions are streamlining the operations and the relocation 
of hub activities to less congested airports (e.g., LH established Munich as 
secondary hub besides its primary anchor FRA).18 Finally, the airports might 
need to invest in additional terminal and runway capacity to enable them to 
handle additional passengers in the future. Although regulatory restrictions 
in most European countries hinder the introduction of innovative methods to 
use existing capacity more efficiently (e.g., alternative slot allocation 
schemes), all involved parties need to address this issue intensively. 
Irrespective of the problems caused by delays, the deployment of large 
feeder aircraft to meet the additional demand generated by the A380, in 
particular, causes further problems for airports and airlines. Both need to 
                                                 
18  Problems associated with this option are a lower number of transfer passengers at 
the primary hub and in many cases lower yields at the secondary hub. 
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ensure the compliance with the minimum connecting time despite increased 
passenger volumes. Moreover, this strategy requires the airlines to invest in 
larger feeder aircraft or to cooperate more closely with feeder airlines 
operating adequate aircraft. Considering these additional financial 
investments as well as the increased bargaining power of related feeder 
airlines, it may turn out that operating an A380 is associated with some 
hidden costs which also need to be taken into account. 
Given the problems of hub-and-spoke systems introduced here, we have 
to ask whether the original hub-and-spoke model is still the adequate type of 
network structure for intercontinental airline operations. By subjecting the 
A380 to the financial test, it is revealed that the A380 requires quite 
favorable conditions for its profitability. 
 
Limitations 
Our method might be criticised for disregarding the correlation between 
the delays of feeder flights. In reality, however, it is likely that the delay of 
one flight has an impact on subsequent flights. 
Furthermore, bad weather conditions are likely to result in delays for the 
entire feeder wave. This limitation had to be taken into account, however, as 
available data did not make it possible to compare delays of the same days 
and thus the ability to adjust the correlations in the distribution. Moreover, 
we see a limitation in the missing translation of empirical distributions into 
inferential distributions. However, the elimination of outliers would not play 
a significant role here. 
CONCLUSION 
We used the case study of LH at FRA to simulate the consequences of 
feeder delays for the success of the new mega airplane A380 which will fly 
from FRA as early as 2008. As a first step, we took today’s wave patterns of 
jumbo operations and applied demand forecasts for each O/D pair to the 
chosen destinations. Our simulation of A380 load factors was then based on 
past delay distributions for relevant feeders. 
The results demonstrate that delays are extremely detrimental to the 
profitable operation of the A380 since a fairly high percentage of feeder 
carriers do not arrive on time to transfer their connecting passengers. We 
indicated that the status quo delay scenario might not be considered so 
harmful to the airline as the flights are usually operated above break-even 
load factors. Our analysis, however, revealed that a further increase of delays 
would result not only in a significant loss of profitability but could also 
threaten overall profitability for two of the three simulated routes. Thus, LH 
would have to reconsider their current scheduling pattern to take into 
account possible escalation of flight delays in the future. 
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We suggested two main options with which the airline may counteract 
these developments. First, a spread of feeder operations, which would, in 
turn, result in an increase in overall travel time. Second, a close monitoring 
of feeder delays could lead to rescheduling options within the existing wave 
patterns. The latter option is particularly relevant to voluminous feeder 
flights likely to experience delays on a regular basis. 
Further research might broaden the context of this study by explicitly 
examining possible consumer and competitor responses and changes in 
market demand due to a change of pricing structures with the introduction of 
the A380. 
In conclusion, delays seem to be one of the major issues which will 
concern the airline industry in the future; not only for airlines operating large 
hub-and-spoke systems but also for infrastructure operators and 
policymakers. Since the introduction of the A380 is imminent, pre-emptive 
action from all participants is required. 
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INSIDE THE MECHANICS OF NETWORK 
DEVELOPMENT: HOW COMPETITION AND 
STRATEGY REORGANIZE EUROPEAN AIR 
TRAFFIC 
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ABSTRACT 
Air transport forms complex networks that can be measured in order to understand 
its structural characteristics and functional properties. Recent models for network 
growth (i.e., preferential attachment, etc.) remain stochastic and do not seek to 
understand other network-specific mechanisms that may account for their 
development in a more microscopic way. Air traffic is made up of many constituent 
airlines that are either privately or publicly owned and that operate their own 
networks. They follow more or less similar business policies each. The way these 
airline networks organize among themselves into distinct traffic distributions 
reveals complex interaction among them, which in turn can be aggregated into 
larger (macro-) traffic distributions. Our approach allows for a more deterministic 
methodology that will assess the impact of airline strategies on the distinct 
distributions for air traffic, particularly inside Europe. One key question this paper 
is seeking to answer is whether there are distinct patterns of preferential attachment 
for given classes of airline networks to distinct types of European airports. 
Conclusions about the advancing degree of concentration in this industry and the 
airline operators that accelerate this process can be drawn.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Hub-and-spoke networks have been discussed in the management and 
economics literature before.1 With the growth of low cost carriers, new 
operational characteristics (i.e., point-to-point route structures) of many 
networks needed to be taken into account when assessing the overall 
evolution of traffic and distribution of routes. More practitioner-oriented 
research into air traffic focused on network development and the effects that 
it had on airports and route structures (see Burghouwt, 2005; Reynolds-
Feighan, 2001). However, the latter covered networks only partially leaving 
scope for extension from the airline’s or the airport’s network-wide 
perspective. Although differences between point-to-point versus hub-and-
spoke structures are often highlighted, the way different airlines’ networks 
evolve or interact to change their structure and function, remain untreated. 
Such network research of air traffic often seems limited in terms of validity, 
both internally (with regards to the different geographies served by airlines) 
and externally (with regards to its applicability to other industries, for 
example). If network development in a (regulated) market context is to be 
understood better, air traffic may provide valuable lessons how these 
networks develop, and in particular, how the different constituent airline 
networks organize air traffic (European, in our case) between airports. 
Through a totally different stream of research, statistical physics 
suggests regularities through a power law for the ranked order distribution of 
vertices that form networks. Data from worldwide distributions of air traffic 
across airports have empirically been tested (see Amaral, Scala, Barthelemy 
& Stanley, 2000). Methods from statistical physics are of interest in this 
paper for several reasons: (a) the regularity of traffic distributions for air 
traffic provides a helpful benchmark against empirically found data; (b) 
network characteristics of classes of airlines can be compared with the 
ranked traffic distribution among airports and the locus of certain airline 
groups on a European (or global) distribution of air traffic can be 
highlighted; (c) by aggregating distinct classes of airlines and understanding 
their attachment patterns, distinct mechanisms driving growth in air traffic 
can be identified; and finally, (d) those network characteristics that influence 
a more or less desirable evolution of air traffic from a policy perspective can 
be emphasized.   
                                                 
1 A short review of literature covering the European context is presented later in this 
article. 
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The topology of European air traffic 
The findings derived from statistical physics (Amaral et al., 2000; 
Barabasi & Albert, 1999) can be highly relevant when conducting 
empirically rooted research in economics or strategy. Its methods allow us to 
derive the big picture of a networks’ topology first, before pinpointing 
interesting phenomena within it. In fact, statistical physics has been used to 
look at the topology of world air traffic in previous research (Amaral et al., 
2000). The examined connectivity distribution for the world’s busiest 
airports shows that there was no power law regime and that air traffic among 
them showed exponentially decaying tails, implying that there was a single 
scale for their connectivity. Amaral et al. infer that physical constraints (at 
the most connected hub airports) would prevent the formation of scale free 
networks in traditional transport networks, that is, that of air traffic. Their 
assessment of the various connectivities of world airports was based on the 
number of passengers in transit at airports (as well as cargo loads for a 
second connectivity distribution) rather than data on the number of distinct 
connections provided through a given airport. In particular, they expect that 
the number of distinct connections from a major airport was proportional to 
the number of passengers in transit through that airport. To this end, they 
made two assumptions. First, there is a typical number of passengers per 
flight. As the number of seats in airplanes does not follow a power law 
distribution, the assumption seemed to be reasonable. Second, there is a 
typical number of flights per day between two cities. In the cases examined, 
there are a maximum of about 20 flights per day and per airline between any 
two cities, thus the distribution of number of flights per day between two 
cities was delimited. 
Networks can be planar or non-planar,2 a feature that can prove crucial 
in the context of airports. In planar networks, the number of edges that can 
be connected to a single node is limited by the physical space available to 
connect them. In airport networks the number of connections is limited by 
the space available at the airport, “such constraints may be the controlling 
factor for the emergence of scale-free networks” (Amaral et al., 2000, p. 
11149). Would the same assumptions and inferences hold when examining a 
distribution for European air traffic? Such an analysis would seek to 
determine whether European air traffic connections present significantly 
different properties for connectivity distributions. 
Summary data on passenger flows and number of movements per airport 
were obtained through the Airport Council International (ACI) for the years 
2001 and 2004. We ranked 330 European airports. This data included 
                                                 
2 Planar network form vertices whenever two edges cross, where non-planar 
networks can have edges cross and not form vertices. 
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domestic, European and intercontinental flights for European airports. These 
data sets show some major advantages when compared to that used by 
Amaral et al.: (a) total passengers flows are known; and (b) no extrapolation 
needs to be made from transit passenger flows. The other assumptions made 
by them still hold: (a) the number of passengers is supposed to be 
proportional to the number of city-pair links to that given airport; and (b) the 
bounded distribution criteria for the number of flights between airports holds 
as well. 
The total number of passenger traffic connecting into a European airport 
was tabulated in ranked (descending) order. At this point of our analysis, 
more detailed structural network data was not available and the number of 
nodes was quite small (less than 330).  
In Figure 1, data for 2001 was plotted in ranked order on a log-log plot. 
The distribution for the worlds’ 150 biggest airports (in analogy to Amaral et 
al.) can thus be compared with the distribution for Europe’s 330 biggest 
ones. For each graph the y-axis shows the number of passenger flows for a 
particular airport (in thousands, on a log scale) and the x-axis is the airport 
ranked in descending order.  
Figure 1. Ranked order connectivity distribution for traffic movements of all airports and 
European Union airports, in thousands of passengers, 2001 and 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pax = total passenger flows, in thousands 
Note. Source: Airport Council International 
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This plot confirms that the traffic distribution for European airports 
decays much faster than a power law. Whereas the distribution seems more 
linear for the first 70 or so busiest airports in the world, the decay accelerates 
significantly thereafter. Among European airports, traffic distribution decays 
much faster from the 20th biggest airport on. Unfortunately, we are unable to 
describe a fat-tail end of world airports due to insufficient data from our ACI 
database. Also, it is impossible to confirm scale freeness between both 
geographic scopes; their respective slopes of decay are different from each 
other. At the other end of the graph for European airports, one can observe a 
flattening of the connectivity distribution at around 100,000 passengers per 
year. It appears as if above a critical threshold, the incremental cost for 
adding new links to the network are becoming prohibitive and are thus 
preventing the addition of new flights to these hubs. Amaral et al. (2000) 
explicitly cite world airports as such an example and our results conclude the 
same for European airports, although the critical threshold (of saturation) 
seems somewhat lower. It is unclear, however, why significant differences in 
passenger flows remain between the most highly connected airports in both 
geographies. If constraints of available space at the most highly connected 
airport hubs were indeed so central for shaping the structure of networks (see 
Amaral et al., 2000), would this necessarily mean that the slopes for the rest 
of the traffic distribution of airports would be impacted?  
This question may be addressed in the light of the preferential 
attachment principle, as shown in the Barabasi-Albert model. Preferential 
attachment stipulates that there is a higher probability for a new or existing 
node to connect or reconnect to a vertex that already has a large number of 
links than there is to (re)connect to a low degree vertex (Barabasi & Albert, 
1999). As the network grows incrementally it expands following preferential 
attachment. The probability (Π) that a new vertex will connect with another 
vertex (i) depends on the connectivity ki of that vertex so that Π(ki) = ki / Σj kj 
(Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Because of preferential attachment, a vertex that 
acquires more connections than another one will increase its connectivity at 
a higher rate; thus, an initial difference in the connectivity between two 
vertices will increase further as the network grows. However, our empirical 
findings, along with Amaral et al., suggest that a preferential attachment 
mechanism may seem to be compromised in air traffic due to the saturation 
at hub airports. Other mechanisms that drive the structural evolution of 
European air traffic may be identified.  
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Table 1. Ranking of Europe’s biggest airports 
 
Note. Source: Airport Council International 
 
 
RANK 2004 RANK 2001 AIRPORT Passengers in 2004 
1 1 LONDON (LHR) 67 344 054 
2 3 PARIS (CDG) 51 260 363 
3 2 FRANKFURT/MAIN (FRA) 51 098 271 
4 4 AMSTERDAM (AMS) 42 541 180 
5 5 MADRID (MAD) 38 704 731 
6 6 LONDON (LGW) 31 461 454 
7 7 ROME (FCO) 28 118 899 
8 8 MUNICH (MUC) 26 814 505 
9 11 BARCELONA (BCN) 24 550 949 
10 9 PARIS (ORY) 24 053 215 
11 13 MANCHESTER (MAN) 21 544 199 
12 22 LONDON (STN) 20 908 006 
13 14 PALMA DE MALLORCA (PMI) 20 411 024 
14 17 COPENHAGEN (CPH) 18 965 675 
15 15 MILAN (MXP) 18 554 874 
16 19 ISTANBUL (IST) 17 375 127 
17 10 ZURICH (ZRH) 17 282 106 
18 20 DUBLIN (DUB) 17 138 373 
19 16 STOCKHOLM (ARN) 16 364 163 
20 12 BRUSSELS (BRU) 15 594 508 
70 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
The 2001 and 2004 data sets suggest a remarkable stability in the rank 
order for the 10 most highly connected (busiest) airports in Europe. At this 
point we cannot say whether this stability is due to preferential attachment, 
to the fact that the historic operators (airline incumbents) concentrate their 
traffic at these hubs3 or due to other causal factors. More striking are the 
changes in rank order for the other 10 airports. The fall of Sabena and the 
near bankruptcy of Swissair are most likely the causes for the drop in traffic 
at Brussels and Zürich airport. The success of London Stanstead can be 
linked to the concentration of low-cost carriers there. These first findings are 
noteworthy, because they suggest that beyond these two extreme cases, 
business policy (or strategy) of airline operators may indeed make a 
difference when structuring European air traffic. Without foregoing the 
findings that follow, we expect that changes in rank order will become more 
important, particularly with medium and small airports. The influence of 
business policy of airlines on such medium and small airports cannot be 
underestimated. The way these airline networks are likely to shape 
connections between airports, particularly medium and small ones, needs to 
be better understood. 
ANALYSIS OF NETWORK ORGANISATION 
Competition between airports has frequently been discussed before. 
Humphreys and Francis (2002) proposed a review on the literature that treats 
the various measures of airport performances. But many questions remain 
open, with certain problems not being dealt with. For example, Veldhuis 
(1997) notes that airport rankings by total number of passengers, cargo or 
aircraft movements are often used to describe the competitive position of 
airports. Other measures that enter into the assessment of spatial 
concentration in air traffic focus on scheduling and capacity related measures 
by flight stage (Burghouwt & de Wit, 2005); quality and frequency of direct 
connection (Adler & Berechman, 2001; Adler & Golany, 2001; Button & 
Reynolds-Feighan, 1999; Lijesen, 2001); quality and frequency of indirect 
connections (Veldhuis, 1997); and efficiency and performance of airports 
(Janic, 2003; Oum, Yu & Fu, 2003). These studies have not covered 
explicitly the fact that linkages between airports are determined by airlines’ 
strategies and that the competitive situation of airports needs to take into 
account the structural characteristics of the network operators. Also, a clear 
distinction seems to be necessary when applying such factors to different 
geographies. According to Burghouwt & de Wit (2005), “Deregulation in the 
US resulted in reconfiguration of airline networks into hub-and-spoke 
                                                 
3 For instance, many hubs maintained or even increased traffic in 2001, despite the 
important drops in passenger demand that had severely affected their intercontinental 
routes. 
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systems. In contrast, airlines in Europe already operated spatially 
concentrated networks, long before deregulation. This concentration at a 
national home-base was the outcome of bilateral traffic rights designated to 
the national carrier” (bilateral air service agreements). Most of the studies of 
airline network development in Europe and the US considered airline 
networks that were radially organized in space as equivalent to hub-and-
spoke networks (Burghouwt & Hakfoort, 2001; Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). 
Although spatial measures for concentration may indeed be suitable for 
tracing hub-and-spoke network structures in the US (Reynolds-Feighan, 
2001), the same measures may be regarded more critically if it were to be 
applied to a European context.  
In order to favor a bottom-up (i.e., airline-induced) approach for 
explaining network structure among airports, we need to find causal factors 
in the business policies of airline operators and their respective network 
operations. A method would be to look at all the operators in the industry 
and compare the ways in which they organize their respective networks. For 
example, are operations among those that we call incumbents similar or 
different from other carriers? Will distinct (strategic) groups of airlines form 
distinctively different network structures among airports over time? Using 
such microscopic approaches towards network analysis we can explain how 
airlines contribute to air traffic and its structural evolution in Europe. The 
following ranked order distributions for flight frequency (number of weekly 
flights, see Figure 2) shows how much service the constituent incumbent 
airlines, for example, allocated to given airports in Europe in 2004. 
The distribution shows that this sample of incumbent carriers have 
concentrated their traffic at very few airports, and that this traffic 
degenerates rapidly once a wider scope of airports are being served within 
the same airline’s network. Such a bottom-up perspective may help illustrate 
how different business policies shape different networks among airports and 
these findings can be contrasted with the general statistical assertion of 
preferential attachment as the driving mechanism for network growth. 
Again, the historical bias of European incumbent carriers towards 
domestic feeder routes cannot be neglected. If one were to consider all 
European airports as the relevant base for our market, the domestic bias 
would continue to shape current network structure in the future. On the other 
hand, the advancing integration (through alliances, code-sharing, etc.) among 
European carriers will likely trigger more reallocation of routes towards 
trans-European connections. The definition of a European market in light of 
a still very recent deregulation is unlikely to show high degrees of 
concentration for small airlines that have entered the industry only recently, 
including low-cost carriers. In short, European air traffic is still at an early 
stage of organizing itself, and current network structures are probably not a 
permanent configuration.  
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Figure 2. Weekly intra-European flight frequencies of incumbent carriers of European 
networks, at selected airports, 2004, ranked order distribution 
 
Note. OAG data, September 2004.  
Airline codes definition: Air France (AF), Finnair (AY), Alitalia (AZ), British Airways (BA), 
Air Ireland (EI), Iberia (IB), Royal Dutch (KL), Lufthansa (LH), Olympic (OA), Austrian (OS), 
Scandinavian Airline System (SK), Sabena (SN), Portuguese Airlines (TP) 
  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In order to determine the influence of airlines’ business policies on the 
evolution of European air traffic under a network perspective, we have to 
start by classifying the linked airports with regard to their function in the 
overall hierarchy for air traffic in Europe. Methods used in previous studies 
for US data use the potential or realized capacity of airports as their single 
classification variable, for example, passengers departing from a certain 
airport (used by the US Department of Transportation), from certain airport 
regions rather than individual airports (used by the Federal Aviation 
Administration), or including also non-scheduled flights at small airports 
(Graham, 1998). Although Reynold-Feighan (2001) uses a more 
comprehensive measure of passengers and/or number of movements per 
airline across airports in the US, such a measure would not sufficiently 
account for network characteristics inside Europe. In particular, the rapid 
growth of some low-cost entrants (as compared to the more established 
carriers such as Southwest in the US) and the yet unaccomplished 
consolidation through alliances and/or mergers and acquisitions among 
incumbents in the future could remain unaccounted for. Burghouwt & 
Hakfoort (2001) propose an alternative by employing cluster analysis based 
on Ward’s method. “Multi-dimensional scaling is appealing because 
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capacity alone does not capture the hub structure of an airport fully. It only 
measures the size but not connectivity” (p. 313).  
We have collected data from the OAG dataset for the years 2001 
through 2004. From this data we constructed variables such as departure 
airport, destination airport, flight frequency, aircraft type, and seat capacity 
for each flight. The data was based on a representative week in early 
November for each year. We decided to use the following three dimensions 
for cluster analysis to classify hierarchies among airport networks.  
1. Total flight frequency deployed (by all scheduled airlines) at the 
airport: this captures the size and capacity actually used at the 
airport. We prefer frequency over number of passengers or 
available capacity since, beyond its direct correlation with airport 
capacity, the variable also expresses policy choices (that is, the 
same number of passengers—or capacity—can be made available 
through different choices in aircraft size and flight frequency).  
2. The scope of other airports served by a given airport: it represents 
the number of destinations and captures what Burghouwt (2001) 
calls connectivity of the airport; and  
3. The number of intercontinental destinations: to capture the 
intercontinental orientation of the airport and helps to distinguish 
intra-European scope from intercontinental scope.4 
 
In the end our clustering methodology is in some aspects similar to 
Burghouwt’s approach, although we shall cluster around observations for the 
first week of November for the years between 2001 and 2004. Observed data 
for scope and total frequency were converted into their log-scale, simply 
because empirical evidence suggests a logarithmic relationship to be more 
appropriate than a linear one to account for traffic distribution. Values for 
intercontinental links remained on a nominal scale, because no valid log can 
be obtained for airports that show zero intercontinental links. A proximity 
matrix was calculated, based upon Euclidean distance, with observations 
being subsequently grouped according to increase in sum of squares. A cut-
off point was defined at the 6th cluster level for two reasons. For one, our t-
statistic showed a 95% confidence interval when the 6th cluster was formed. 
Also, a clear and succinct interpretation would be facilitated if the number of 
clusters remained limited.  
At this point it shall suffice to present results for the first week of 
November 2001 (the evolution of these clusters will be discussed at a later 
stage). The six airport clusters are described below. 
Clusters 1 and 2 represent four primary hubs: London Heathrow (LHR), 
Paris CDG (CDG), Frankfurt (FRA) and Amsterdam (AMS). Both the 
                                                 
4 The same measure was used by Burghouwt. 
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number of destinations and flight frequencies are very high. Strikingly, the 
number of intercontinental links represents a high percentage of overall 
connections, although Cluster 2 (London Heathrow and Amsterdam) show 
one third less intercontinental connections compared to Cluster 1 (Paris CDG 
and Frankfurt). 
Clusters 3 and 4 represent 18 secondary hubs in Europe: the nine hubs in 
Cluster 3 [including Madrid (MAD), London (LGW), Munich (MUC), etc.] 
are slightly bigger than those in Cluster 4 [Düsseldorf (DUS), Vienna (VIE), 
Athens (ATH), Copenhagen (CPH), etc.], with more than twice as many 
intercontinental links per airport, on average. These secondary hubs remain 
both in scope (i.e., connectivity) and size well below the primary hubs. 
Cluster 5 consists of 101 airports that can be considered medium and 
small. Examples are Lyon (LYS), Basel (BSL), Nürnberg (NUE) or Naples 
(NAP). A significant level of intra-European connections and medium 
frequencies per connection contrast with a small number of intercontinental 
connections.  
Cluster 6 consister of 357 very small airports, for example  Porto Santo 
(PXO), Kerry County (KIR), Narvik (NVK), Samos (SMI), Nimes (FNI), 
etc. There are practically no intercontinental links, and European or domestic 
connections are few, although the frequency per route served can be 
compared to that of other airports. 
Before we go on to apply a model equation and to interpret the 
relationships between airline operators, their strategies and the evolution (or 
variation) of air traffic at airports, it seems appropriate to group airlines 
according to their networks’ descriptive features that reflect route strategies. 
In the next section, we shall proceed by clustering what will resemble in 
many respects the method used in the above, but applied to the specifics of 
airline networks. In the section thereafter, changes in European airports’ 
network structures shall be assessed. Finally, the impact of the various 
operators’ strategic policies on these airport networks’ evolution shall be 
estimated and be interpreted through appropriate (logit) regression analysis. 
CLASSES OF AIRLINE NETWORKS IN EUROPE 
Again we chose multi-dimensional scaling in order to classify European 
airline operators’ networks. The methodology is analogous to the one 
applied in the above, except that carriers’ strategies can be summarized even 
more concisely:  
By clustering their operational characteristics around three 
dimensions—(a) the scope of airports served through its European airports; 
(b) the highest frequency deployed at one airport inside the European 
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network;5 and (c) the slope of decreasing frequencies across the network—
we can group all airlines into strategic groups, as their allocation choices for 
service are closer to one another inside the same cluster as compared to 
airlines that are clustered elsewhere (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Strategic groups of airports formed around airline networks, 2001 
 
2001 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 
Members [16] [30] [38] [53] [53] [20] 
Scope 4,042 2,935 2,072 1,289 0,927 0 
Frequency 8,039 6,591 5,266 3,538 1,681 0,7 
Slope (nom.) 1,786 1,882 1,707 1,399 1,134 0 
 
 
There were 16 airlines that were grouped inside Cluster 1, including 
Olympic Airways (OA), Finnair (AY), Turkish Airways (TK), Austrian 
(OS), SAS (SK), British Airways (BA), Alitalia (AZ), KLM (KL), Air 
France (AF), Iberia (IB), and Lufthansa (LH). It remains instructive to see 
the structural differences between this Cluster 1, containing the biggest 
networks of operators, most of them incumbents, and other clusters. 
Although showing the lowest number of member airlines, the number of 
airports that each member’s network serves, are the highest. This broad 
scope in serving many airports is, on average, associated with the highest 
number of flights from the carriers’ main airport(s). The difference to the 
other airline groups is striking. Cluster 4 carriers appear to focus their 
strategy on high flight frequency on relatively few routes; also, the 
distribution of frequency across the airports being served is starting to flatten 
here (with Cluster 5 showing an even flatter slope). This means that 
frequency is being more evenly spread compared to the more hub-and-spoke 
like concentration inside Clusters 1, 2 or 3. In fact, the frequency distribution 
of airlines inside Cluster 2 is the most uneven of all. However, the scope of 
destinations, or the maximum frequency observed inside the network, remain 
below that of Cluster 1. 
NETWORK TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTIONS 
On an airport cluster level of analysis 
If we apply the same method used in 2001 (refer to airport clusters) for 
the years 2002 to 2004, changes in Euclidean distance will form new clusters 
                                                 
5 This variable will differentiate at a later stage between total frequency and 
frequency that is deployed at EU routes only.  
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(see Table 3). The separation of 4 primary hubs into two clusters in 2001 
yields a single cluster including these same airports between 2002 and 2004. 
As November 2001 was still heavily influenced by the events of September 
11, 2001 (9/11), the change could be explained by it. Also, a certain physical 
constraint at such primary hubs may impede growth beyond a critical point. 
Cluster 2 (2001) may still have had some margin to grow, whereas Cluster 1 
was simply saturated. Cluster 3 (2001) leaves most operational 
characteristics unchanged, but due to the yield of Cluster 2 into Cluster 1, 
this Cluster 3 moves up in our classification to become Cluster 2 (2002-
2004). Only intercontinental links grow significantly by some 17% within 
this cluster. A similar pattern can be observed for Cluster 4 (2001), which 
becomes Cluster 3 (2002-2004). Airports within this cluster keep their 
multiple scales relatively stable over time, but this cluster seems to develop 
more during 2004, particularly with regards to its intercontinental scope 
(+27%). What we classify as Cluster 4 (2002-2004) can not really be 
identified as a distinct cluster in 2001: around 25 airports are contained in it. 
Table 3. Evolution of strategic groups of airports, based on weekly averages, 2001-2004 
2001* Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 
Members [2] [2] [9] [9] [101] [357] 
Scope 5,401 5,126 4,753 4,287 3,112 0,787 
Frequency 8,362 8,271 7,649 7,064 5,81 3,219 
Intercont. 105 75,5 37,889 17,333 1,505 0,017 
2002             
Members [4] [11] [7] [25] [260] [167] 
Scope 5,263 4,783 4,192 3,771 1,803 0,249 
Frequency 8,33 7,655 6,974 6,38 4,446 2,383 
Intercont. 92,25 37,727 16 5,56 0,073 0,006 
2003             
Members [4] [10] [8] [25] [82] [352] 
Scope 5,29 4,768 4,316 3,686 2,978 0,828 
Frequency 8,322 7,656 7,028 6,256 5,666 3,14 
Intercont. 95 37 17,25 5,48 0,207 0,02 
2004             
Members [4] [9] [10] [28] [91] [332] 
Scope 5,315 4,836 4,444 3,904 2,911 0,8 
Frequency 8,331 7,727 7,129 6,501 5,421 3,089 
Intercont. 98 43,222 21,8 5,036 0,319 0,039 
 
*November each year. 
Note. Source: Airport Council International. 
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It would be interesting to see whether such a cluster had existed before 
2001 (due to 9/11), or whether these airports would form for the first time 
and in a very rapid way. Unfortunately, our database does not allow us to go 
further back in time. In any case, this classification appears quite durable 
over the subsequent three year period. Changes in Clusters 5 and 6, which 
contain over 90% of all European airports are quite noteworthy. The very 
small airports in Cluster 6 remain remarkably unchanged over time, except 
for 2002. In 2002, less than half of these 350 some airports maintain very 
low activity, and even drop further. Similarly, Cluster 5 seems quite 
comparable in 2001 and 2003-2004. The most significant change is probably 
due to elimination of the remaining very few intercontinental links at the 
airports concerned. The changes in 2002 concerning Clusters 5 and 6 may be 
explained by some 190 airports (normally part of Cluster 6) that were then 
included in Cluster 5, due to the growing Euclidean distance in intra-
European scope and frequency with the residual 167 airports that remained 
inside Cluster 6. 
 
On an origin-destination level of analysis 
In order to trace the evolution of airport networks on a comparable 
basis, as well as changes in the presence of airlines inside such network 
structures, the following procedure was chosen. First, airports that were part 
of a certain cluster in period 1 (i.e., during 2001) stayed within this initial 
classification during the four-year observation period. This allowed us to 
pinpoint possible changes in network characteristics for groups of airports 
whose members did not change. We will see that these airports’ intra-
European characteristics, on average, remained remarkably stable over time, 
but changes for individual airports within the same cluster could be quite 
significant (see Table 4). Other, more significant changes in these networks 
rather concerned inter-continental scope of air traffic. Secondly, our data 
also looked at different airlines that served these airports. An origin-
destination perspective, discriminating among the different airlines serving 
distinct routes, allowed for such more detailed examination. Some 
observations regarding market presence can be made and some inferences 
about the differential attraction of airport networks relative to airline 
operators can be drawn. 
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Airports that were grouped inside Cluster 2 (during 2001) increased 
their inter-continental scope (connectivity) from some 75 to 91 links (+21%) 
and the same type of links from airports inside Cluster 3 increased by +13% 
between 2001 and 2004. For Cluster 4 airports, these increases amounted to 
+30% over the same period. With the absolute number of inter-continental 
connectivity differing substantially between the clustered airport groups, 
growth (or new attachment) of such linkages going outside the European 
market shows a clear preference for airports inside Cluster 2. That is, 
primary hubs (London Heathrow, Amsterdam), but also to a lesser extent 
medium airports (including those of Cluster 4) appear to continue to grow 
with regards to their intercontinental links.6 Some kind of critical threshold 
(cut-off) for growth through intercontinental connectivity seems to separate 
Clusters 5 and 6 from Cluster 4 or bigger. 
As far as the attractiveness of differently sized airport networks for 
airline operators is concerned, clear preferences for the much larger airports 
appear. In 2001, 115 airlines serve the largest two European airports, 88 
airlines serve the next two biggest airports, 156 airlines serve the nine 
airports in Cluster 3, and 133 airlines serve the nine airports in Cluster 4. A 
relatively few (201) airlines serve 101 airports that are grouped in Cluster 5. 
We cannot easily draw conclusions from such summary descriptions, but it is 
clear that incumbent operators’ market power, though substantial at primary 
hubs, could be counter-balanced by the sheer number of alternative operators 
already present there. Also, airline operators seem to be able to exert much 
higher influence on airport policy at small airports (i.e., Cluster 5). Given the 
fact that the same airline operators most often operate across airport clusters, 
differential market power at airports may often better be exploited at 
medium or small airports rather than at primary hubs. 
Another factor relative to the evolution of air traffic networks is the 
entry of airlines at airports. Between 2001 and 2004 the number of airlines7 
serving Cluster 1 primary hubs remained (almost) unchanged: 115 versus 
114. Cluster 2 increased from 88 to 104 airlines. This may signal more and 
new routes being attached to Cluster 2 rather than Cluster 1. The number of 
airlines serving Cluster 3 airports increased by 22 (+14%) and for Cluster 4 
by 22 as well (+16.5%). Only ten more airlines were present for Cluster 5 
airports (+5%) in 2004 compared to 2001. In all these cases, the (intra-
European) connectivity of the airports had increased in the process (compare 
with Tables 4 and 5). However, this increased connectivity was the highest 
                                                 
6 Almost all of these additional inter-continental links are operated by incumbent 
operators, as no agreements with extra-European authorities to liberalise such traffic 
had been concluded yet (e.g., Open skies, etc.). 
7 Again, only airlines being part of the EU were taken into account. 
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for airports within Cluster 5 (+21%), followed by Cluster 4 (+19%), Cluster 
2 (+13%) and Cluster 3 (+8%). Clearly, the growth at medium airports was 
dependent on new entrants. There is no indication that preferential 
attachment mechanisms would drive the development of intra-European air 
traffic. Rather, we would like to suggest that airlines’ strategies determine 
the structure, shape and development of European air traffic even if that may 
be in a rather complex manner. 
THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS STRATEGY 
The model equation 
Our model needs to classify different airline networks’ and their 
(business) policy choices and relate them to the different clusters of airports. 
As these six airport categories reflect increasing scales for the airport 
networks, we conclude that they are ordinal. We can even determine by how 
much, the respective scales differ between these clusters. Under 
circumstances where the dependent variables are ordinal categories (as 
opposed to continuous variables), and where the independent variables are 
either continuous or categorical (or both), ordered logit analysis is the 
appropriate type of analysis. Unlike Ordinary Least Squares regression, 
logistic regression does not assume linearity of relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent, does not require normally 
distributed variables, does not assume homoscedasticity, and in general has 
less stringent requirements (Smith, 1997).  
Like logistic regression, ordered logit uses maximum likelihood 
methods, and finds the best set of regression coefficients to predict values of 
the logit-transformed probability that the dependent variable falls into one 
category rather than another. Ordered logit fits a set of cut-off points for the 
fitted probability of the dependent variable. If there are 6 levels (as in our 
case) of the dependent variable (1 through 6), it will find 5 cut-off values 
separating Clusters 1 through 6. In our case (see model below), the reference 
for these cut-offs is Cluster 6 (i.e., the smallest airport networks). If the fitted 
value of logit(p) is below Cluster 5 intercept, the dependent variable is 
predicted to take a value corresponding to Cluster 6. If the fitted value of 
logit(p) is between Clusters 5 and 4, the dependent variable is predicted to 
take value for Cluster 5, and so on. In that sense, decreasing values for 
airport cluster intercepts in our model signal that the airline’s policy choices 
for route service are oriented towards the bigger airport networks, if 
coefficients of the explanatory variable are negative. 
As with logistic regression, we get an overall Chi-square for the 
goodness of fit of the entire fitted model, and we can also use a Chi-square 
test to assess the improvement due to adding an extra independent variable 
or group of independent variables. As with logistic regression, a crucial 
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piece of information for evaluating the fit of the model is a table of predicted 
versus observed category membership. 
 
Interpretation of results from ordered logit analysis 
We run the model for our entire four-year sample that includes all 
European airlines. An additional measure compared the model prediction 
with the accuracy that could be obtained simply by chance. Under the 
cumulative chance criteria for ordinal, multinomial cases, one examines 
whether a prediction by guessing can achieve a correct rate for each group 
involved equal to the proportion of that group in the training set. Standard 
test statistics (\le, our dummy variable representing data for 2001 shows that 
airline networks tended to allocate routes to significantly smaller airports 
with their respective networks and 9/11 appears to have discouraged further 
concentration around primary hubs and spokes. This tendency was slightly 
corrected for data in 2002, but not durably, as the dummy variable for 2003 
shows.  
As far as airlines’ policy choices go, we find that new routes (see 
connectivity) had significant impact in the sense that they were more likely 
to attach to bigger airport networks. Although this result may appear self-
evident, we have to keep in mind that airlines could also have renounced to 
routes at the bigger airports and start new routes from smaller airports 
instead, which is not supported by our findings. Similarly, we see that total 
flight frequencies deployed by airlines (including frequencies for 
intercontinental traffic), clearly were more likely to favour bigger airport 
networks which rendered them denser, which is quite coherent with the hub-
and-spoke logic of feeding regional and national traffic into hubs before 
transiting into intercontinental traffic. Flight frequencies that account for 
intra-European traffic only, however, follow a pattern that is completely 
opposite. Intra-European routes show a significant tendency to increase their 
frequency preferentially on medium or even small airports, rather than 
primary hubs. One reason may be the growth of low-cost scheduled airlines 
that prefer to save costs with regards to landing fees at non-hub airports and 
that prefer direct flights to tourist sites. Interestingly, our slope variable 
shows a significant explanatory coefficient that is negative: airlines that 
concentrate their capacity (i.e., frequency) on some airports only, rather than 
spreading them evenly, tend to increase frequency at bigger airports. That is, 
the more uneven the distribution of frequency inside such airlines’ networks, 
the higher the probability that the airports concerned will figure among the 
bigger ones. 
With these first results in mind, we seek to go into more detail to 
understand how particular strategic groups of airlines influence the 
development and evolution of differently sized airport networks. To this end, 
we filtered our data base for the selected groups (clusters) of airline networks 
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and conducted the same logit ordinal regression analysis as above in a 
separate manner for each airline group. 
 
Likely impact of distinctive groups of airlines 
The desired multicollinearity of the independent variables and the small 
number of observations in some of the dependent variable categories raised 
methodological problems by diminishing the model’s predictive power and 
descriptive potential, and increasing rounding errors for some airline groups. 
These problems became more salient for the smallest two groups, in 
particular for Cluster 6 (where the Chi Square for Cluster 6 yields a p = 
0.13). We could have chosen to remove those variables that contribute most 
to the intercorrelation problem in a stepwise process. Since our logit 
regression analysis is ordinal and the overall results are very coherent and 
symmetrically structured across all examined airline groups, we decided not 
to modify our format (the logit equation) for problematic clusters and, rather, 
maintain comparability across all six clusters. Therefore, the results for 
Cluster 6 had to be interpreted particularly carefully, that is, regarded in the 
light of their coherence with other clusters rather than focusing on the 
resulting values as such (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Differential odds for strategic groups of airports (2001 classification) 
* p < 0,5 
 
The Chi Square test indicated that, of the four explanatory variables 
describing airlines’ policy choices, the degree of connectivity (scope) of 
airline operators showed no significant impact on changes in airport 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 
[AP_CLUST = 1] -3,910* -6,719* -1,069* -1,358* -1,960* -1,943* 
[AP_CLUST = 2] -2,679* -5,486* 0,159 -0,059 -0,586 -0,626 
[AP_CLUST = 3] -2,046* -4,934* 0,767 0,689* 0,242 0,088 
[AP_CLUST = 4] -1,240* -4,170* 1,598* 1,647* 1,033* 1,204* 
[AP_CLUST = 5] 0,495 -1,790* 3,588* 3,343* 2,754* 3,579* 
AL_SCOPE 1,153* -0,083* -0,955* -1,066* -0,453 0,485 
FREQ_T -13,428* -4,490* -1,331* -0,254* -1,161* -0,821* 
FREQ_M 13,013* 4,232* 1,965* 1,083* 1,612* 0,649* 
AL_SLOPE -0,885* -0,948* 0,342* -0,099 -0,692* -0,008 
[WK_NOV=2001] 0,839* 0,599* 0,809* 0,978* 1,512* 1,356* 
[WK_NOV=2002] -0,327* -0,281* -0,154 0,175 0,135 0,212 
[WK_NOV=2003] 0,514* 0,146 0,035 -0,005 0,155 0,165 
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clustering (for airlines grouped in Clusters 5 or 6). The slope variable that 
represents airlines’ concentration of capacity across airports shows no 
significant impact for Cluster 6, nor does it for Cluster 4 airlines.  
As was already shown before, 9/11 had a tendency to fragment the 
market structure among airport networks—that is, airline networks had a 
tendency to remove capacity from airports—grouping many then in lower 
ranked categories (see dummy variable NOV = 2001). Although this trend 
was pervasive across all different groups of airlines, its effect was more 
important with the medium and small operators: although larger airlines 
reduced their presence, smaller airlines did so much more. It was the latter 
that showed higher likelihood of dropping route service, particularly at larger 
airports. In 2003, only the most important airline networks (Clusters 1 and 
2), corrected this movement in a statistically significant way and added 
capacity on the bigger airports. 
 
Airline scope 
The most important airline networks (Cluster 1) had a tendency to 
extend their routes into medium and maybe small airports, rather than 
increasing their concentration around primary and secondary hubs. This is 
not the case for big airline networks that are grouped inside Cluster 2: 
although there is a significant relationship to deploying routes more on the 
primary and secondary hubs, but its importance is much smaller. Medium 
airline operators show both a significant and strong likelihood that their 
routes attach on hub airports, maybe also medium airports, but much less on 
the small ones. 
 
Intercontinental frequency 
Measures for flight frequency that include intercontinental frequency 
show the same pattern across all six groups of airlines, although this pattern 
appears to diminish for smaller airline networks: intercontinental flight 
frequencies show a strong tendency (likelihood) to attach to the primary and 
secondary hubs. Although this finding seems quite intuitive, it is noteworthy 
that it is only the very biggest airline networks (to a lesser extent Cluster 2) 
may reap more immediate benefits from such a strategy, given the current 
state of market liberalisation. 
 
Intra-European frequency  
The opposite is true for airline policies that increase frequencies on 
intra-European routes: here, the likelihood that they occur in small or 
medium airports is much more important. Interestingly, medium or even 
small airline operators show a much stronger propensity towards such intra-
European service outside of primary or secondary hubs (when comparing the 
coefficient with total frequency in Freq_T). 
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Concentration of capacity 
The slope variable indicates significant relationships for Clusters 1, 2 
and, to a lesser extent, for small airline operators grouped in Cluster 5. These 
airlines, when concentrating their traffic at some airports rather than 
spreading it evenly across the entire network, show a stronger likelihood to 
attach to the bigger airports (primary and secondary) hubs. Although its 
impact may be less important than that for connectivity or frequency, we 
have to keep in mind that it is correlated with the former and that the distinct 
slope variable remained significant for the likelihood of attachment. Medium 
airlines (Cluster 3), however, suggest that increased concentration of traffic 
may also favour medium or maybe even small airports as a base. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Starting with general assumptions that came from statistical physics, our 
analysis allowed us to assess and identify in a more microscopic way drivers 
of concentration in air traffic. The role of airlines’ strategy for the evolution 
of different structures in air traffic could be emphasized. The general 
statistical assumption that attempted to model network growth, that is, that of 
preferential attachment, was put in perspective in an empirically founded 
analysis for distinct ranges in the distribution of air traffic in Europe. 
We found that different (strategic) groups of airlines showed a 
significant and varying influence on the structure and distribution of air 
traffic. The most serious qualification for the preferential attachment 
assumption came from the biggest airline operators (most of them 
incumbents) with regards to connectivity and for all groups of airlines 
regarding frequency on intra-European routes: here, clear patterns for 
decentralizing air traffic emerged. In particular, it was the strategies of 
medium airlines (i.e., Clusters 3, 4, and also 5) that grew service through 
frequency in a more decentralized way inside Europe. The way airlines 
allocate their capacity inside their own networks mattered as well: Cluster 3 
type of airlines showed commitment to concentrating routes on few medium 
airports rather than primary hubs. Also, distinct groups of airlines provided 
much better resistance to airports in the case of demand shocks: airports that 
were served by airlines in Cluster 2 suffered much less after 9/11. Despite 
the apparent complexity in the interaction between groups of airlines 
regarding the structuring of airline networks, lessons about the progressing 
degree of concentration in air traffic and about the actors responsible for it 
can be drawn. It is up to policymakers to draw further conclusions about the 
optimality of the paths chosen. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the opportunities and threats which arise when turning 
origin/destination airports into hubs. The analysis focuses on market development 
trends, competitive structures—especially in the light of airline network strategies 
and the growing rivalry between airports—and finally the potential financial 
impacts for the airport, including both investment efforts and the financial results 
from hub operations. We argue that in most cases a decision against converting a 
traditional origin/destination airport into a major transfer point is preferable to the 
transformation into a hub.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The hub-and-spoke concept has remained a dominant characteristic of 
most scheduled airline networks since its introduction in the late 1970s, 
particularly for carriers integrated in global airline alliances.1 As a 
consequence, airports facilitating airline hub functions were able to increase 
their air traffic volumes significantly. Even though the market entry of low 
cost carriers has recently re-strengthened point-to-point links between non-
hub airports,2 Hub airports still dominate the global ranking of airports in all 
traffic categories (passengers, air cargo, aircraft movements).  
Driven by the competitive pressure on (formerly) protected national 
carriers to adapt to an increasingly competitive market environment, the hub-
and-spoke-system became a typical companion of the trend towards a 
liberalization of air transport. Consequently, hub-and-spoke networks are 
still increasing their geographic coverage now reaching more newly 
industrialized countries. The general character of hub airports has changed 
due to the fact that the total traffic figures of these countries are usually 
significantly lower than current focal hub-and-spoke markets like North 
America and Central Europe. The carriers operating from hubs are smaller 
(in terms of passengers transported, fleet size, etc.) compared to the 
traditional hub carriers in first world countries. Furthermore, the global 
airline alliances—oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance—have only partly 
sought co-operation or membership by carriers from developing countries. 
These carriers are either not yet able to guarantee the alliances’ quality 
requirements, or the respective national markets are already well served by 
existing alliance members. Therefore, at present fully functioning alliance 
hubs are a rarity in these regions.  
As part of the political process to liberalize the national aviation 
systems, governments of developing countries should consider two closely 
interlinked aspects: the future competitiveness of the national carriers as well 
as the operational and economic capabilities of the countries’ airports. The 
predominant centralization of the administrative and economic processes in 
these countries is also reflected in the structure of their national airport 
systems. The capital city airport is generally the operational base of the 
national carrier and the main gateway to international destinations, bundling 
the services of foreign airlines to and from this country. Consequently, it is 
normally the largest national airport in terms of air traffic handled. Integrated 
national aviation policies have to take this exposed function into account. A 
                                                 
1  On the importance of hubs for airlines and their marketing efforts see Dennis, 
1991. 
2  For a detailed analysis of the impact of low cost carriers on the development of 
airports see Dresner, Lin and Windle, 1996. 
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liberalization policy offers the opportunity of enhancing the airports’ 
capacity and performance as well as improving their market position.  
As the investment for this transition often exceeds the governments’ 
resources, privatizing the airport offers the achievement of international 
airport quality standards within a manageable timeframe. However, the 
market position of the airport on the supply side in terms of destinations, 
frequencies and airlines offered, can only be influenced indirectly by the 
airport.  
In the context of a long-term airport strategy governments often define a 
hub function as the key functional target for the central national airport. This 
expectation, which is often part of the airport privatization tender documents, 
has to be reflected in the light of the different stakeholders’ individual 
targets. As the airport only facilitates but does not operate the hub system, 
the importance of the airlines’ role becomes obvious. The question remains, 
whether this expectation is a valuable target for the airport as well.  
This paper analyzes the effects a hub function has on central capital 
airports in newly industrialized countries. We assume that airport operators 
strive towards achieving business success, whether the operating company is 
privatized or still remains under state ownership. For the purpose of this 
paper, the argument focuses on the passenger market segment. However, 
most of the aspects are also applicable to the air cargo business. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN AIRPORT FUNCTION: 
ORIGIN/DESTINATION AIRPORT VERSUS HUB AIRPORT 
In general, airports can be divided into two categories in commercial 
aviation: origin/destination (O&D) airports and hub airports. In the following 
chapter we will show why this strict separation does not reflect the full 
picture, since airports have to pass various evolutionary stages or 
development phases between being one of those two kinds of airports. To 
allow for this discussion, we first briefly discuss the typical characteristics of 
the traditionally distinguished airport types. 
The role of O&D airports is mainly defined as to act as the gateway to 
their region, offering an attractive point of entrance for visitors and a reliable 
point of departure for locals on their way abroad. O&D airports always 
require a sound traffic demand to allow for efficient and profitable 
operations. Connection traffic is of minor importance for these airports: 
Consequently, their infrastructure does not provide specific transfer 
facilities, and the national carrier has not established coordinated flight 
arrivals and departures to facilitate passenger itineraries which are not 
necessarily related to the respective airport region. Any transfer traffic at 
such airports is mainly limited to connecting small domestic airports with the 
international services and vice versa. O&D airports are the fundament of any 
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point-to-point air transport. Their focus is not to provide the more complex 
transfer operations, which are to a certain extent independent from the 
airport’s location. 
Airlines that have restructured their network on the basis of the hub-and-
spoke concept choose one airport—the hub—as their central point of 
transfer. Flights originating at the various cities in the carrier’s network 
(spoke airports) are consolidated and passengers wanting to travel between 
this airline’s non-hub airports are transferred within a specified timeframe. 
Thus, instead of providing a large number of direct connections between 
cities in the network, a far larger number of indirect connections with a 
transfer stop at the hub can be provided.3  
In this system, a so-called bank can ideally be defined by a wave of 
flight arrivals at the hub from numerous spoke airports during a limited 
timeframe. All aircraft utilized are on ground for a certain period of time to 
allow for the transit of passengers between flights. The airport’s specific 
minimum connecting time (MCT) defines the minimum period necessary to 
allow transfers from all arrivals to all departures and thus to ensure the full 
coverage of potential passenger itineraries.4 Once all transfers have been 
finalized, the aircraft leave the hub again within a limited period of time 
causing a second wave: the flight departures. 
This strict separation between hubs and O&D airports cannot reflect the 
whole range of airport functions in airline networks. On the one hand, like 
O&D airports, all hubs offer direct connections especially for the local 
passengers, leaving from the airport without using feeder flights. On the 
other hand, many O&D airports are trying to establish an initial hub position 
by attracting airlines and promoting transfers  
                                                 
3  The International Civil Aviation Organization uses the following definition for 
transit and direct transit passengers: “Direct transit passengers: Passengers who 
continue their journey on a flight having the same flight number as the flight on 
which they arrived. Passengers in direct transit are counted only once. Other transit 
passengers and stop-over passengers are counted twice: once as embarked passengers 
and once as disembarked passengers.” See ICAO Air Transport Reporting Form, 
Airport Traffic, Form I. Based on this definition, IATA is also referring to transit 
passengers in their airport charges manual. A more common definition, different 
from this official, approach names the other transit passengers as transfer passengers. 
See for example Doganis (2002), p. 339. In this paper, we follow the latter definition 
to avoid confusion with discussions in other papers. 
4  The MCT depends on the necessary processes involved in the transfer of 
passengers and their luggage. These not only include pertinent security checks of 
passengers and bags changing aircraft at the hub, but also immigration or customs. 
Furthermore, depending on the airport’s dimensions, a considerable amount of time is 
needed for the passengers to reach their departure gate and for the handling and 
sorting of their luggage. 
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Our discussion of the various airport and hub types is based on an 
analysis of current capacity supply profiles of selected airports being typical 
representatives of their respective types. These profiles show the available 
arriving and departing seat capacity both for the entire airport analyzed as 
well as for its hub airline or the strongest airline at the airport, respectively. 
The following charts show this profile for a typical day. On the x axis the 
hours of the day are shown, the y axis gives the available number of seats 
provided at any given time. Negative volumes represent capacities arriving 
at the airport, positive values are capacities departing from the airport.  
The charts have been derived through an analysis of the official flight 
schedule data for each airport for calendar week 10, 2006. In this process, 
the entire published flight schedule data including departure and arrival 
times as well as the available capacity per flight and the operating airlines 
has been analysed and clustered into 48 time periods of 30 minutes. This has 
resulted in the reflected total capacity supply in each interval.  
 
Origin/Destination (O&D) Airports 
Tunis-Carthage Airport (TUN) is an example for the first airport 
category, the typical O&D airport. 
Figure 1.  Typical capacity supply profile of an O&D airport: Tunis-Carthage Airport 
(TUN), Tunis, Tunisia 
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Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
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Tunis-Carthage Airport is the home base of Tunisian national carrier 
Tunisair. The airline is concentrating its entire network on its home base. 
This is not only reflected in the fact that almost the entire aircraft fleet 
employed is parked at Tunis overnight, resulting in significant departing 
capacities in the early morning hours and large capacities returning in the 
evening. Tunisair focuses on destinations which can be reached within 
approximately 2.5 hours flying time, which leads to a certain accumulation 
of flight activity during midday, when the entire fleet returns to Tunis before 
leaving again for the second rotations of the day. 
Other airlines than Tunisair have significantly lower market shares at the 
airport. Since most carriers operate routes of a similar stage length as 
Tunisair, but originate at the flag carrier’s destinations—mainly in Europe—
most of their flights arrive in the morning and return around noon.  
Besides these peaks, no major variations can be observed regarding the 
available capacity during the day. The capacities offered are usually in line 
with the demand experienced at the respective airport.  
The operational patterns of the airport as a whole and of Tunisair as the 
most important airline in terms of total seat capacity per day in Tunis do not 
show a clear indication of intended hub operations. These would be reflected 
by a stringent wave structure. 
O&D airports with first hub characteristics 
An example for an airport showing first hub characteristics is 
Johannesburg International Airport (JNB) in South Africa. Its major home 
base carrier South African Airways accounts for a significant share of the 
overall airport operations, but does not reach a clear dominance regarding 
the entire traffic at its base airport. Nevertheless major capacity demand 
differences between the peak utilization and the off-peak periods occur at 
Johannesburg. South African Airways only dominates the morning peak, the 
evening capacity peak is the result of several international airlines arriving 
and departing. The limited overall share of the home base carrier is also a 
result of the competition by other carriers in the liberalized domestic aviation 
market with its strong O&D traffic. 
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Figure 2. Typical capacity supply profile of an O&D airport with first hub characteristics:  
Johannesburg International Airport (JNB), Johannesburg, South Africa 
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Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Long-haul transfer hub airports 
Compared especially to the first example of Tunis-Carthage, but to a 
large extent also to the Johannesburg example airports mainly serving long-
haul routes represent a different typology in terms of their traffic pattern. 
Those routes tend to be served at a lower daily frequency than short- to mid-
haul routes and also depend on a number of specific long-haul travel 
parameters (time differences, night curfews, passenger departure/arrival time 
preferences, etc.). This results in an overall far more condensed operational 
pattern at the airports. These also show longer connecting times between the 
waves to allow the processing of the large number of passengers and their 
luggage. Typical examples for such airports are the new hub airports arising 
in the Middle East, which are the home bases of carriers strictly focusing on 
long-haul flights and competing for connecting traffic. 
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Figure 3.  Typical capacity supply profile of a long-haul transfer hub airport: Doha 
Airport (DOH), Doha, Qatar 
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Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Qatar Airways, the home base operator at the Airport of Doha (DOH), 
accounts for almost the entire traffic at the airport, creating a strong 
dependence of the airport on the national carrier. Due to the airline’s strategy 
of serving and connecting mainly long-haul flights, there are only two peaks 
during the day, with the one close to midnight being absolutely dominant. 
This pattern results in extremely high capacity requirements during the hub 
bank period, while substantially less handling capacities are needed for the 
rest of the day. A very similar picture with even higher traffic volumes can 
be seen at Dubai Airport (DXB) with its home base carrier Emirates. 
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Figure 4.  Typical capacity supply profile of a long-haul transfer hub airport:  Dubai 
Airport (DXB), Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
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Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Hub airports of the Doha or Dubai type experience a daily traffic 
distribution leading to a highly utilized infrastructure only during the peaks. 
During the remaining time, a major share of the capacity provided remains 
under-utilized. Such a situation cannot be achieved by smaller airports, 
which do not have a major home base operator or have not established a 
strong competitive position as a transfer point. 
 
Mature hub airports 
At well-established hub airports a strong home base carrier operates 
several banks—up to 5 or 6 waves during the day-time, taking a total time of 
about 1.5-2.0 hours each. This leads to a situation in which the single peak 
periods follow each other at close intervals and thus generate a relatively 
stable level of infrastructure utilization, interrupted only by short periods of 
lower traffic loads. It has to be realized that even within the group of fully 
developed hub airports differences in the operational patterns and thus in the 
degree of infrastructure utilization can be observed. Paris-Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG) is a typical example of a mature hub airport with a combination of 
short- and long-haul traffic. 
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Figure 5:  Typical capacity supply profile of a mature hub airport: Paris–Charles de 
Gaulle (CDG), Paris, France 
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Source: Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Paris-Charles de Gaulle is one of the largest hub airports in Europe, 
being the home base of the French national airline Air France. It is also one 
of the very few large European hub airports still providing sufficient space 
for further expansion. The operational pattern shown in figure 5 reflects the 
typical traffic situation for a highly frequented hub airport. There are five 
very sharp peaks almost equally distributed over the day, with large 
capacities arriving at the airport and departing shortly afterwards. In the 
evening, there are only two minor additional peaks. These are not as strong 
as the first peaks, but can still be well recognized. The home base operator, 
Air France not only operates the majority of the shown aircraft capacities 
and thus dominates the overall development of the airport. Air France also 
determines the traffic peak pattern with its supply. 
 
Hub airports with de-peaking strategy / Rolling hubs 
Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) reflects a further evolutionary stage of hub 
airports with a so-called rolling hub structure. 
Similar to Paris, a single airline, in this case American Airlines, clearly 
dominates the overall air traffic supply. Apparently this is mainly done using 
a hub concept, but based on a total of about eight waves per day. Due to the 
high number of wave operations, only minor variations between the peaks 
and the short off-peak periods occur. This is the result of a de-peaking 
concept, which tries to reduce extreme peaks and increases the permanent 
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utilization of the airport. At large airports, this is possible by moving flights 
to less congested times, resulting in a more even distribution over the day. In 
the case of Dallas/Fort Worth this is accompanied by coordinating eastbound 
and westbound waves allowing fast and reliable connections for 
transcontinental traffic. Furthermore, along with the increasing number of 
flights the number of connections to most destinations has increased as well. 
This allows for transferring from one incoming flight to several outgoing 
flights, which leads to an erosion of the clear wave structures and eases the 
peaks. 
Figure 6.  Typical capacity supply profile of a rolling hub airport with de-peaking 
strategy: Dallas/Fort Worth Airport (DFW), Dallas, Texas, USA 
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Source: Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Before such a change in the operational pattern is possible, a hub needs 
to reach a certain development stage. Only well-established hub airports, 
which serve a large variety of markets and extremely large passenger 
volumes, show as high a number of waves as the examples given. Usually, 
these hubs serve both short- and long-haul flights as well as continental and 
intercontinental traffic. 
 
The hub airport’s evolutionary stages 
Summarizing the results of these analyses a total of five different airport 
types can be distinguished. The first is the traditional O&D airport, serving 
its region without a clearly observable hub transfer service pattern (e.g., 
Tunis-Carthage). The second airport type only partly targets transfer traffic 
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flows, but has a home base operator operating only one bank in the morning. 
This peak might be accompanied by a second peak in the evening, resulting 
from the same-time operation of several international carriers (e.g., 
Johannesburg). 
The first clearly identifiable hub airport type describes airports with 
strong home base operators focusing on the transfer of passengers between 
long-haul flights. These airports experience one or two banks per day, 
resulting in strong peaks and relatively stable, but significantly lower traffic 
volumes over the day (e.g., Doha and Dubai). Finally, a fully developed hub 
airport combines multiple waves over the day, in which short- to medium-
haul flights are connect with long-haul flights and vice versa. There are two 
possible development stages. The first can be observed at large hubs still 
offering open capacity reserves, showing substantially lower traffic in the 
off-peak periods (e.g., Paris–Charles de Gaulle). The other is the category of 
congested mega-hubs, at which the airlines have already started to introduce 
de-peaking to lower the peak utilization by rescheduling flights into off-peak 
times, resulting in a balance in the use of infrastructure (e.g., Dallas/Fort 
Worth). 
These evolutionary stages of airport development can be identified at 
every airport worldwide. Even though airports are increasingly active in 
developing their own business by attracting airlines through various means 
of airport marketing and air service development,5 it has to be realized, that 
airports do not provide hub operations themselves. It is—and will remain—
the airline that decides whether to establish hub operations at a given 
location. Any initiative of an airport driven transfer strategy remains at a 
very low level, because airports can only cover a minor share of the financial 
risk of providing air services. Thus, for any functional development an 
airport is highly dependent on its most important customers—the airlines—
particularly the home base operator. Therefore providing facilities at an 
airport, which are designed to facilitate hub operations is always a risky 
endeavour, opening great opportunities as well as risks for the success of the 
airport. As long as the hub operations of the home airline flourish, the airport 
will also prosper, due to the constantly growing traffic volumes. Should 
there be major changes in the carrier’s network strategy or should the airline 
go bankrupt, this situation can pose a threat to the airport. 
Recent examples of the discontinuation of a positive traffic development 
at hub airports have emphasized the risk the dependency on one carrier bears 
for an airport. The airport operation is increasingly at risk, the more 
specialized the hub function, the lower the share of the local O&D traffic and 
the higher the passenger share of the hub carrier. 
                                                 
5   See, for example, Jarach (2005). 
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Especially during crisis periods—which are experienced quite 
frequently in the volatile aviation industry—airlines have to react by 
significant cost-cutting measures at short notice. Airports can suffer 
substantially from this situation if a multi-hub carrier decides to scale down 
its network. A remarkable example was the closure of American Airlines’ 
hub at Raleigh/Durham Airport, North Carolina, in 1995. Airport facilities 
highly specialized for the hub function lost their main mission, leaving the 
airport with over-dimensioned, under-utilized facilities generating high fixed 
costs.  
Zurich and Brussels airports have experienced similar situations as a 
consequence of their respective hub carriers’ financial instability. Both have 
constructed major hub terminals for their home base carriers, Swissair and 
Sabena. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both carriers went 
bankrupt within weeks. By that time the construction works were already at 
an advanced stage. As a consequence, both airports had to finalize the 
facilities, continuing to invest substantial amounts in their terminals. To limit 
further losses resulting from the lack of traffic, both airports decided to close 
down the completed facilities to at least save operational costs for the time 
being. Thus, the terminals were not used until a sufficient number of other 
carriers had taken the opportunity to fill the gaps left by the former hub 
carriers at least by serving the strong passenger O&D demand at the two 
cities. Parts of the older terminals were closed after the new facilities 
opened. Both airports lost their specific hub status and a high share of 
connecting traffic, but the O&D demand was still served. 
COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF HUB DEVELOPMENT  
To evaluate the implications of hub operations on an airport from an 
economic or financial perspective, first the underlying basis for any hub 
development needs to be analyzed. Due to the main characteristics of any 
hub—established and operated by an airline, but requiring major investments 
and operational changes from the chosen airport as infrastructure and service 
provider—the goals of both parties involved should be discussed when 
establishing a hub. While the goals are identical or at least complimentary in 
some regards, there are some contradicting targets, which need to be dealt 
with—even though for both parties the main goal of course is a 
maximization of traffic and revenues. 
For the airline, network attractiveness is achieved by providing as many 
connections between as many airports as possible at an efficient and 
profitable level at the lowest achievable cost base. Before the late 1970s the 
standard operational pattern was to link two airports with direct services, 
thus providing non-stop services even on routes offering only a comparably 
low demand. The result of this strategy is the need for a very large aircraft 
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fleet to be able to serve all relevant routes. Furthermore, this fleet must 
consist either of aircraft with very different capacities to serve every market 
adequately, or low seat load factors on some routes and an under-satisfied 
demand on other markets have to be accepted. Both approaches result in 
high direct costs by operating an inflexible and inadequate aircraft fleet or by 
accounting for high opportunity costs caused by not serving existing 
demands. Either strategy has proved to be a sub-optimal business model.6 
Therefore, airlines have started consolidating traffic flows at single points, 
their hubs, to be able to offer flights with a high demand using larger aircraft 
at lower per seat costs while still serving other destinations with direct 
flights. Along with these operational targets another goal is of course to 
establish a strong customer position with the hub airport, enabling the airline 
to negotiate discounts or other benefits. 
A major disadvantage of the hub concept from the passengers’ point of 
view is the transfer procedure itself. Passengers have to change aircraft at an 
airport they did not intend going to and by doing so they need even more 
time to reach their final destination compared to direct services. To minimize 
total travel times as far as possible, airlines need to reduce the time required 
for transferring at their hub. In the global distribution systems (GDS), 
itineraries are always ranked by elapsed travel time. Therefore, airlines with 
inefficient hubs requiring long connecting times are ranked relatively low in 
the GDS. Since approximately 90% of all bookings are made from the first 
screen of the GDS, such a constellation results in substantial competitive 
disadvantages and thus translates into a direct loss of revenues.  
For an airline a hub is not only the transfer point of its passengers. 
Besides the in-flight service it is the best place to cater to their customers’ 
other service requirements. The hub airport is always the ideal location to 
offer dedicated additional services to the high value passengers, namely 
frequent travellers, business and first class passengers. These range from 
lounges and special assistance services to dedicated terminals and transport 
services between the terminal and the aircraft—either with dedicated buses 
or even luxury limousines. 
                                                 
6  While this statement is valid for the traditional network carriers whose target is to 
serve a wide portfolio of destinations, regions and passengers, low cost carriers 
strictly adapt to the point-to-point network structure. Establishing and operating a 
hub-and-spoke network is a very complex and costly issue, whereas low cost carriers 
are strictly focusing on reducing costs. This is achieved by many different means, 
including network simplicity. Transit opportunities are not offered to the passengers, 
there is no time coordination between the single flights. Thus, the following 
discussions exclude the low cost market segment, even though these carriers are 
taking over an increasing share of the market. They do not play a relevant role in hub 
development. 
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While for the airline the main target is to offer a high product quality at 
the hub at low costs, for the airport operator the goals differ significantly. 
The common goals of both parties are passenger services, customer loyalty 
as well as an overall efficient and thus cost reducing operation. At the same 
time, the targets of operating profitably and maximizing revenues for the 
airport require completely different approaches in the context of hub 
development. Airlines endeavour to keep their passengers on the ground for 
as short a time period as possible, which is counterproductive to the airports’ 
target to maximize retail revenues, as passengers hurrying to their 
connecting flight do not have sufficient time to allow for extensive shopping.  
Furthermore, airports naturally strive for a continuously high utilization 
of their infrastructure. Airports are increasingly reluctant to discount charges 
for the hub airline and show a growing interest in attracting other airline 
customers to exploit the available business opportunities. The exclusivity 
targeted by the hub carrier is of course not supported by such a strategy. 
Several additional arguments have a high impact on an airline’s hub 
choice and development. Driven by the still rather regulated aviation system 
the main hub of any carrier can only be located in its home country—
resulting from the availability of traffic rights which usually depend on the 
carriers’ nationalities. Thus, any country without a strong national carrier 
faces severe difficulties in establishing a strong hub.  
Apart from regulative and political reasons various additional influences 
have an impact on a successful hub development. The first is the airport’s 
geographic location. If a hub is intended to bring any advantage to the 
passengers, who ultimately decide on the hub operations’ success, a major 
factor is the lowest possible total travel time even when using the hub. This 
requires a hub location as close to the direct line between origin and 
destination as possible to minimize the flying time for feeder flights.7 Distant 
locations, far from the main routes, are considered disadvantageous and 
cannot be compensated by other competitive means. In this respect it is 
important to distinguish between intercontinental hubs and continental hubs. 
Continental hubs located far away from the heart of the continent tend to be 
suboptimal, for intercontinental hubs the position close to the most utilized 
intercontinental routes is the main decision factor. 
Topographic aspects generally add to the geographical arguments in 
evaluating the hub potential of an airport. Airport locations significantly 
above sea level surrounded by mountains or experiencing extremely high 
                                                 
7  A network simulation model like applied by Berechman and de Wit (1996) for the 
deregulated European market can contribute to the theoretical choice of the hub 
location. However, this approach is of limited value for most developing countries as 
the system of bilateral air service agreements restricts the free choice of routes served 
by the airlines. 
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temperatures bear operational disadvantages especially for long-haul flights, 
since all these features might result in payload restrictions or similar 
operational limitations for the airlines. While these aspects are also relevant 
for certain direct flights, for example, flights between Europe and certain 
South American destinations, they can be accepted for single flights. If a 
complete hub operation has to be set up under such restrictions, negative 
operational factors lead to an overall situation that is not suited to handling 
the complexity of an airport hub operation. 
Besides the operational aspects discussed, competition issues have 
developed as the most crucial influential factors in turning O&D airports into 
hubs.8 The decision to realize this development is usually driven by three 
main targets. First, the airport targets at developing a preferred position in 
the greater region, achieving the status of largest facility in the market and 
the focal point of future air transport development. Particularly economic 
expectations are the main drivers of such a strategy. Second, air transport 
generates economic development and trade flows. The hub for the region has 
a potential position to become the most important trade centre at which the 
trade and travel routes of the region meet. This creates opportunities for an 
increasing economic development of the airport’s surrounding area—for 
example, in the form of logistics parks or a free trade zone—and of course 
for the airport itself.9 Third, the political dimension of having a hub airport is 
one of the most important development drivers, since it is expected to give 
the country and thus the government a leading role in the region. 
All these expectations are closely related to the original hub function. 
Increasing air traffic, as related to a hub development, implies new revenues 
and commercial potential for an airport operator. Additionally, the economic 
impact of air transportation on a country’s industry, trade and tourism are 
well proven. Furthermore, the political dimension of becoming the trade 
centre of a region should not be underestimated. This constellation’s core 
problem is that the benefits expected by developing a hub are far too 
promising to be ignored by any airport in a region without a dominant 
airport. Thus, usually several O&D airports try to take over the leader’s 
position at the same time. This directly results in intense competition 
between several relatively weak candidates, often ignoring the operational 
aspects discussed above. This type of situation can currently be observed in 
Central South America with airports like Lima, Bogotá, Guayaquil and 
Caracas all competing to become a main hub for the continent. While all four 
airports are trying to attract more traffic and to support transfer structures, 
                                                 
8  A deeper discussion of the effects of liberalization developments on airports in the 
European Union can be found in Barrett (2000) or Starkie (2002). 
9  For an evaluation of the economic welfare effects of airports, especially in the case 
of their development by airline alliances, see Park, 1997. 
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they compete intensively by improving, expanding and marketing their 
airport infrastructure. None of them have strong interregional home base 
operators able to support such a development so far.  
A similar kind of competition can be observed in other parts of the 
world, even between larger airports such as Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 
both competing for the same transfer market, or several airports in the Pearl 
River Delta, including Hong Kong and Guangzhou. 
Besides adding to their own, existing infrastructure by undertaking 
multi-million or even multi-billion dollar investments, the competing 
airports use every other available means of competition as well. These range 
from reducing overall landing fees and handling charges for all airlines, to 
special marketing and incentive programs for selected airlines, which for 
example introduce intercontinental services or establish transfer-focused 
operations. Besides the direct financial impact on the airport’s performance, 
which will be discussed in the following, the dramatic competitive aspects 
should be regarded as well, creating a situation in which deregulation might 
lead to destructive competition. 
The competitive dynamics of such a constellation can be shown with 
simple theoretical considerations. Two airports with the choice between 
establishing a hub or not, can be presented in a simple, two-dimensional 
matrix. For both airports, this matrix allows the choice of either an O&D or a 
hub function.  
Now consider a move by any one airport towards establishing a hub. 
There will be a competitive reply by the other airport, resulting in reduced 
revenues for both airports as well as high investment and operational costs. 
We assume that in the case of no change for both airports (both remain O&D 
airports) the business performance will not change for the two players. If 
now any one of the two players chooses to become a hub, this will have two 
impacts. On the one hand, this will lead to an improved economic situation 
for the active player, taking advantage of the new market position. On the 
other hand the competitor will lose traffic and thus experience negative 
impacts. Therefore both players will strive for the position as the first mover, 
since a position as the only hub is preferential to remaining an O&D airport. 
This results in a situation in which both parties establish hub operations at 
high costs, competing at a level which eliminates the positive effects for 
both. The situation for the remaining O&D airport is even in danger of a 
further deterioration as other airlines might shift long-range direct flights to 
the hub airport and only operate spoke feeder flights to the O&D airport. 
104 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
Figure 7. Result matrix for hub considerations 
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In this simple scenario an overall positive outcome (following any 
change) is impossible. Furthermore, the financial risks in setting up a hub 
operation are neglected irrespective of new competitive patterns. In the 
following, this financial perspective is discussed more closely. 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A HUB STRUCTURE FOR 
AIRPORTS 
Hub operations are specifically characterized by an extremely intensive 
utilization of airport infrastructure in a short period of time. The underlying 
concept of providing a high number of transfer opportunities to a multitude 
of destinations leads to significant operational peaks for all elements of the 
airport and the aviation infrastructure at the hub location. Air traffic control 
capacities have to satisfy these demands. Furthermore, runway and taxiway 
systems, apron space, fuel farm reservoirs, passenger terminals and cargo 
facilities have to be provided in line with demand. This may also result in 
further requirements for landside facilities such as the access roads to the 
airport, depending on the share of passengers using the transfer airport as an 
origin or destination airport. This leads to the problem of significant capital 
investments in infrastructure, which is only utilized during the peak times.  
In 2004, the member airports of Airport Council International together 
spent about US$ 30 billion in infrastructure projects.10 This figure underlines 
the high investment costs needed for the upgrading of existing airports to 
                                                 
10  See Airport Council International (2005). 
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cope with the traffic developments and to prepare the airports for the future. 
Of course, the measures taken and the costs of such development projects 
differ significantly depending on the location of the existing airport, its 
current size and the objective of the project. Nevertheless, any terminal 
construction or even building a new airport to replace the existing 
facilities—usually because the current airport cannot be developed further at 
its present location—requires substantial investments. The following table 
gives some examples for recent new terminal or airport development projects 
in different parts of the world. The significantly higher investment costs for 
projects focusing on hub facilities compared to destination airport facilities 
are apparent. 
Table 1. Investment costs for airport expansion or development projects, 2006 
Airport Investment Cost Kind of Project Hub focus? 
Munich, Germany US$ 1.8 billion New terminal including apron Yes 
Frankfurt, Germany US$ 4.1 billion New terminal including new runway Yes 
Lima, Peru US$ 1.2 billion Terminal expansion Yes 
Manila, Philippines US$ 650 million New terminal Limited 
Bangalore, India US$ 180 million Greenfield airport Limited 
Guayaquil, Ecuador US$ 250 million Greenfield airport No 
Ouagadougou,  
Burkina Faso US$ 230 million Greenfield airport No 
Source: own depiction 
 
In addition to the facilities required for successful hub operations, major 
investments also have to be made into the mobile equipment such as 
passenger stairways or trucks and, of course, in qualified personnel to 
operate and handle the airport, the aircraft and the passengers and goods. In 
addition to the sheer air traffic volumes to be handled during the peaks, 
transfer operations require special processes and technical installations, for 
example, a central baggage handling and sorting system or dedicated, 
separate transfer areas for the passengers, who in many cases are not allowed 
to mix with departing or arriving passengers before reaching their respective 
departure gates. The larger the hub operations, the more complex processes, 
systems or terminal areas. These factors lead to high investments and rising 
operational costs. Operational costs include salaries for additional staff, the 
maintenance costs for facilities and equipment, energy costs, insurance costs 
and a multitude of further cost-related items.  
For a financial evaluation of the advantages of hub operations both the 
start-up investments as well as the operational costs need to be considered in 
detail. All these items have to be regarded as fixed costs. It is neither 
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possible to operate the terminal and other infrastructure units only during the 
peak periods, nor to have the necessary staff available only for selected 
hours of the day. Therefore any under-utilization of the airport leads to an 
inefficient use of the available resources. Significant opportunity costs are 
incurred, where the money spent on providing over-capacities could 
otherwise be used for alternative business developments. 
A major underlying problem of hub operations are the different, 
diverging interests of the various partners involved. Airlines following a 
hub-and-spoke network strategy focus all their planning and operation on the 
minimization of the aircraft time on the ground and the maximization of the 
number of connections offered during this time. Successful operations at 
their hub require as little time as possible. Utilizing the airport off the waves 
is comparably unattractive for the respective airline, despite a limited 
number of direct connections only serving local O&D traffic. At the same 
time, reducing costs is a main driver for all business decisions. Keeping 
operating costs and of course airport charges to a minimum is a top priority.  
For airports on the other hand, hub operations result in a far more 
complex and difficult situation. Airlines pay for the use of the provided 
infrastructure and services offered by the means of landing fees or passenger 
service charges. Thus, the costs incurred during the off-peak times through 
maintaining the peak-time capacities have to be covered by other means—
sufficiently higher charges during the peak-times to subsidize off-peak 
periods are usually not accepted by the airlines. This effect, combined with a 
continuous attempt to lower the common aviation charges has led to the 
rising importance of non-aeronautical revenues for airport operators.11 While 
general assumptions claim that about 50% of total revenues at airport 
companies are already generated though non-aeronautical, commercial 
activities, the share aviation revenues account for is expected to further 
decrease over the next years. Even today, large airports such as Los Angeles 
International, San Francisco International, Frankfurt or Munich already earn 
between one-third and two-thirds of their revenues by non-aeronautical 
activities. Table 2 shows current revenue splits for a selection of 
international hub and non-hub airports as well as for several airports with 
only minor hub operations. 
While the changing revenue structure shows that airports have learnt to 
diversify their business and started to develop a certain independence from 
the air traffic development at their facilities, the hidden threats to hub 
airports also become apparent. Obviously the revenues from landing fees and 
passenger service charges will rise with an increase in air traffic, which is the 
                                                 
11  Francis, Fidato and Humphreys (2003) discuss the issue of airport revenues and 
the potential conflicts of interest along two case studies of low cost carriers and their 
impact on airports.  
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core of every hub operation. This general observation still leads to a purely 
positive evaluation of setting up hub operations, since these bring both air 
transport and passenger movements on a large scale. However, it does not 
directly reveal the competitive and operational downsides of such a traffic 
pattern as shown in the above table. Aeronautical revenues become less 
important when hub operations gain momentum, literally forcing the airport 
to compensate their high investment and operations costs with another non-
aeronautical income. 
Table 2. Revenue split for selected airport operators, 2006 
Airport Hub status? 
Share of aeronautical 
revenues 
Share of commercial 
revenues 
Frankfurt 
International Yes 40% 60% 
Singapore Changi Yes < 40% >60% 
London Heathrow 
(BAA) Yes approx. 40% approx. 60% 
Los Angeles World 
Airports Partly 62%* 38% 
San Francisco 
International Partly 67% 33% 
Toronto Partly 59% 41% 
Hamburg No 65% 35% 
Stuttgart No 67% 33% 
* including building rentals 
Source: own depiction 
 
As discussed in the light of competitive aspects, in most regions of the 
world there are either well-established hub airports already holding a strong 
market position or there is a group of airports simultaneously competing for 
the preferred hub location. The quality of facilities and services provided as 
well as the charges due for the airlines are of major competitive importance. 
While the airports’ services tend to increase in volume and quality, the 
charges are systematically lowered in an attempt to attract airlines. 
Therefore, the positive financial effect of additional traffic tends to be 
diminished by the competitive measures facilitating the traffic growth.  
At the same time, former monopolies, for example, ground handling 
services are being increasingly liberalized, leading to greater or new 
competition for the airport operators even within their own operations. This 
again leads to the effect of being forced to reduce charges and to increase the 
service quality offered. 
In total, the effects of hub operations which are originally regarded as 
positive aspects have to be re-evaluated as very limited or non-existent. This 
situation mainly applies to newly developing hub airports. Well-established 
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major hubs with an accordingly strong market and competitive positions 
have usually solved these problems. 
In addition to the discussed leveraging effect two additional factors have 
to be closely regarded in evaluating the financial side of turning an airport 
into a hub: passenger charges and commercial revenues. 
Passenger charges at airports are levied to compensate the airport for its 
services in the context of providing passenger and baggage handling, ranging 
from check-in services, security controls, and baggage screening to the 
transport of passengers and luggage to the aircraft. Since most of these 
activities take place on the landside of the terminal and thus before the 
passenger enters the airside, the complexity and volume of services for 
departing passengers are the highest. For transfer passengers, the most 
important target group of hub operations, the majority of these activities are 
not needed since they have already passed security, very often even 
immigration and customs before leaving their origin airport. Thus, the 
passenger service charges for transfer passengers are usually significantly 
lower than for departing passengers, which again reduces the financial 
benefits for the airport operator. The following table gives an impression of 
passenger service charges at selected airports worldwide for both departing 
and transfer passengers. 
Table 3. Passenger service charges at selected airports, April 2005 
Airport Departing Passenger Charge 
Transfer Passenger 
Charge 
Reduction of 
Transfer versus 
Departure Charge 
Frankfurt € 12.15 – € 17.10 € 10.00 18% – 42% 
Munich € 9.86 – € 12.08 € 7.69 – € 9.42 22% 
Düsseldorf € 9.90 – € 11.78 € 8.80 11% – 25% 
Paris–Charles de 
Gaulle € 4.19 – € 12.10 € 3.64 – € 9.08 13% – 25% 
Dubai AED 30.00 None 100% 
Doha QAR 30.00 None 100% 
Singapore SGD 15.00 None 100% 
USA international 
airports USD 14.10 USD 14.10 0% 
Tunisia € 4.50 – € 6.00 None 100% 
Lima USD 5.04 – USD 28.24 None 100% 
Nairobi USD 40.00 None 100% 
Note: Data from Airport and Air Navigation Charges, by International Air Transport 
Association, April 2005. 
 
The lower the aeronautical revenues, the more important the non-
aeronautical revenues become for the healthy business development of any 
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airport operator. While there are almost unlimited opportunities for airports 
to generate commercial revenues, the most profitable activities are usually 
the operation of parking spaces, concessions and retail activities. Parking is 
only needed by departing and arriving passengers and thus does not offer 
significant revenue generation potentials for hub airports. The same applies 
to many concessionaires’ businesses, for example, car rentals or currency 
exchange bureaus.  
Retail activities are mainly used by passengers who have already passed 
the security line and are on the airside. Having reached that point, the 
passengers use the waiting time to entertain themselves with shopping or 
dining, for example. The retail business of airports therefore benefits from a 
maximum idle time for the passengers. This of course is the direct opposite 
of what an airline expects from its hub airport, that is, the shortest possible 
minimum connecting time. If the passengers have only a very limited time to 
change aircraft they do not have enough time or at least feel that they do not 
have enough time to take advantage of the commercial attractions at the 
airport. This leads to a situation in which increasing operational efficiency 
and speed of the hub operations cause a significant decrease in commercial 
revenues. 
A final aspect with significant impact on the economic success of hub 
operations for an airport is the required terminal space. Hub operations 
process large numbers of passengers and baggage at the same time. To 
handle these traffic flows adequately, terminal areas free of hindrances or 
installations to disturb the traffic flow are needed, providing an efficient 
operation. However, due to the need to finance the hub development through 
non-aeronautical revenues, the commercial areas need to be as large as 
possible. Since these areas should not interfere with the operational 
processes, even more space is required leading to additional investments and 
operational costs. 
The financial impacts of turning a destination airport into a hub airport 
should be evaluated very carefully in each individual case. Well-established 
hub airports have found ways to generate sufficient revenues from their hub 
operations, even though they need to provide large capacities. In the first 
step this requires very high investment costs for new hub airports which 
furthermore lead to significant operational costs once the facilities are in 
place. The more efficiently the processes at the airport can be designed and 
realized, the less the airport will earn with hub operations, making the 
financial result of the development a rather risky undertaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Hubs are the focal points of today’s aviation business. The growing 
importance of low cost carriers and their network strategies have increased 
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the number of point-to-point services in most parts of the world. However, 
the concept of consolidating traffic at major airports will remain the 
dominant approach in the foreseeable future.12 Therefore the general interest 
in achieving a hub status will continue to remain an attractive target.  
Most global markets already have well-established hub airports, which 
have gained dominant positions for their respective niches e.g. hubs for 
regional services or in the intercontinental market. The differences between 
these hub types have to be taken into account in all evaluations of the 
opportunities for a successful airport development. There are only a few 
white spots left where so far no airport has been successful in taking over the 
leadership role. In regions like parts of South America, Africa or even South-
East Asia, many airports intend to establish such a position. 
Our arguments have shown the typical development stages of airports, 
growing from typical O&D airports into hub airports. We have also 
described the competitive reactions to the strategic decision to transform an 
airport into a hub by surrounding competitors and have pointed out the 
financial risks in this undertaking. 
In summary the following factors evolve as the crucial decision points 
for such a development. 
1. From a financial point of view, operating an efficient and reliable 
O&D airport is far more beneficial than setting up a hub airport. Hub 
facilities require large facilities, needing high investments and 
generating increased operating costs. At the same time, aviation charges, 
especially passenger service charges, tend to decrease for transfer 
traffic, forcing the airport to generate revenues from other sources. 
Commercial revenues tend to be difficult to improve, due to the very 
limited time transfer passengers spend in the terminal. 
2. A suitable geographical location is a prerequisite for an airport 
being chosen by an airline as a transfer point. A home base operator is 
necessary, since no other carrier usually has sufficient market presence 
to operate a real hub at a foreign airport.13 A hub needs to be situated at 
a location which does not result in major additional flying time for 
airlines and passengers. 
3. Any airport trying to establish a hub has to face severe competition 
by surrounding airports that are not willing to lose market share to their 
                                                 
12   This development is supported by the introduction of very large new aircraft like 
the A380 and the B747-8. Nevertheless, there will be a growing market for direct 
services on routes with larger demand—the market for which the B787 and the A350 
are designed for. 
13   One of the very few examples is the airport of Singapore, at which Qantas of 
Australia operates a type of hub operation, having co-ordinated all their flights 
between Europe and Australia to allow for transfers. 
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neighbour or to give up their own position as gateway to their region. 
Competition will most probably result in decreasing revenues due to 
reduced aviation charges. 
4. Closely related to the hub status is a strong dependence of the 
airport on a single carrier. If this carrier takes the strategic decision to 
close or relocate the hub or if the hub airline goes bankrupt, the airport 
faces a severe economic threat, which leaves it with substantial 
problems and costs. 
 
It is always a risky decision to promote a change of the current function 
of an airport into a hub facility. Economic and financial success can of 
course be achieved, but need a long and consistent development. During this 
phase, severe competition has to be fought, requiring sufficient financial 
reserves to cover that period. Even then there is no guarantee for success in 
the intended venture. 
Airports working on establishing a hub position do not have to watch 
competition passively. The fields of airport marketing and air service 
development offer significant potential to support the airport’s development. 
They mainly include promotion and incentive programs to attract carriers to 
expand existing services or to introduce new ones to the airport. Of course 
those measures cannot guarantee a successful hub development. The future 
always depends on the airlines’ and their passengers’ decisions. 
As soon as the hub status has been achieved and becomes established, it 
remains promising from both the economic and political points of view. In 
contrast to the attractiveness of this situation for governments of newly 
industrializing countries, the demand for potential new hub airports is 
diminishing. Therefore, the financial and political risks of achieving the hub 
function increase. If a developing country’s government decides to liberalize 
the national aviation market, airline and airport development should be co-
ordinated. Regulatory requirements for potential airport investors to develop 
an airport into a hub are of limited value to both, the national economy and 
the investor. A stabile hub operation at these airports can only be achieved, 
when the national carrier based at the airport benefits financially from a hub-
and-spoke network structure. If this situation can be realized, positive effects 
will be achieved for both the local aviation players and for the region. 
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ABSTRACT 
The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar 
accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based 
on the findings extracted from the investigation, the “lesson learned” becomes a 
genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety 
analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the 
usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today’s 
usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, 
which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the 
merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System 
Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To 
do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 
scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were 
categorized into 10 groups― Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, 
Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, 
Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct 
hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination 
model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. 
An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of 
accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate 
the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Chien-tsung Lu is an Assistant Professor at Central Missouri State University. He completed 
his Ph.D. at the University of Nebraska. He earned an M.S. from Central Missouri State 
University. He is an FAA certified aviation maintenance technician (A&P) and a Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) licensee. His research and teaching interests are in the areas 
of aviation policy, aviation safety, System Safety, and management. 
114 Journal of Air Transportation  
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of the slow recovery of passenger volume, the air 
transportation industry is steadily regaining its customers (Woodyard, 
2004). For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, the outbreak of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) between 2002 and 2003 had 
discouraged passengers from traveling with airlines and substantially 
consumed airline profits. Asian passengers are now gradually rebuilding 
their confidence in air transportation because of the relief of possible 
pathological contagions (Dennis, 2003; FAA, 2004; Lu, 2003). In the 
United States (U.S.), after the disastrous September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist 
attacks resulting in a massive economic loss (Archibold, 2001; Eisenberg, 
2001; Kluger, 2001), public confidence in air transportation is recovering 
due to the government’s implementation of advanced technologies and 
necessary means to ensure aviation safety and airport security (Loy, 2003 
July). 
Historically, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is 
responsible for fostering and encouraging civil air commerce and 
simultaneously auditing aviation safety (Adamski & Doyle, 1999; Rollo, 
2000; Wells, 1999). However, the FAA’s “dual-mandate” responsibility has 
resulted in criticism in terms of the lack of a sufficient ability to accomplish 
safety surveillance (Carlisle, 2001; Carmody, 2001; Donnelly, 2001; Filler, 
2001; Nader & Smith, 1994; Stout, 1999). Not surprisingly after 9/11, the 
FAA’s workload was immediately increased due to the urgent response to 
war on terror. In order not to overburden the FAA, the Transportation 
Security Administration, initially a new branch of the Department of 
Transportation and now attached to the Department of Homeland Security, 
was specifically created to take charge of the overall transportation safety. 
However, despite a tightened airport security, aircraft accidents that 
endanger aviation passengers still occur periodically (e.g., the crash of 
American Airlines Flight 587 in New York on November 11, 2003 and US 
Airways Flight 5481 in Charlotte, NC, on January 8, 2003). Accidents 
indicate a continuing demand to improve safety; but at the same time, most 
airlines operate with a “red-ink” balance sheet (Lu, 2003). In fact, the 
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airline industry is faced with a critical challenge: improving safety in an 
expense-reducing environment. In this situation, a practical model that 
assists safety managers in promptly identifying safety deficiencies would be 
very helpful.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the airline industry is extremely safe, finding a better way to 
continuously audit and promote aviation safety is a perpetual duty for all 
safety enthusiasts. During the past decade, several leading media reports—
the Wall Street Journal (Dahl & Miller, 1996; Goetz, 1998) and USA Today 
(Stroller, 2000)—have tried to rank airline safety by solely focusing on a 
single element: the accident rate. In addition to the reports from Dahl and 
Miller, Goetz, and Stroller, Bowen and Lu (2000) advocated the importance 
of measuring airline safety performance and suggested a more 
comprehensive tool. As advocated by Bowen and Lu in 2000, a more real-
time risk-audit model available for airline managers and government 
agencies could promptly help remedy potential threats to safety. In 2001, 
Bowen and Lu initiated a new safety measuring mechanism― the Aviation 
Safety Rating. This study compared 10 major airlines’ safety performance 
based on four essential categories― Enforcement Action, Accident Rate, 
Management Performance, and Financial Health― with 17 selected safety 
factors (Bowen & Lu, 2001). By applying Analytic Hierarchy Process as 
well as the national Airline Quality Rating, a relative comparison of safety 
performance among 10 US-based airlines was generated. The ASR provided 
a reference table of the airline overall safety that was available for the flying 
public and government agencies. In order to help airline managers prioritize 
the accident factors for effective safety training, Bowen and Lu (2004) 
conducted a follow-up study focusing on the criticality of selected risk 
factors affecting overall airline safety. They reported “the level of 
importance” pertaining to the selected safety factors using a new 
terminology, namely performance sensitivity (Sp). They defined Sp as: the 
percentage change of overall safety score due to the percentage change of a 
specific safety factor. Based on Sp calculation, a list of prioritized factors 
impacting safety performance was created. The result showed that fatality 
rate, average fleet age, and accident rate were the three most critical factors 
affecting an airline’s overall safety performance (Bowen & Lu, 2004a). 
Although the prior studies have proposed tools for measuring airline 
safety performance, they all had one thing in common: they did not discover 
the genuine cause of accidents. Further research is required so as to reveal 
the causality between root factors, causes, and accidents. This situation 
opens a window for further research. With the discovery of root factors 
leading to causes of accidents, a model that targets on accident prevention 
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and safety training could be formulated. In this study, the System Safety 
techniques were applied in an attempt to fill this knowledge gap. 
  
The System Safety concept 
System Safety was conceptualized by the U.S. aerospace industry in the 
late 1940s (Vincoli, 1993). Traditionally, System Safety experts in 
aerospace engineering applied systemic analysis to identify operational 
hazards and subsequently provide countermeasures before a mishap in order 
to eliminate potential risks or hazards (Malasky, 1982; Roland, & Moriarty, 
1990). System Safety is defined by Military Standard 882B as “the 
application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and 
techniques to optimize safety within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle” 
(Layton, 1989, p.1). It is widely known that using System Safety concepts is 
an effective approach to reduce risk by identifying potential hazards, 
providing countermeasures, and assessing the outcome in relation to an 
operational system (Malasky, 1982; Roland, & Moriarty, 1990; Vincoli, 
1993). As noted by Vincoli, a countermeasure could be in the format of 
system re-modification, warning device, safety training, or regulatory 
change; and the application of a specific countermeasure is based on the 
result of cost-effect analysis. 
 
Risk matrix and risk chart 
System Safety is a doctrine used to minimize risk, optimize safety, and 
maximize system’s expected function (Layton, 1989; Malasky, 1982, 
Vincoli, 1993) by using a “risk matrix” (see Appendix A). In the “Risk 
Matrix”, risk is defined as the “likelihood or possibility of hazard 
consequences in terms of severity and probability” (Vincoli, 1993, p.10). To 
further explain this concept, if either the probability (the likelihood of a 
condition or a set of conditions that exist in a given environment) or 
severity (the description of hazard level based on real or perceived potential 
for causing harm, injury, or damage) or both can be minimized, the risk (R) 
of an accident will be minimized consequently. Thus, when the reduction of 
a potential risk (R) becomes urgent, the multiplication of probability (P) and 
severity (S) (i.e., Risk = Probability x Severity) can be flexibly used to 
achieve the determined safety goal (Malasky, 1982; Roland, & Moriarty, 
1990; Vincoli, 1993). To do so, a Risk Chart (see Appendix B) should be 
designed to better interpret the meaning of the original risk matrix in the 
hope of shifting the line of R3 to R2 or even R1 (i.e., either 
Probability/Frequency is reduced from “A: Frequent” toward “E: 
Impossible” or Severity is compressed from “I: Catastrophic” toward “VI: 
Negligible”). 
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The application of System Safety concept 
There are very few studies using System Safety in promoting aviation 
safety regardless of the common application in the fields of aerospace 
engineering, product manufacturing and design, environmental hygiene, and 
medicine. 
In the medical safety field, Robert L. Helreich (2000) advocated the 
application of the System Safety error management concept in medical 
practice. In his study, he first determined the origin of System Safety 
stemming from aerospace engineering and then the usefulness of data 
management pertained to hazard reduction. To accomplish hazard 
reduction, a well-managed database was the key to prevent medical 
malpractices based on the statistical predication of the likelihood of a 
failure. Yet, solely addressing the quantitative forecast, Helrireich’s study 
did not provide any workable models or procedures that the industry could 
adopt and implement. In fact, Helreich’s work was not the only application 
of System Safety techniques in medical industry. Manon Croheecke and his 
research associates (1999) and William Hyman (2002) utilized the leading 
tool of System Safety, the well-known FTA, in evaluating potential hazards 
associated with new innovated medical devices before moving toward the 
production phase within the device’s life cycle. 
In aviation safety, the military launched System Safety techniques to 
improve pilot training procedures. According to Diehl’s (1991) cross-
referenced analysis of 208 military accidents, the top three pilot errors 
leading to mishaps were decision making, mission analysis, and situational 
awareness. Human error was found to be the major cause of aircraft 
accidents in the U.S. Air Force (Diehl, 1991). He discovered that the 
breakdown of cockpit communication/team performance, known as crew 
coordination, had directly constituted military aircraft mishaps. As a result, 
a mandatory crew and cockpit resource management (CRM) training, 
developed by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), for 
military aircrews was immediately put in place. Diehl’s study also used 
System Safety techniques to suggest a modification of the cockpit layout of 
the Cessna Citation used by U.S. Air Force officers. He conducted a 
hazardous and ergonomic analysis and suggested that the cockpit control 
panel should be redesigned in order to eliminate possible confusions 
between pilots and their working environment. His study linked System 
Safety analysis, accident investigation, and hazard identification, to human 
factor and CRM training. He subsequently recommended the development 
of a user-friendly cockpit for military pilots. 
A recent study by Thom and Clariett (2004) was published in 
Collegiate Aviation Review focusing on the applicability of job safety and 
task analysis, another essential tool of System Safety. In their study, a basic 
concern of System Safety analysis, namely job safety analysis, was closely 
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interpreted and the layout of human-machine interface was emphasized. 
Using the Risk Homeostasis Theory of human behavior, their study helped 
identify potential hazards surrounding the hangar, factory, or student 
workshop both internally and externally (Thom & Clariett, 2004). This 
study was of great interest to the aviation community. This study introduced 
aviation educators to the heart of System Safety techniques (job safety, 
environmental factors, failure modes, human error, and hazardous 
categories) and developed significant interest in it within the aviation 
community. 
The previous studies showed the importance and applicability of 
aerospace engineering’s System Safety techniques in promoting military 
flight safety, reducing medical service fault and malpractice, enhancing 
cockpit design, and identifying workplace hazards. Although System Safety 
has been recognized by various industries in upgrading safety or reliability, 
only a small portion of the aviation research community have utilized 
specific System Safety tools to promote airline safety. 
 
The FAA’s System Safety efforts 
The Office of System Safety is the leading player in the FAA’s work on 
aviation System Safety research. It was in 2000 that the FAA Office of 
System Safety first introduced System Safety concept to the aviation 
industry and initiated risk management workshops for its own staffers in 
Hampton, Virginia as a compliance activity after the FAA Order 8040-4 
was published (FAA, 1998). The FAA Order 8040-4 required the Office of 
System Safety to incorporate a risk management process for all high-
consequence decisions (FAA, 1998, p.1) and to provide a handbook/manual 
of System Risk Management and to recommend “tools” of System Safety to 
all US-based airlines. In addition, an annual System Safety conference and 
workshop available for airline managers has become routine since 2000. 
The research efforts from the FAA, project contractors and other sources 
were discussed and ideas were exchanged during each conference or 
workshop. Despite the handbook of System Safety containing essential 
System Safety theories, the current System Safety publications are limited 
to engineering design; navigation system; weather and turbulence forecast; 
global positioning systems; runway incursion; consumer safety guidelines; 
and airport operational procedures. On the other hand, the usage of System 
Safety has been closely tied to data collection and risk management on a 
voluntary basis in the airline industry. Examples of such data collection and 
management include the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), 
FAA Safety Reporting System and Database (SRSD), NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA), Air Carrier Operations System Model (ACOSM), and American 
and Delta Airlines’ Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) (see Appendix 
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C). It is obvious that most current studies from the airline industry have 
been limited to a basic introduction of System Safety management, data 
collection for risk analysis and trend study such as SRSD, ASAP, ASRS, or 
FOQA. Appling System Safety “tools” such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
to identify and prioritize hazardous precedents upstream, determine 
countermeasures, reduce hazardous probability or severity, and prevent 
accidents upfront throughout the life cycle of flight operation would provide 
another meaningful mechanism to the aviation community. It would also 
extend the scope of the usage of System Safety. In this paper, one of the 
essential System Safety tools, namely FTA, was adopted for the required 
calculation of hazardous probability and future simulations purpose. 
 
Fault tree analysis 
FTA is used to examine an extremely complex system involving 
various targets such as skills, quality, equipment, facility, operators, 
finance, management, reputation, or property within the domain of 
operation (Malasky, 1982).  
“By placing each contributing factor in its respective location 
on the tree, the investigator can accurately identify where any 
breakdowns in a system occurred, what relationship exists 
between the events, and what interface occurred.” (Vincoli, 
1993, p.135) 
 
FTA uses an inductive approach in conjunction with Boolean logic and 
failure probability that connects a series of events leading to the top-event 
(Roland & Moriarty, 1990; Vincoli, 1993) (see Appendix D). To 
accomplish a holistic view of an aviation system facing critical hazards, 
FTA tracks upstream and identifies causal factors that may lead to an 
accident or system failure (Brown, 1976). In addition, FTA will help 
researchers build an advisory foundation (recommendation-basis) for 
developing a better accident prevention program from the bottom-up 
(Brown, 1976; Malasky, 1982). The basic procedure of conducting FTA is 
suggested as follows: 1) identifying the top-event, 2) finding all 
contributory events from top-down, and 3) creating a full “fault tree” for 
analysis and recommendation (Roland & Moriarty, 1990; Vincoli, 1993). 
Because FTA may encompass hundreds of root factors underpinning 
accident causes, this study introduced a mini-FTA model that is sufficient to 
describe its purpose of accident-prevention and safety training (Vincoli, 
1993). 
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Research focus 
In order to fulfill knowledge gap and further apply System Safety in 
promoting airlines’ operational safety, the implementation of this study was 
designed with the following four stages: 1) identifying the direct hazards 
leading to airline accidents, 2) discovering critical safety factors 
constituting the causes leading to an accident, 3) creating an accident 
prevention model using FTA for risk simulation, and 4) providing case 
studies and reports showing the applicability of FTA in commercial 
aviation safety by recommending training emphasis. 
RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
Document review 
Accident reports (between 1999 January and 2004 May) were retrieved 
from the U.S. NTSB Accident Docket Databases focusing on FAA FAR Part 
121 scheduled U.S. air carrier services. Accident reports were limited to final 
reports meaning the accident investigation had been completed before the 
day of data retrieval and analysis of this study. 
 
Data coding 
Data coding is a systematic procedure for synthesizing the significant 
meanings of texts by references and comparisons across different records 
and coders (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & ]man, 1994). Data coding is a standard 
practice for a qualitative study (Gough & Scott, 2000). Based on the 
aforementioned analytical highlights of data coding, this study coded 
accident reports based on eight (8) main components: (a) name of air carrier, 
(b) date of accident, (c) aircraft type, (d) number of fatalities, (e) number of 
injuries (both serious and minor), (f) aircraft and property damage, (g) cause 
or causes of an accident, and (h) factor or factors of an accident cause or 
causes. 
 
Reliability and validity 
The reliability of this project rests in the category of research 
consistency. This consistency involved operational processes of Delphi 
techniques (re-identification) and the conformability of results (Creswell, 
1998; Maxwell, 1994). This study used cross-references skill of qualitative 
data coding (QDA) double-checking two codebooks obtained from different 
analytical time and researchers (August 10 and October 1). The obtained 
reliability rate was 90.9% (ten out of eleven causes were concurred where 
the code of “Weather” was not identified by one of the researchers initially). 
After a third round of data review, the cause labeled as “Weather” was 
collectively updated and placed into the cause labeled “Turbulence.” This 
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agreement was done after the initial reliability rate (90.9%) was achieved. 
About validity, the governmental information databases help researchers 
secure data validity of a qualitative research based on the value of 
verification, trustworthiness, and authenticity (Creswell, 1998). With this in 
mind, the NTSB accident reports satisfy the validity criteria of good 
qualitative research (Berg & Latin, 1994; Creswell, 1998; Lincoln & Cuba, 
1985). 
FINDINGS 
The time-period of data retrieval and analysis was between June 18 and 
December 11, 2004. There were a total of 189 final accident reports 
available on the NTSB Aviation Accident Database dated between January 
1, 1999 and May 31, 2004. The finding sections were reported as follows: 
1) The causes of airline accidents, 2) The contributing factors of accident 
causes, 3) FTA model and probability simulation, and 4) Case studies and 
FTA reports. 
 
The direct causes of airline accidents 
The direct causes leading to FAR Part 121 airline accidents between 
January 1999 and May 2004 were ranked and categorized as follows (see 
Table 1): 
Table 1. The Direct Causes of FAR Part 121 Airline Accidents 
 
Rank Accident Cause* Number of Cases % of Cases 
1 Flight Operations 46 24.34% 
2 Ground Crew 43 22.75% 
3 Turbulence  40 21.16% 
4 Maintenance 25 13.23% 
5 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 15 7.99% 
6 Flight Attendant 8 4.23% 
7 Air Traffic Control (ATC) 4 2.12% 
8 Manufacturer 4 2.12% 
9 Passenger 3 1.59% 
10 FAA 1 0.53% 
* Please see Appendix E for the definition of each accident cause after data coding 
 
The accident cause due to Flight Operations error resulted in 46 
accidents (24.34%), which was the most critical individual cause of the Part 
121 accidents. There were 43 accidents as a result of Ground Crew error 
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followed by Turbulence (40 cases), Maintenance (25 cases), FOD (15 
cases), Flight Attendant (8 cases), ATC (4 cases), Manufacturer (4 cases), 
Passenger (3 cases), and the FAA (1 case). Although Flight Operations error 
was the most significant cause (24.34%), the dyad of Ground Crew and 
Maintenance (non-flight) error had resulted in 68 accidents (35.98% of the 
overall mishaps). 
 
The contributing factors of accident causes 
The factors leading to Flight Operations error were: 1) loss of 
situational awareness, 2) misjudgment (ground clearance), 3) weather 
(contaminated, snowy, or icy runway), 4) ineffective communication, 5) 
operational deficiency (supervision, misjudgment, preflight inspection), or 
lack of training (heavy landing, go-around procedure, unfamiliar with 
regulations, and decision-making), 6) non-compliance with standard 
operational procedures, 7) over-reaction (evasive maneuvers, abrupt 
reaction to Traffic Collision Avoid System warning), 8) physical fatigue, 9) 
weather and airport information ignorance (weather briefing, turbulence 
report, Notice to Airmen, Minimum Equipment List, outdated Runway 
Visual Range). 
The factors leading to Ground Crew error were: 1) poor situational 
awareness (clearance, airstair/jet bridge/vehicle operations), 2) ineffective 
communication (tug/truck/beltloader driver-pilots-wing walkers), 3) lack of 
supervision/quality assurance, 4) ramp agents’ ignorance of safety criteria, 
5) physical fatigue, and 6) personal health and medication. 
Most accidents due to Turbulence resulted in flight attendant injuries. 
The factors that led to injuries or fatalities resulting in the cause of 
turbulence were: 1) lack of weather awareness (pilots or dispatchers’ poor 
discipline pertaining to weather evaluation), 2) inadequate training of cabin 
crews when encountering turbulence (inaccurate cabin reaction procedures, 
ineffective crew communication, delayed public announcement), and 3) 
passengers’ inability of cooperating with cabin crews during emergency 
situation. 
The factors that led to Maintenance error (equipment contamination, 
corrosion, engine failure, etc.) were: 1) the lack of quality assurance and 
supervision on performance, 2) non-compliance of standard maintenance 
procedures (SMPs), 3) incorrect data from the FAA, 4) lack of training and 
knowledge, 5) rushed service, and 6) operational ignorance.  
The factors that led to FOD cases were: bird/geese strikes and collision 
with deer. The FOD frequently occurred during: 1) take-off and landing 
phase and 2) night flights around remote non-hub airports. The factors 
leading to the cause of Flight Attendant’s mistakes were: 1) unfamiliarity 
with safety procedures during evacuation, 2) poor communication (between 
pilot, flight attendants, or ramp/gate agents), and 3) inadequate training with 
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abnormal emergency conditions. The factors that led to the cause of ATC 
error were: 1) improper ATC service (the result was pilot’s abrupt 
maneuver) and 2) a failure to provide adequate in-flight separation.  
The factors contributing Manufacturers’ error were: 1) inadequate 
manual information (e.g., gearbox maintenance manual), and 2) improper 
material and imperfect design. The factors that led to the cause of 
Passengers and their injuries were: 1) passengers’ non-compliance with 
regulations during emergency situation, and 2) unruly passengers and 
behaviors. The one factor leading to the cause of FAA was the FAA’s 
improper issuance of airworthiness certificate and Airworthiness Directives 
for specific parts. 
 
FTA model and probability simulation 
The findings revealed that there were 10 main causes, along with 36 
associated root factors, which led to airline accidents during this time 
period. A mini-FTA block diagram showed in Appendix F presents an 
inductive relationship among accidents (top level event), the accident causes 
(second level events) and the causes’ root factors (the lowest level events) 
(see Appendix F). Each accident cause contained from one to nine 
contributory root factors. Based on the Boolean logics, “AND” and “OR” 
gates, researchers are able to examine the whole system from the bottom to 
the top level. These root factors (the lowest level events) included 
inadequate flight performance, fatigue, poor quality assurance, carelessness, 
air-rage, lack of situation awareness, non-compliance with SOPs, 
miscommunication, etc. The mini-FTA model in Appendix F also 
demonstrates an individual root factor could create a category of accident 
cause (second level event) that eventually leads to an accident (top level 
event). 
To address the criticality of the 36 discovered root factors that led to 
the accidents, simulating accident probability of the top-event would help 
explain the significance of the FTA model and predict the likelihood of the 
top level event. For instance, using the study of Bowen and Lu’s assessment 
of major airlines’ safety performance in 2001 and 2004, the probability of 
pilot fatigue (a root factor) leading to an accident was about 1.7x10 ⎯5 (1.7 
cases per one hundred thousand flights) (Bowen and Lu, 2004). Because 
there could be hundreds of different factors associated with one accident 
cause, the probability for an accident cause to exist would be (1.7x10 ⎯5) x 
100, which is 1.7x10-3 (see Appendix G). And since  any of the ten accident 
causes (an “OR” gate logic in this study) could lead to the top-event, the 
probability for an accident to occur could be (1.7x10-3) x 10, which is 
1.7x10-2 meaning 1.7 accidents for every 100 flights. This high probability 
of an accident should have drawn the attention of the aviation community. 
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Reversely, based on the same FTA model presented in Appendix G, if 
airlines can reduce the accident probability of each root factor to 1.7x10 ⎯7 
instead of 1.7x10 ⎯5 (as a result of imposing safety trainings, new safety 
guidelines, effective flight training, or upgraded navigation technologies), 
the ultimate accident probability of the top level event becomes 1.7x10-4 
meaning 1.7 mishaps for every 10,000 flights. This simulation of accident 
probability shows that it is extremely critical for the airlines to mitigate 
potential hazards from the bottom level as early as possible. If the 
probability of each root factor (the lowest level of the fault tree) could be 
compressed or even eliminated, the probability of accident causes (the 
second level of the fault tree) resulting from a combination of various root 
factors would be dramatically reduced. Eventually, the probability for the top 
level event (i.e., an accident) to occur could be minimized. 
 
Case studies and FTA reports 
The main purpose of conducting FTA in aviation safety is to identify 
potential hazards, provide recommendations and reports, and to prevent 
similar accidents from happening again. In order to further strengthen the 
applicability of the FTA accident model, case studies are provided. All 
cases were retrieved from the NTSB Accident Database online either in a 
PDF version. 
Case 1. NTSB ID: LAX00LA223 
An engine forward cowling door on the number 1 engine separated 
from the engine nacelle during the take off rolling at Las Vegas 
International Airport. The separated part consequently struck the 
horizontal stabilizer attached to the vertical fin. The pilot described 
that aircraft vibrated on runway during the take off rolling. The 
aircraft was under an RON (Remain Over Night) check due to the 
complexity of maintenance. The technicians opened the engine 
cowling door for the needed RON check at night but failed to ensure 
the proper hand-over procedure with the day-shift team the next 
morning. In addition to the required follow-up in relation to engine 
inspection, the day-shift team was assigned with other inspection 
tasks as well (NTSB, 2001, August 21) 
 
The cause and root factor of this accident was mechanic’s failure to 
refasten the cowling door prior to signing off the aircraft back to service. 
Providing countermeasures should focus on retraining communication skills 
and quality assurance and re-emphasizing team work capability based on 
the recommendations of AC-120-51D and maintenance resource 
management (MRM). 
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Case 2. NTSB ID: NYC02LA013 
Before the landing, the captain briefed a “no go-around” for a night 
visual approach even though the approach was not stabilized. The 
airspeed was decreasing to near the speed of stall. After touch 
down, the aircraft maneuvered at a nose-high pitch attitude and 
struck the runway on the aft fuselage. The first officer did make an 
initial callout about the stall airspeed but the captain did not 
respond. During the post-accident interview, the captain reported 
that she decided to land without initiating go-around because there 
was no traffic on the runway at night. The first officer did not 
challenge the captain even though the decision was wrong. The 
captain described that the first officer was very quiet; yet the first 
officer complained that the captain was self-defensive and did not 
like any criticisms (NTSB, 2003a) 
 
The cause of this accident was the captain’s failure to maintain airspeed 
resulting in both a stall and a hard landing. The factors involved were the 
failure of both pilots to comply with the company’s CRM guidelines, flight 
manual procedures, and the captain’s improper approach briefing. 
Providing countermeasures should focus on: (a) recurrent CRM 
training, (b) pilot’s flight procedure retraining, and (c) flight operation 
proficiency and training guidelines should come from AC-120-51D, 
Preflight SOPs, and airline’s simulator training procedures. 
Case 3. NTSB ID: DCA99MA060 
A McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82) crashed after it overran the 
end of runway 4R during landing … After departing the end of the 
runway, the airplane failed to maintain vertical airspeed and struck 
several tubes extending outward from the left edge of the instrument 
landing system (ILS) localizer array…The airplane was destroyed by 
impact forces and a post-crash fire (NTSB, 2003b, p. 169-170). 
 
The cause and root factors of this accident were “The flight crew’s 
failure to discontinue the approach” and their failure to ensure the spoilers’ 
extension for landing due to (a) flight crew’s fatigue and stress, (b) 
situational awareness of airport weather, and (c) incorrect operation of using 
reverse thrust after landing. Providing countermeasures should focus on 
conducting recurrent CRM trainings for pilots and retraining pre and post 
landing procedures based on the recommendations of AC-120-51D and 
SOPS of flight operations. 
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Case 4. NTSB ID: DCA03MA022 
A Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D crashed shortly after takeoff from 
runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport due to the 
airplane’s loss of pitch control during take-off. The 2 flight 
crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 
person on the ground received minor injuries (NTSB, 2004a, p. 13) 
 
The cause and root factors of this accident was the loss of pitch control 
resulted from an incorrect rigging of the elevator system compounded by 
the airplane’s aft center of gravity, which was substantially out of limit. 
Additional contributing factors to the cause of incorrect rigging were: (a) 
lack of oversight of the maintenance station by the airline and the FAA; (b) 
improper maintenance procedures and documentation; (c) erroneous weight 
and balance calculation; (d) ineffective manufacturer’s onsite quality 
assurance; and (e) the FAA’s outdated weight and balance assumptions. 
Providing countermeasures should focus on: (a) revising the FAA’s 
weight-and-balance reference data, (b) imposing recurrent trainings for 
quality assurance (QA) inspectors both for airline and manufacturer, (c) 
providing aircraft technician’s job compliance training, and (d) ensuring 
preflight SOPs based on the FAA’s formed rulemaking procedures and 
inspection handbooks, maintenance trouble-shooting SOPs, preflight SOPs, 
maintenance resource management (MRM) guidelines, and AC-120-51D 
recommendations. 
Case 5. NTSB ID: NYC03FA039 
A Boeing 757 was struck by a taxing Airbus, while parking at the 
gate with passengers aboard. Maintenance technicians were taxing 
the Airbus. The maintenance technicians testified that both parking 
brakes were activated while waiting for ground crews to arrive for the 
follow-up procedures. He released the parking brake after the ground 
crews arrived and took over the residual operation. The technicians 
slightly increased the throttles because the aircraft did not move after 
parking breaks were released. The airplane struck the jet way despite 
the engine throttles were repositioned to idle speed (NTSB, 2004b) 
 
The cause and root factors of this accident are the aircraft technician’s 
lack of training in terms of aircraft system, maintenance procedures, and 
ground safety guidelines. Providing countermeasures should focus on: (a) 
imposing a recurrent training of maintenance standard operation procedures 
(SOPs), (b) aircraft system training, and (c) ground operation safety training 
based on the maintenance resource management (MRM) guidelines, AC-
120-51D recommendations, and manufacturer’s system handbooks or 
maintenance manuals. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study discovered the 10 direct causes leading to accidents and 
36 root factors behind accident causes. By using FTA, aviation safety 
practitioners can design a more efficient and effective safety training aiming 
to detect risk factors, provide countermeasures, and reduce the associated 
hazardous probability and severity. This study is concluded as follows: 
1. Implementing System Safety techniques is feasible. In this study, 
the ultimate goal of conducting System Safety analysis using FTA is to 
prevent future accidents by identifying potential hazards and providing 
countermeasures and recommendations. Although many studies had been 
accomplished measuring the overall safety performance (Bowen & Lu, 
2001 & 2004a; Dahl & Miller, 1996; Goetz, 1998; Stroller, 2000), they did 
not provide a good model for safety practitioners to promptly and 
effectively identify accident causes and their root factors. Without 
identifying specific root factors and accident causes leading to mishaps, 
solely measuring safety performance could be of limited value and result in 
aimless and ineffective safety training. In fact, System Safety experts 
advocate four fundamental levels of safety precedence regarding hazard 
ramification. They are reengineering; redundant system design; warning 
signals and devices; and safety training and education. The most 
inexpensive safety precedence is safety training and education (Vincoli, 
1993). This is an important feature for today’s airline businesses suffering 
from financial hardships and simultaneously concerned with offering the 
highest degree of care in terms of passenger’s safety. 
2. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is plausible. It is important to 
understand FTA because it helps safety enthusiasts (government or airlines) 
to effectively and promptly isolate accident postulates and to implement 
strategic safety prevention programs from the bottom-up. Based on the FTA 
block-diagram in this study, any of the root factors on the bottom level can 
form a cut-set, that is, a chain-of-events that can result in an accident or a 
system failure, breaking down the entire system. Hence, compressing or 
eliminating the failure probability of root factors from the lowest level of 
“the tree” should be regarded as the training priority. 
3. Human Factors training is critical to pilots. Regardless of the 
accident cause of turbulence and FOD, “pilot error” was the primary factor 
leading to airline accidents in this study. Krause (1996) and Orlady (1999) 
stated that Human Factors is a very powerful training tool for pursuing an 
error-free and safety-laden airline operation. Since 1990, the FAA has 
regulated CRM training for flight crews (based on NASA’s Human Factors 
research in the early 1970s). This can be found in Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR) Part 121 Subpart N for major air carriers and for Part 135 
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regional commuters under SFAR 71 (Aviation Supplies & Academics 
[ASA], 2001). 
4. Non-flight activities are equally hazardous as flight activities. 
According to the findings of this study, non-flight error constituted more 
mishaps (68 cases) than flight operation (46 cases). In fact, the aviation 
safety net consists of flight crews, maintenance personnel, air traffic 
controllers, airplane dispatchers, flight attendants, ramp agents, airport 
security, and all related professionals. Aviation personnel should work 
closely together because a single flawed portion of the safety net could 
result in an unrecoverable safety breakdown and, thereby, human injuries, 
fatalities, or substantial financial loss. By virtue of the Swiss-cheese safety 
model, aviation accidents happen when unsafe acts or operations are present 
and line up simultaneously (Reason, 1990; Wood, 1997). With this in mind, 
in order to strengthen the aviation safety net based on mini-FTA model, it 
may be reasonable for the aviation community to support a mandatory 
Human Factors or MRM training for ground and maintenance personnel. 
COMMENTS 
Although the potential cost is always a big concern regarding an 
accident prevention program (Del Valle, 1997; Duke, 1999; Finder, 1999; 
Hahn, 1997; Morris, 2001; Morris, Rigavan, Whitelaw, Glasser, Strobel, & 
Eltahawy, 1999; Wald, 2000), providing safety trainings to employees 
would consume the least amount of financial sources. According to System 
Safety guidelines, the prevailing methods of implementing an accident 
prevention program include system re-engineering, administrative reform, 
and work practice controls (Brown, 1976; Gloss & Wardle, 1984). If system 
re-engineering and administrative reform are too costly to adopt, work 
practice control (i.e., safety training) is the most cost-effect method to 
reduce risks and prevent potential accidents. The safety training should be 
mandatory or routine. Otherwise, the effectiveness of training would be 
lower-than-expected (Bowen & Lu, 2004b; Lu, 2003; Vincoli, 1993). 
The doctrine of System Safety is very useful in accident prevention and 
safety enhancement. Aviation safety enthusiasts could utilize System Safety 
tools like the FTA model to identify potential hazards associated with 
airline operation and to recommend needed countermeasures and trainings 
for employees. Despite the immediate goal for the aviation industry to 
regain its revenue after the 9/11, maintaining a risk-free aviation 
environment should be positioned as the top priority for airlines and our 
government. Even though the airline industry is extremely safe in the U.S., 
accidents are still a threat to the flying public because accidents will occur 
periodically and will claim lives again. From the public’s standpoint, each 
accident is a metaphor for either the government’s or the airline’s failure to 
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adequately protect its clients. This study has demonstrated that using 
System Safety tool is another viable approach to achieve the goal of zero 
accidents. 
FUTURE STUDY 
Despite free publications offered by the FAA regarding severe weather, 
in order to proactively reduce aircraft accidents resulting from turbulence 
and bird hazard/FOD, the aviation community needs to put more effort into 
meteorological, technological, and biological studies. In the future 
application of System Safety techniques, using computer software could 
dramatically help System Safety managers in different segments of the 
aviation industry simulate hazards and provide safety trainings scenarios 
promptly and accurately. With the help of computer technologies tailored for 
risk analysis, the application of FTA or other System Safety tools can be 
applied to a greater extent. 
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APPENDIX A 
RISK MATRIX, SEVERITY & PROBABILITY 
Risk Matrix* 
Frequency Catastrophic (I) Critical (II) Marginal (III) Negligible (IV) 
Frequent (A) 1A 2A 3A 4A 
Probable (B) 1B 2B 3B 4B 
Occasional (C) 1C 2C 3C 4C 
Remote (D) 1D 2D 3D 4D 
Impossible (E) 1E 2E 3E 4E 
* A “Risk” falling into this category [1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 1B, 2B, 1C] is “Unacceptable” 
A “Risk” falling into this category [1D, 2C, 3B, 3C, 4B] is “Undesirable” 
A “Risk” falling into this category [1E, 2D, 2E, 3D, 4C] is “Acceptable With Review” 
A “Risk” falling into this category [3E, 4D, 4E] is “Acceptable Without Review” 
The determination of “Unacceptable,” “Undesirable,” “Acceptable With Review,” or “Acceptable 
without Review” is based on a System Safety analyst’s subjective decision-making based on the 
onsite situation from case to case. 
 
Risk Severity (S) and Probability (P) are defined as: 
 
Risk Severity (S) 
Description Category Mishap Definition 
Catastrophic I Death or system loss/failure 
Critical II Severity injury, occupational illness, or system damage 
Marginal III Minor injury, occupational illness, or system damage 
Negligible IV Other 
 
Risk Probability (P) 
Description Level Mishap Definition 
Frequent A Likely to occur frequently 
Probable B Will occur several times during the life of an item 
Occasional C Likely to occur sometimes in the life of an item 
Remote D Unlikely, but may possibly occur in life of an item 
Impossible E So unlikely, assumed that hazard will not occur at all 
Source: DOD MIL-STD-882B System Safety Program Requirements (1984) 
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APPENDIX B 
RISK CHART 
 
 
Note. The product of Risk Probability (P) and Risk Severity (S) is equal to Potential Risk (R) 
thus in System Safety concept R = P x S. The forming of a “Risk Chart” above was converted 
from the original Risk Matrix and generates a bivariate curve for a better understand and 
interpretation.  
Probability 
Severity/Financial Loss 
R1
R2
0 
R= S x P 
R3
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APPENDIX C 
SYSTEM SAFETY WORKSHOPS AND CONFERENCES – 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
System Safety Management X x x X 
Aviation System Safety Program (AvSP) X x x X 
FAA-Airlines Collaboration X x x X 
Data Collection & Risk Analysis X x x X 
System Risk Management (SRM) & Safety Culture  x x X 
Flight crews-centered X x  X 
Non-flight crews-centered X x x X 
All aviation workers X    
Air Carrier Operations System Model (ACOSM) X    
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) X x  X 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) X x  X 
Advanced Quality Program (AQP) X    
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) X   X 
Continuous Analysis and Surveillance System (CA X    
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) trainin X x   
Human Factor CRM training X x x X 
Case-based training/Naturalistic Decision-making X x x X 
Regulations X x x  
Cost-benefit and Safety Investment X x x X 
Failure Mode and Effective Analysis (FMEA) 
Concept 
  x   
Failure Mode and Effective Analysis (FMEA) 
Application 
     
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Concept   x   
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Application      
Risk Control Management (RCA)     x 
Hybrid Causal Modeling    x x 
Note. The origin of this Content Analysis Table was statistically extracted 
from the research projects and papers presented at the FAA System Safety 
workshops and conferences between 2000 and 2004. As shown in the above 
table, most researches either focused on the advocate of using System Safety 
concepts or risk analysis covering trend study. Researchers did not apply 
tools (i.e, FTA or FMEA) to their studies for a demonstration. Especially, 
there were only two papers explained FMEA and FTA techniques over the 
past four years. Yet no further application was found. 
136 Journal of Air Transportation  
  
 
APPENDIX D 
BASIC LOGICS OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Top 
Event/Acci
dent 
Cause 1 Cause 2 
Sub-
Causes 1 
Sub-
Causes 2 
Sub-
Causes 3 
Sub-
Causes 4 
Sub-
Causes 5 
Sub-
Causes 6 
P9 
P8 P7 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
Note. The Sub-Causes must be preconditions of the upper level accident Cause; and Causes 
are preconditions of the Top-Event/Accident. Pi (i = 1~9) represents the risk 
probability associated with each specific “cause” or “factor.” 
Note: 
 
  represents “AND” gate, while  represents “OR” gate. Other logical gates could 
be used into tree analysis based on different cases, purposes or situations. 
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APPENDIX E 
TERMINOLOGY OF ACCIDENT CAUSES 
 
In this study, the causes leading to an accident were categorized and defined 
as the following for a better understanding of research findings: 
 
Flight operation: an accident was caused by cockpit crews 
 
Turbulence: an accident was caused by turbulence (in-flight, clear air, wake 
turbulence) 
 
Maintenance: an accident was caused by aircraft maintenance personnel 
 
Ground crew: an accident was caused by ground crews (truck driver, 
beltloader or tug operator, ramp agents, etc.) 
 
Foreign Object Damage (FOD): an accident was caused by birds, animals, 
and any objects that do not belong to aircraft itself 
 
Flight Attendant: an accident was caused by flight attendant’s inadequate 
emergency actions 
 
Air Traffic Control (ATC): an accident was caused by air traffic controller’s 
misjudgment 
 
Manufacturer: an accident was due to manufacturer’s design, official 
inspection manuals, etc. 
 
Passenger: an accident was caused by passengers themselves 
 
FAA: an accident was caused by FAA’s discretionary function regarding 
certificate approval, inspection, etc. 
 
Non-flight Error: a combination of maintenance and ground crew’s 
operational mistakes. 
138 Journal of Air Transportation  
  
 
APPENDIX F 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
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APPENDIX G 
SIMULATING THE PROBABILITY OF THE TOP-LEVEL EVENT 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Commercial aircraft undergo a significant number of maintenance and logistical 
activities during the turnaround operation at the departure gate. By analyzing the 
sequencing of these activities, more effective turnaround contingency plans may be 
developed for logistical and maintenance disruptions. Turnaround contingency 
plans are particularly important as any kind of delay in a hub based system may 
cascade into further delays with subsequent connections. The contingency 
sequencing of the maintenance and logistical turnaround activities were analyzed 
using a combined network and computer simulation modeling approach. 
Experimental analysis of both current and alternative policies provides a framework 
to aid in more effective tactical decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal deregulation of U.S. airlines in 1978 resulted in significant 
changes to the air transportation industry. One of the most significant 
consequences continues to be the phenomenal growth in the number of air 
passengers. According to Department of Transportation (DOT), between 
1975 and 1999, the number of air passenger enplanements in the U.S. rose 
by 210 percent from 197 million to 611 million (DOT, 2001). In 2003 alone, 
there were 642 million enplanements and this is expected to exceed 1 billion 
by the year 2010. As Table 1 illustrates, in recent years, a large percentage of 
these flights have been subjected to delays. DOT estimates the cost of these 
air traffic delays at approximately $3 billion per year, and projects that 
delays will continue to increase as the demand for air traffic grows (DOT, 
2003). 
Table 1. U.S. airlines delays, 2001-2003 
Note. The data are from Airline Industry Metrics: Report Number: CC-2003-007, by 
Department of Transportation, 2003. Washington, DC. 
 
A major source of flight delays involves turnaround operations. 
Turnaround operations are defined as the activities that take place in the 
intervening period between the arrival of an airplane at an airport and 
departure of the same airplane. These activities include baggage handling, 
passenger deplaning and enplaning, security checks, cleaning, catering 
supplies, aircraft maintenance, and fueling. Some of these activities are 
mandatory, and are statutory requirements of government agencies such as 
Federal Airports Administration and the new Transportation Security 
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Administration. Other activities are routine and are guided by the operational 
policies of the airline. 
Turnaround activities consume significant time and resources. 
Walkways must be set up for passengers to deplane and enplane; material 
handling equipment placed and operated for baggage offloading and 
uploading; and maintenance, fueling, cleaning and stocking of catering 
supplies scheduled. The efficiency and duration of the turnaround operation 
has a significant impact on the punctuality of flight departures. If turnaround 
activities are not completed on time, flight departure may be delayed. 
Flight departure delays can have increased impact at hub and spoke 
airport systems. In these types of systems, banks of flights are scheduled to 
depart and/or arrive at the same time. This enables an airline to have several 
connections to many destinations, several times a day. The main attraction of 
a hub-and-spoke network is the ability of airlines to sustain a higher level of 
aircraft utilization while passengers enjoy increased frequency of service. 
This has led all the top 10 major airlines in U.S. (except Southwest Airlines 
which has a point-to-point operation) to utilize the hub-and-spoke network to 
route their airplane traffic. However, the hub-and-spoke network is not 
without some disadvantages. The high volume of air traffic generated at an 
airline hub airport invariably leads to congestion and delays (Ghobrial & 
Kanafani, 1995). This is even more critical because of the multiplier effect of 
a delay on other flights. 
PREVIOUS RELEVANT RESEARCH 
A number of different research approaches can be found in the literature 
dealing with various aspects of airline delays and congestion. Many 
researchers have adopted common types of mathematical modeling to 
examine air traffic delay and congestion. For example, Teodorovic and 
Stojkovic (1995) proposed a heuristic model based on dynamic 
programming to reduce airline schedule disturbances. Similarly, Gu and 
Chung (1999) studied the aircraft gate reassignment problem using a genetic 
algorithm approach. 
Although these types of mathematical modeling can be a useful tool to 
provide several solutions simultaneously, it is frequently necessary to make a 
large number of simplifying assumptions. A more effective tool for large and 
complex problems that may not be very appropriate for mathematical 
modeling is discrete event simulation (Cheng, 1998). Simulation in 
particular allows researchers to experiment with different resource and 
operating policy alternatives without disturbing the actual system. 
These advantages have resulted in simulation being used in a wide 
variety of applications in the air transportation industry. Tunas, Young and 
Bender. (1998) described the use of discrete-event simulation in modeling 
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curbside vehicular traffic which was used in planning and designing a new 
airport. Gatersleben and Van der Weij (1999) developed a model to analyze 
and simulate passenger flow in an airport terminal. The application was used 
to identify bottlenecks in passenger handling, and also to provide integral 
solutions for these bottlenecks. Ottman, Ford and Reinhardt (1999) 
investigated aircraft departure procedures at the United Parcel Service 
Louisville Air Park. These researchers developed a simulation model to 
determine taxi times, taxi delays, and ramp delays during changes in flight 
departure schedules and parking plans. The model was also used to analyze 
stages involved in an airport expansion and potential changes in the airport 
property. 
Rosenberger et al. (2000) conducted extensive research on a stochastic 
model of airline daily operations. Chung and Sodeinde (2000) used 
simulation modeling to analyze the sequencing of passenger procedures at 
the ticketing counter. Hafizoguillari, Chinnusamy and Tunasar (2002) 
studied how simulation is used to reduce airline misconnections in the 
analysis of Delta Airlines’ new planned facility at JFK Airport. The 
simulation evaluated the airline’s minimum connect time.  
Many air traffic delays can be directly attributed to turnaround activities 
but there is very little research in this particular area. Braaksma and 
Shortreed (1971) analyzed aircraft turnaround activities using a critical path 
method. This was a pioneering effort. It was, however, limited to a single 
turnaround operation at one gate, and did not consider the occurrence of 
unusual delays during turnaround. Manivannan and Zeimer (1996) described 
an application of discrete-event simulation in the modeling and analysis of 
aircraft cargo offloading operations at an air-cargo hub. The simulation was 
implemented in Automod II software and included a base model that showed 
existing cargo offloading operation. Findings from the experimentation and 
statistical analysis revealed the best configurations for resource planning. 
Andersson, Carr, Feron and Hall (2000) carried out a study of ground 
operations at hub airports in order to build an airport congestion prediction 
capability. Maintenance activities during the turnaround period for 
commercial aircraft have been investigated. However, this has been from a 
maintenance worker resource level planning perspective (Gupta, Bazargan & 
McGrath, 2003). 
Turnaround delays associated with passenger boarding have been 
examined by Landeghem and Beuselinck (2002). They conducted a 
simulation analysis investigating different boarding patterns and operating 
strategies, and suggested ways to improve the existing system. Lastly, Wu 
and Caves (2002a, 2002b) developed a simulation model to simulate aircraft 
turnaround using data from a European airline. However, their model is 
limited to baggage/cargo flow and passenger/crew flow. The model does not 
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include other aircraft turnaround activities (such as refueling, aircraft 
maintenance, and catering).  
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are several consequences of flight delays. First is customer 
dissatisfaction (missed meetings, lost personal time, anxiety and stress), 
which may eventually lead to the boycotting of the airlines, and loss of 
business (Bethune, 1998). Second is lower system productivity because 
flight delays may lead to flight cancellation or reduction in the number of 
available flights. This implies that less revenue is being earned from the 
utilization of the airlines’ assets. Third is the multiplier effect on the system. 
One particular flight delay can cause congestion and disruption of several 
flights, especially during peak periods in hub networks. All of these 
contribute negatively to the bottom-line of airlines and airports. 
In order to better understand the impact of flight delays associated with 
turnaround operations, a simulation model was developed that specifically 
focused on the activities related to the turnaround operation. This model was 
used to analyze the effects of different maintenance, logistical, and 
operational delays on the aircraft’s turnaround time. By analyzing these 
effects, more effective contingency plans can be formulated to respond to 
these delays. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the research methodology that was utilized to 
analyze the aircraft turnaround operation. The research methodology section 
includes system definition, data collection and analysis, model translation, 
verification and validation, and experimental design. The research 
methodology section is followed by research results and discussion sections. 
 
System Definition 
A flow chart showing a high-level conceptual description of the system 
is shown in Figure 1. An aircraft arrives at the hub and is assigned a gate for 
parking by the air traffic control tower. A Jetway is prepared and the 
turnaround activities begin. As previously discussed, these activities include 
the positioning of baggage material handling equipment, baggage offloading 
and uploading, maintenance operations, fueling, cleaning and stocking 
catering supplies. Some of these activities are not necessarily sequential. 
When the turnaround operation is completed, the aircraft is dispatched and 
ready for departure. 
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Data collection and analysis 
Input data associated with the turnaround process was collected at the 
principal hub of a major U.S. passenger air carrier. The collected input data 
was analyzed and fitted to a theoretical probability distribution using the 
Arena Input Analyzer (version 7.0; Rockwell Automation, 2005) simulation 
modeling software. Table 2 summarizes the theoretical probability 
distributions related to each turnaround operation activity. These probability 
distributions were utilized as input to drive the turnaround simulation model. 
Figure 1. Conceptual description of an aircraft turnaround operation 
system
Aircraft
Arrival
Parking
Flight Dispatch
Aircraft
Departure
Turnaround activities:
Passenger deplane
Baggage offload
Catering
Fueling
Cleaning
Maintenance
Passenger enplane
Baggage upload
Stop
Start
 
Table 2. Summary of input data distributions related to each activity of an aircraft 
turnaround operation system 
Variable Expression 
Passenger deplane Triangular (3.50,8,12.50) 
Baggage offload 6.50 + 24 * Beta (0.67,0.86) 
Catering Normal (22.10, 3.44) 
Fueling 6.50 + 29 * Beta (0.58,0.70) 
Cleaning 4.50 + 16 * Beta (0.96,1.30) 
Maintenance 3.50 + Weibul (7.91, 0.92) 
Passenger enplane Triangular (13.50,21.30,22.50) 
Baggage upload 16.50 + 18 * Beta (0.99,1.12) 
Scheduled turnaround Poisson (68.10) 
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Model translation 
The simulation was developed with the simulation modeling software 
Arena (version 7.0; Rockwell Automation, 2005). The simulation is divided 
into model, experiment, and animation components. The model component 
describes the physical elements of the system (aircraft, material handling 
equipment, ground personnel, passenger and baggage flow, etc.) and their 
logical interrelationships. The experiment component defines the 
experimental condition under which the model runs. It specifies conditions 
such as resource availability, initial conditions, and number of replications. 
The animation component of the model graphically represents the 
activities being simulated by the program. In this model, the activities 
include catering, fueling, maintenance, passenger/crew deplaning, cleaning, 
passenger/crew enplaning, baggage offloading, and baggage uploading. 
Figure 2 illustrates the animation component. 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the activities of an aircraft turnaround operation 
system, in Arena simulation modeling software (version 7.0) 
Note. Source and permission from Rockwell Automation. 
 
Verification and validation 
Verification is the process of ensuring that the model operates as 
intended. This means that the program is not only bug free, but also includes 
all of the components that need to be modeled. The animation component of 
the model is particularly helpful in the debugging process as it provides a 
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visual representation of what is going on in the system. Any unusual or 
unexpected model behavior can be identified and corrected. 
Validation is the process of ensuring that the model represents reality. 
There are two stages in the validation process, namely face validity and 
statistical validity. The face validity involves a critical appraisal of the model 
by domain experts who understand the modeled system and intended 
operation. Two industrial engineers provided this critique for the 
improvement of the model and their suggestions were integrated into the 
model. 
Statistical validity, involves a statistical comparison of the system and 
model performance under identical system loading conditions. One of many 
different comparison of means tests is used. The comparison of means test is 
typically applied to a measure of performance such as system time. In this 
effort, system times are defined as the time between the arrival and departure 
of the aircraft from the gate. The actual system time had a mean of 66.13 and 
a standard deviation of 12.39, while the simulation model system time had a 
mean of 67.55 and a standard deviation of 6.80. A non-parametric u test was 
used to perform the comparison of means. Formally stated: 
1. Ho: There is no difference between the actual system and model 
system times; 
Ha: There is a difference between the actual system and model 
system times; 
2. Alpha = 0.05; 
3. The critical values for the Z distribution at 0.05 are -1.96 and 1.96; 
4. The test statistic for the non-parametric u test is -0.48; and 
5. -0.48 is between -1.96 and 1.96, cannot reject the Ho. 
 
Since Ho cannot be rejected at a 0.05 level of significance, there is 
evidence to support the claim that the model is statistically valid. Since the 
basic model can be assumed to be valid, the next step was to determine what 
experimental alternatives to examine. 
 
Experimental design 
The essence of the research experimental design was to conduct an 
analysis of the effects of altering different system parameters and input 
variables. It was however, not feasible to carry out an infinite number of 
experiments to investigate all the different combinations of parameters and 
input variables. A combination of network analysis and one-factor 
experimental design was used to select the appropriate experiments. 
 
Representing the turnaround operation as a network 
To guide the choice of experimental design, the turnaround operation is 
represented as a set of paths as illustrated in Figure 3. Each individual path 
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represents a set of particular activities that can only be completed in the 
specified sequence. For example, the plane cannot be cleaned until the 
passengers deplane. To complete the entire turnaround process, all activities 
on each of the paths must be completed. Paths are classified as critical or 
non-critical. The critical path represents the sequence of activities which if 
delayed will results in a longer overall delay in the completion of the entire 
turnaround operation. In contrast, non-critical paths have slack. This means 
that the activities on these paths may be delayed to some extent without 
delaying the overall process. However, in some instances, a significant delay 
in a non-critical path activity can result in the activity’s path becoming the 
critical path. 
Figure 3. Network of activities in an aircraft turnaround operation system and the mean 
and standard deviation of each path, in minutes  
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Calculating the critical path 
There are five possible paths. The paths and the duration of each are 
presented in Table 3. To complete the turnaround operation, all five paths 
must be completed. The longest path in duration is the critical path. The 
critical path activities are baggage offload and baggage upload. Any delay in 
these activities result in longer duration of the turnaround operation. Now 
that the critical activities have been identified, it is necessary to investigate 
the delays in the critical path and the effect on the completion time of the 
turnaround operation. 
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Table 3. Paths of activities of an aircraft turnaround operation system 
The network indicates that the fueling process may be delayed by as 
much as 22.11 minutes before the fueling process becomes critical. 
Similarly, the passenger unloading/maintenance operations can be delayed 
by 21.21 minutes. The catering operation may be delayed by 18.91 minutes. 
Lastly, the passenger unloading, cleaning, and passenger loading process 
may be delayed by up to 2.81 minutes before becoming critical. 
A one-factor experimental policy was used to examine the operation 
policy of baggage upload delay at seven different levels. This means that in 
addition to the base model, there are seven additional alternatives (D0-D24) 
as shown in Table 4. The configurations examined the impact of baggage 
upload delay at an increment of four minutes each. Baggage upload delay is 
defined as the time between the end of offload and the start of upload. With 
the base model, E40, baggage upload is initiated 40 minutes before 
scheduled departure. 
Table 4. Design of one-factor experiment to determine impact of a delay in the baggage 
upload activity on the aircraft turnaround operation system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
D0 D4 D8 D12 D16 D20 D24 E40 (Existing System) 
0 min (no delay) 4 mins 
8 
mins 
12 
mins 
16 
mins 
20 
mins 
24 
mins 
40 mins (before 
departure) 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
This section includes research results for the simulation replication 
analysis, the Analysis of Variance of the simulation alternatives, and Duncan 
Multiple Ranges test results. 
 
 Replication Analysis 
In order to make a statistical robust comparison between alternatives, a 
sufficient number of simulation replications must be run. The commonly 
accepted 0.10 Desired Relative Precision approach to replication analysis 
Path Activities Duration (minutes) 
1 – 5 – 8 Fueling 18.90 
1 – 3 – 7 – 8 Passenger deplane; Maintenance 19.80 
1 – 4 – 8 Catering 22.10 
1 – 3 – 6 – 8 Passenger deplane; Cleaning; Passenger enplane 38.20 
1 – 2 – 8 Baggage offload; Baggage upload 41.01 
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was utilized for the analysis (Law & Kelton, 2000). This method calculates 
the number of replications or simulation runs that must be conducted so that 
the ratio of the half-width confidence interval divided by the mean of 
replication means is less than 10%. To begin this method, an initial 10 
replications are run. The final number of replications that are needed to 
achieve the desired relative precision are then calculated for each alternative. 
All of the alternatives are then rerun for the highest number of replications 
required for any of the individual alternatives. 
 
Table 5. Replication analysis of eight alternatives of the duration of the baggage upload 
activity of an aircraft turnaround operation system 
 
IDENTIFIER D0 D4 D8 D12 D16 D20 D24 E40 
Operating 
policy of 
"Delay" 
0 
mins 
4 
mins 
8 
mins 
12 
mins 
16 
mins 
20 
mins 
24 
mins 
40 
mins 
Mean of 10 
reps (mins) 61.10 63.30 65.70 69.00 73.00 77.00 81.00 68.86 
STD of 10 
rep 6.18 7.86 9.45 10.40 10.40 10.40 10.40 6.93 
T value @ 
TINV(0.05,9) 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 
Replications 
required 10 10 14 15 13 12 11 10 
 
Table 5 indicates that the 12 minute delay alternative (D12) requires a 
minimum of 15 replications in order to achieve a desired relative precision of 
0.10. Each of the eight alternatives was then rerun for a total of 15 
replications in order to perform a robust statistical comparison. The results 
from the 15 replications were then analyzed for differences in the means of 
the alternatives. 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA is used to determine if there is any significant statistical 
difference in the means of the alternatives. The analysis is based on a ratio of 
the variance between and within the different alternatives. This tests the null 
hypothesis (Ho) of the experimentation that the means of the alternatives are 
equal, and the alternate hypothesis (H1) that the means of the alternatives are 
not equal. 
At 0.05 level of significance, the Fexperiment (10.32) is greater than the 
Fcritical (2.09). The null hypothesis was rejected, implying that the means are 
not equal. The ANOVA results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Results of an analysis of variances of eight alternatives of the duration of the 
baggage upload activity of an aircraft turnaround operation system 
 
 
Duncan multiple range test 
If the ANOVA null hypothesis is rejected, then one or more of the 
alternatives are statistically significantly different from the others. However, 
ANOVA by itself does not indicate which of the alternatives are statistically 
significantly different from the others. The Duncan multiple range test 
provides this information. After sorting the data in ascending order, the test 
compares the range of a given sized group of adjacent values to a calculated 
least significant range value. The calculated least significant range values are 
listed in Table 7. 
Table 7. Least significant range of adjacent means of eight alternatives of the duration of 
the baggage upload activity of an aircraft turnaround operation system 
P 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
R 6.25 6.58 6.78 6.96 7.07 7.19 7.25 
 
Where: 
p = number of adjacent values in the range; and 
R = Least significant range value for alpha = 0.05. 
 
If the range of a given sized set of adjacent values is less than the least 
significant range value at a given alpha level, then there is no statistically 
significant difference among the adjacent values. Conversely, if the range of 
the given sized set of adjacent values is greater than the least significant 
range value, one or more of the values is statistically significantly different. 
Non-significant ranges of adjacent values are represented by an underline. 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test Results are presented in Table 8. 
Source of Variation 
Sum 
Squares 
DF 
Mean 
Squares 
F 
Experiment 
F 
Critical 
Between Treatments 5395 7 770.70 10.32 2.09 
Error 
(Within Treatments) 
8366 112 74.70   
Total 13761 119    
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Table 8. Duncan Multiple Range Test results of eight alternatives of the duration of the 
baggage upload activity of an aircraft turnaround operation system 
Alternative D0 D4 D8 E40 D12 D16 D20 D24 
Delay (mins) 0 4 8 40 12 16 20 24 
Means (mins) 61.10 63.50 66.40 67.55 69.90 73.90 77.90 81.90 
DISCUSSION 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test Results presented in Table 8 can be 
interpreted as follows. At an alpha level of 0.05, there is no statistically 
significant difference among the alternatives in the following groups of 
delays: 
1. delays of 2 minutes, 4 minutes, 8 minutes and the existing 
system (D0, D4, D8 and E40, respectively); 
2. delays of 8 minutes, 12 minutes and the existing system (D8, 
D12, and E40, respectively); 
3. delays of 16 minutes and 20 minutes (D16 and D20, 
respectively); and 
4. delays of 20 minutes and 24 minutes (D20 and D24, 
respectively). 
 
This means that there is no performance difference between the existing 
policy of loading the baggage 40 minutes before the scheduled departure and 
loading the baggage either 0, 4, or 8 minutes after offloading the baggage. 
Similarly, there is no difference between the existing policy and loading the 
baggage either 8 minutes or 12 minutes after offloading the baggage. There 
is also no performance difference between loading the baggage either 16 or 
20 minutes later. Lastly, there is no performance difference between loading 
the luggage either 20 or 24 minutes later. 
All other differences are statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.05. 
This means, among other things, that: 
1. delays of 0 minutes, 4 minutes 8 minutes and the existing 
system D0, D4, D8 and E40, respectively) are statistically 
significantly different than delays of 16 minutes, 20 minutes 
and 24 minutes (D16, D20, and D24, respectively); 
2. a delay of 12 minutes (D12) is statistically significantly 
different from delays of 16 minutes, 20 minutes and 24 minutes 
(D16, D20, and D24, respectively); and 
3. a delay of 16 minutes (D16) is statistically significantly 
different from a delay of 24 minutes (D24). 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the turnaround process operates without incident, the airline will be 
able to follow normal procedures without extending the length of the 
turnaround process. As previously noted, several turnaround activities are 
not on the critical path. These activities need not be started immediately 
when the plane arrives at the gate. However, if any of these activities are 
delayed past the slack, they will possibly result in an extended turnaround 
time. These slack times are summarized below: 
1. Fueling, 22.11 minutes;  
2. Passenger unloading and maintenance, 21.21 minutes; 
3. Catering 18.91 minutes; and  
4. Passenger unloading, cleaning, passenger loading 2.81 
minutes 
 
Since the baggage unloading and loading processes are on the critical 
path, additional attention was directed at this process. Under regular 
conditions, the baggage upload is started 40 minutes before the scheduled 
departure. This approach does not necessarily provide the airline with the 
opportunity to take early action in the event of a problem. The airline can 
only determine that a problem is initially developing if the 40 minute start 
window is exceeded. A more proactive approach involves examining the 
upload delay period. This was defined as the delay between the end of the 
baggage unloading process and the start of the baggage uploading process. 
As previously noted, alternatives of delays of 0 minutes, 4 minutes, 8 
minutes and the existing system (D0, D4, D8, and E40, respectively), 
perform statistically significantly the same at an alpha level of 0.05. 
Alternatives of delays of 8 minutes, existing system, and 12 minutes (D8, 
E40, and D12, respectively) also perform statistically significantly the same. 
This means that if the baggage upload delay is longer than 16 minutes than 
the turnaround time for the flight will be extended. Since the baggage upload 
is contingent on the luggage download, the flight turnaround time will also 
be extended, if the beginning of the baggage off load is delayed by greater 
than 16 minutes. Similarly, if the baggage offload process takes longer than 
16 minutes past the normal expected time of 16.30 minutes, the turnaround 
time will also be extended. This information means that the airline has a 
buffer of approximately sixteen minutes for accommodating the luggage of 
passengers arriving late from connecting flights before there is an effect on 
the duration of the turnaround operation. 
The airline should closely monitor this buffer period and plan 
accordingly. As the buffer is consumed, additional attention should be 
focused on the causes of the delay. In some cases, such as the late arrival of 
other luggage, there may be no option but to delay the departure of the flight. 
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In this case, the contingency plan would include the assignment of additional 
resources to reduce the baggage upload time. Similarly, if the baggage 
upload was started within 16 minutes, but is taking longer than normal, the 
contingency plan would include additional resources being assigned to help 
insure that the flight can leave on schedule. If the buffer period is properly 
managed, there is a greater likelihood that the flight will leave on schedule. 
This in turn will help reduce the cascade effect of delays inherent in the hub-
and-spoke network system. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the underlying principles of this research is the maintaining of 
current resource levels so that no additional cost is incurred. It is suggested 
that further research examine the resource policy of baggage offload and 
upload activities, and especially the concept of crashing the turnaround 
operation, that is, compressing the operation without regard to the operating 
cost. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Council on Aviation Accreditation (CAA) was established in 1988 in response 
to the need for formal, specialized accreditation of aviation academic programs, as 
expressed by institutional members of the University Aviation Association (UAA). 
The first aviation programs were accredited by the CAA in 1992, and today, the 
CAA lists 60 accredited programs at 21 institutions nationwide. Although the 
number of accredited programs has steadily grown, there are currently only 20 
percent of UAA member institutions with CAA accredited programs. In an effort to 
further understand this issue, a case study of the CAA was performed, which 
resulted in a two-part case study report. Part one focuses on the following 
questions: (a) why was the CAA established and how has it evolved; (b) what is the 
purpose of the CAA; (c) how does a program become accredited by the CAA; and 
(d) what is the current environment in which the CAA operates. In answering these 
questions, various sources of data (such as CAA documents, magazine and journal 
articles, email inquiries, and an on-line survey) were utilized. Part one of this study 
resulted in a better understanding of the CAA, including its history, purpose, and 
the entire accreditation process. Part two will both examine the contemporary issues 
being faced by the CAA and provide recommendations to enhance the future 
growth of the organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the only formal, specialized accrediting agency for aviation academic 
programs, the Council on Aviation Accreditation (CAA) 1 fulfills an 
important role in the aviation academic community. Based in Auburn, 
Alabama, the CAA is a relatively young organization, having been 
established in 1988. During the past 17 years, the CAA has been actively 
accrediting various aviation academic programs and today boasts 60 
accredited programs at 21 institutions nationwide. However, out of 105 
institutional members of the University Aviation Association (UAA), which 
is an organization representing collegiate aviation with over 800 members, 
only 20 percent of UAA member institutions currently have CAA accredited 
programs (“Candidates,” n.d.; UAA, n.d.). This is in contrast to an average 
59 percent accreditation rate in other academic fields [based on a random 
sample of 11 accrediting organizations recognized by the Council for Higher 
Education Accreditation CHEA)].  
In an effort to better understand this issue, a case study was conducted 
from June through December 2005. The primary research question that 
motivated this research effort concerned why there so few aviation programs 
accredited by the CAA. Based on this primary research question, secondary 
research questions (to which answers were obtained as a result of this case 
study) were formulated and include the following: 
1. Why was the CAA founded and how has it evolved? 
2. What is the purpose of the CAA? 
3. How does a program become accredited by the CAA? 
4. What is the current environment in which the CAA operates? 
5. What are some of the costs to a program seeking CAA 
accreditation? 
6. What are some of the benefits of being CAA accredited? 
7. Why do programs seek CAA accreditation? 
8. Why do programs choose not to seek CAA accreditation? 
9. What role is the CAA playing in the international aviation academic 
community? 
10. What are some possible strategies the CAA may adopt to enhance 
the benefits of CAA accreditation and increase the number of CAA 
accredited programs?  
                                                 
1 This case study was undertaken during 2005.  In 2006, the Council on Aviation 
Accreditation (CAA) announced a change of name and identity.  Although the CAA 
is now known as the Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI), references 
to the CAA within this article also refer to the AABI.  
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The first four questions are addressed in part one of this study, while the 
remaining six questions are addressed in part two of this study. 
METHODOLOGY 
In an effort to fully understand the CAA, including the complex issues 
surrounding the organization and the accreditation process, a comprehensive 
research strategy was necessary (Yin, 2003). A case study design was chosen 
because, as Yin explains, “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ 
or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context” (p.1). 
Yin (2003) acknowledges that case studies can be conducted by 
gathering both quantitative and qualitative evidence, yet all case study 
inquiries rely on multiple sources of evidence, with data converging in a 
triangulating fashion. The evidence for case studies may come from six 
sources: (a) documents, (b) archival records, (c) interviews, (d) direct 
observation, (e) participant observation, and (f) physical artifacts (p. 83). 
Although each of these sources, according to Creswell (2003), has various 
strengths and weaknesses, it appeared most appropriate for this case analysis 
to gather evidence from documents, archival records, and interviews.  
Specifically, documents analyzed included all CAA documents [such as 
the Accreditation Standards Manual (CAA, 2003a), Bylaws (CAA, 2003c), 
and Outline for a Self-Study Report (CAA, 1999b)] that were accessible on 
the CAA website. In addition, journal and magazine articles related to 
accreditation in general, and CAA accreditation in particular were analyzed. 
Archival records (including the CAA membership list and the listing of CAA 
accredited programs and candidate programs) were analyzed as well. 
Interviews were also relied upon extensively during this case study. As Yin 
explains, “One of the most important sources of case study information is the 
interview” (2003, p. 89). Two types of interviews were utilized in this 
research effort. First, a focused interview was conducted via telephone with 
both the President and Executive Director of the CAA, as well as two 
administrators of aviation programs (one of which is CAA accredited). 
These participants were purposefully selected, as described by Creswell 
(2003), to represent CAA leadership, as well as the views of a CAA 
accredited and non-accredited program (with the director of the non-CAA 
accredited program also serving as a CAA trustee). Each telephone interview 
was completed during a 30-60 minute time period. The second type of 
interview, recognized by Yin (2003) as having more structured questions and 
resembling a formal survey, was also utilized. First, a brief questionnaire 
was sent via email to the entire population of 101 U.S. institutions offering 
non-engineering degrees in aviation (as determined by the 2003 UAA 
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Collegiate Aviation Guide and UAA Institutional Member List) that 
currently do not have programs which are either CAA accredited or 
candidates for accreditation (UAA, n.d., 2003). Accounting for invalid email 
addresses, a total of 92 institutions received the email questionnaire. The 
email survey resulted in an initial response rate of 19.6 percent. A follow-up 
email encouraged an additional 5 responses (for a total of 23), resulting in a 
total response rate of 25 percent. Although lower than the preferred response 
rate, the purpose of the survey was simply to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of why non-accredited programs chose to remain non-
accredited, and even with a lower than desired response rate, this purpose 
was fulfilled. Next, email questions were sent to various specialized 
accrediting organizations recognized by the CHEA, as well as to the staff of 
both the CAA and UAA. These email questions garnered a 100 percent 
response rate. Last, using the most recent CAA Board of Trustees listing 
available on the CAA website, each of the officers and educator trustees of 
the CAA were asked to complete an on-line survey developed specifically 
for this research effort. One of the educator trustees selected explained that 
he has recently retired and is no longer a member of the CAA Board of 
Trustees. Of the 11 individuals selected for this survey, 9 responded, 
resulting in an 82 percent response rate. 
Since the original purpose of the case study was to describe the CAA 
and the contemporary issues being faced by the organization, the general 
analytic strategy guiding this research was that of developing a case 
description. Within this analytical framework, Creswell’s (2003) six steps of 
data analysis and interpretation served as a theoretical guide in making sense 
of the many sources of evidence and compiling the data into an organized 
and informative narrative that maintained a focus on the original research 
questions. First, the many sources of evidence were prepared for analysis by 
organizing interview notes, collating survey responses, and arranging the 
data into different types depending on the sources of information. Second, 
although this was an ongoing aspect of the analysis, all the data was read 
through to obtain a general sense of the information. As a follow-up to this, 
the data was analyzed in great detail with a subsequent coding of the data 
into categories. Fourth, the coding process was used to generate both a 
description of the CAA and themes appropriate to the research focus. Next, 
in consideration of the description and themes, a decision was made as to the 
best manner in which to convey the description and themes in the narrative 
(which included both a chronology of the events leading up to the formation 
of the CAA and a discussion of interconnecting themes in response to the 
research questions). The final step in this case analysis involved interpreting 
the data by formulating recommendations to improve the organization and 
enhance the number of accredited programs. As Creswell (2003, p. 195) 
notes, “Interpretation in qualitative research can take many forms, be 
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adapted for different types of designs, and be flexible to convey personal, 
research-based, and action meanings.”  
In an effort to ensure trustworthy data, the concept of triangulation was 
employed through the gathering of data via interviews, surveys, and 
documents to observe patterns in the data. Reliability, specifically 
concerning the accuracy of observations, was enhanced by the use of 
detailed notes and audio recordings of the interviews, use of participant 
quotations in the final case study report, and member checking. Member 
checking was accomplished by allowing interviewees the opportunity to read 
the draft case study report and correct any inaccurate statements attributed to 
them. Additionally, CAA officers and educator trustees were asked to 
indicate agreement or disagreement (via an on-line survey) with the results 
of a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis 
conducted as part of this case study. To enhance internal validity, six months 
were allotted for the case study to allow collection of a large amount of 
evidence and an in-depth analysis of the data. Additionally, detailed notes 
were taken, abundant use of detail and verbatim language of participants 
were included in the case study report, and as often as possible, trends 
identified in one source of data were corroborated by at least one other data 
source. Lastly, external validity was strengthened through a concerted effort 
in this case study to accurately describe the data and provide for a more in-
depth understanding of the CAA and the issues the organization currently 
faces. In this way, readers should be able to understand these findings so that 
they can be applied in other settings. 
HISTORY OF THE CAA 
Since the birth of aviation on December 17, 1903, there has been an 
increasing need to educate and train pilots, mechanics, airport managers, and 
air traffic controllers. Although several training programs existed prior to 
World War II, the majority of today’s collegiate aviation programs were an 
outgrowth of the Civil Pilot Training Program, which was established in 
1939 in an effort to prepare America for the war, and from wartime training 
of military pilots at campuses nationwide. Following World War II, Reserve 
Officer Training Corps programs were popular among students desiring 
orientation to flight. Later in the 1960s, the introduction of jet aircraft led to 
the development of programs that addressed the challenges presented by this 
new generation of aircraft. In fact, more aviation programs leading to a 
baccalaureate degree were established in one year, 1968, than in all years 
combined since 1950 (Prather, 1998). Although programs such as flight, 
maintenance, avionics, and management proved popular, their varied 
standards and requirements created confusion among these early collegiate 
aviators (Kiteley, n.d.). 
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Decades earlier, in July 1947, the National Association of University 
Administrators of Aviation Education (NAUAAE) had been established. 
With the name changed to the University Aviation Association (UAA) in 
1949, the association went about promoting collegiate aviation and 
partnering with industry to improve the academic quality of aviation 
academic programs. It was not until 1974, in an effort to address the wide 
disparity among aviation programs, that an Academic Standards Committee 
was created in the UAA. This Committee was later divided into two 
subcommittees, the first concerned with standards and articulation, and the 
other with accreditation. The Accreditation Subcommittee soon conducted a 
survey of institutions with aviation programs to identify current practices and 
the potential need for curricula accreditation. A report prepared by this 
Committee in April 1975 led to the formation of a Task Force to develop an 
Academic Standards Manual. The “College Aviation Accreditation 
Guidelines” (also known as the Green Book) was developed in October 
1976, and served as the first standards manual for associate, baccalaureate, 
and graduate aviation programs. Several institutions volunteered for program 
evaluation under the new Guidelines, which became adopted as a 
recommended standard for aviation curricula. To oversee review of 
programs in light of these guidelines, an Executive Director of the UAA was 
hired in 1977 (CAA, 2003a; Kiteley, 2001). 
The move toward aviation accreditation received another boost as a 
result of the 1981 strike by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air 
traffic controllers and the subsequent firing of 11,350 of these striking 
controllers by President Reagan. The UAA offered to assist the FAA in 
staffing its technical positions with college graduates. To accomplish this, a 
UAA Task Force was created to develop a special curriculum targeted 
toward five FAA occupational specialties. Once the curriculum was 
developed, the FAA first contracted with the UAA in 1983 to evaluate 
proposed curricula from institutions desiring to be recognized under the FAA 
Airway Science Program. By 1985, the UAA was conducting on-site campus 
evaluations of facilities, administration, faculty, and students of institutions 
applying for FAA Airway Science Program recognition. These activities 
were carried out by an UAA Airway Science Curriculum Committee 
comprised of professional educators who served as both a review and 
evaluation board for curricula and on-site evaluations. From 1983 to 1988, 
the UAA gained extensive experience in the review and evaluation of nearly 
30 aviation programs throughout the country (CAA, 2003a).  
In September 1987, the UAA appointed a Professional Accreditation 
Task Force to further evaluate the feasibility of formal aviation program 
accreditation and gauge the level of interest in such a specialized accrediting 
organization. A survey of UAA institutional members in the spring of 1988 
showed general support for the establishment of a formal accrediting 
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organization for aviation academic programs. The Task Force concluded that 
there was indeed sufficient interest in such an organization and a general 
consensus of need, considering that there was no existing accrediting 
organization with the appropriate statement of purpose and experience to 
conduct specialized accreditation of non-engineering aviation academic 
programs. As a result of these findings, in July 1988 the Task Force 
expanded the previously created “College Aviation Accreditation 
Guidelines” into an initial draft of what would serve as the foundation of an 
accreditation standards manual (CAA, 2003a; Connolly, 1991). 
In October of that same year, the CAA was established at the UAA 
Annual Meeting in Dallas. Although the CAA initially functioned as a 
subsidiary of the UAA for administrative support, the CAA was an 
autonomous, legally chartered entity with directors and officers elected from 
within the organization. The CAA formulated bylaws which both governed 
the organization and embraced the concepts and principles acceptable to the 
Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (CAA, 2003a).  
Initially, during the first four years of operation, the CAA did not 
accredit any programs. However, in 1992, programs at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, Florida Institute of Technology, Middle Tennessee 
State University, and the University of North Dakota, became the first to be 
granted CAA accreditation (CAA, 2005). Since that time, growth in the 
number of institutions with accredited programs has grown fairly 
consistently (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Historical growth in institutions with CAA accredited programs 
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ACCREDITATION IN THE U.S. 
Accreditation has been defined as “a procedure of quality assessment 
aiming at formal approval of a study programme (programme accreditation) 
or an institution (institutional accreditation) by a non-governmental body of 
experts and . . . stakeholders (Kohler, 2003). As Wellman (2003) shares, 
accreditation of higher education is a distinctly American invention. Indeed, 
this private, non-governmental, volunteer process substitutes for direct 
governmental regulation of academic standards, which is performed by the 
central government elsewhere. In the U.S., in fact, although the federal 
government requires recipients of federal student grants and loans to attend 
institutions accredited by an organization approved by the government, the 
accrediting organizations are responsible for assuring academic quality. 
Likewise, the states often defer to accrediting organizations on matters of 
academic quality (Eaton, 2003).   
Today, three types of accreditation exist. First, regional accreditation is 
the largest and historically the oldest form of accreditation. There are eight 
agencies in six regions that together accredit approximately 3,000 
institutions enrolling close to 14 million students (Wellman, 2003). National 
accreditation is usually sought by trade, business, and technical schools in 
the for-profit sector. Eleven national agencies collectively accredit 
approximately 3,500 institutions enrolling 4.75 million students. The third 
type of accreditation is specialized. The specialized agencies accredit 
individual schools or programs within larger colleges and universities. 
The field of specialized accreditation in the U.S. is quite diverse. For 
instance, the CHEA recognizes 46 specialized accrediting organizations that 
accredit programs in 48 different academic fields, including audiology, 
aviation, computer science, forestry, nursing, social work education, and 
veterinary medicine. Interestingly, although most of these academic fields 
only have one specialized accrediting organization (similar to aviation), 
several fields (such as business, nursing, and teacher education) are covered 
by two organizations. This may be understandable, as these academic fields 
are quite popular and contain the number of programs that can support 
additional specialized accrediting organizations (CHEA, 2005).  
A quick overview of the industry is possible by reviewing specialized 
accrediting organizations currently recognized by the CHEA. A random 
sample of 11 (out of 46) of these organizations reveals the average 
organizational age to be 65 years (resulting in an average year of 
establishment of 1940). The oldest of these organizations was founded in 
1864 (American Veterinary Medical Association), with the youngest having 
been established in 1978 (American Association for Marriage and Family 
Therapy). Thus, it appears that the average specialized accrediting 
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organization is much older than the CAA (which is a young 17 years). The 
average number of institutions being accredited by each of these 
organizations is 221. Obviously, this number is greater than the entire 
population of institutions offering non-engineering aviation academic 
programs. However, when looking at percentages, we discover that 
approximately 59 percent of institutions with eligible programs are 
accredited by each of these organizations in their respective academic fields, 
much more than the approximately 20 percent accredited by the CAA 
(CHEA, 2005; K. Moynahan, R. Coscarelli, D. Pierce, T. Clark, P. Jenness, 
D. Simmons, & J. Knych, personal communication, July 5, 6, and 11, 2005). 
CAA  ACCREDITATION 
Accreditation, according to the CAA, assures students and prospective 
employers that an educational degree program has met “stringent industry 
standards of quality” (“Purpose,” n.d., para. 1). Further, it ensures that 
graduates have received quality training and are indeed capable of 
performing a broad range of professional responsibilities. From the CAA 
perspective, accreditation serves two fundamental purposes: (a) to ensure the 
quality of the institution or programs, and (b) to assist in the improvement of 
the institution or program. In that regard, the goals of the CAA are: 
To stimulate aviation program excellence and self-improvement; 
establish uniform minimum educational quality standards; and 
increase the credibility, integrity and acceptance of collegiate 
aviation programs within institutions of higher education and all 
aspects of the aviation community, to include industry and 
government. (“Goals,” n.d., para. 1) 
 
The specific purposes of the CAA are: (a) to engage in accrediting 
programs of aviation at the associate, baccalaureate, and graduate levels 
offered by colleges and universities in the U.S. and throughout the world; (b) 
to maintain procedures consistent with the recognition requirements of the 
U.S. Department of Education and other recognized accreditation 
sanctioning bodies; (c) to publish current information concerning criteria and 
standards adopted by the CAA for accrediting aviation programs; (d) to 
report the results of its activities; (e) to provide advisory services to colleges 
and universities offering or planning programs in aviation; (f) to maintain a 
list of the colleges and universities with accredited programs of study in 
aviation; and (g) to review at regular intervals the criteria and standards 
which CAA has adopted to evaluate programs in aviation. It should be noted 
that the CAA currently does not have standards for associate degree 
programs designed only to prepare students for technical careers, nor 
graduate programs. In a survey of CAA officers and educator trustees, a 
 Prather 165 
 
 
combined 100 percent either agreed or strongly agreed that the CAA is 
adequately fulfilling these various purposes (CAA, 2003a, 2003c). 
For institutions seeking CAA accreditation, it may appear, at least on the 
surface, to be a simple four-step process—application, self-study, 
accreditation team visit, and subsequent review and action by the CAA 
Board. In reality, according to Ceci Hogencamp, CAA accreditation and 
meeting services manager, the process is “rigorous . . . taking two years from 
the time of submission” (Knauer, 2005, p. 28).  Indeed, the CAA lists no less 
than 29 steps to accreditation (see Appendix). Although CAA accreditation 
is a rigorous process, 100 percent of survey respondents, composed of CAA 
officers and educator trustees, disagreed that it should be less rigorous to 
encourage more programs to seek CAA accreditation. This may be due, in 
part, to the fact that 67 percent of these respondents disagreed that aviation 
programs are discouraged from even attempting CAA accreditation due to 
the rigorous accreditation process. 
Those programs desiring accreditation must first submit the following 
items to the CAA: (a) CAA Form 102-Application for Candidate Status; (b) 
application fee-currently $1,750 per program, with $350 for each additional 
program; (c) three copies of the institutional catalog; (d) three copies of 
aviation course descriptions; (e) three copies of the classroom hour coverage 
of core topics; and (f) three copies of a curriculum review form. To 
demonstrate the level of commitment to the accreditation effort, the 
application must be signed, not only by the program director, but also by the 
next higher administrative officer and the chief executive officer of the 
institution (CAA, 2003b).  
Once these documents are submitted, two different actions may be taken 
by the CAA. First, if the aviation program appears to meet CAA standards 
and criteria, and at least one class will have completed the full program and 
graduate by the time of the required on-site visit, the institution will be 
granted Candidate Status. If it appears, however, that the program will be 
incapable of complying with CAA standards and criteria within the five-year 
period, the institution will be denied Candidate Status. Based on the actions 
taken by the CAA, the institution may request reconsideration for cause or 
withdraw its application and make new application at such time that the 
deficiencies have been corrected (CAA, 2003b).  
If the institution is granted Candidate Status, there are at least 24 
additional steps that must occur for the program to become accredited, the 
most demanding of which is the full self-study resulting in the Self-Study 
Report. It could easily be argued that the self-study is the most burdensome, 
as well as the most beneficial, aspect of the accreditation process. Indeed, 89 
percent those CAA officers and trustees responding to the survey agreed that 
the self-study is the most beneficial aspect of the application process. As 
Ceci Hogencamp (in Knauer, 2005, p. 28) describes, “During the self-study 
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phase, the college examines every aspect of the program—curriculum, 
administration, budgets, courses, degrees, staff, and their assignments, 
aircraft fleet and so on—and prepares a report for the Council.” CAA notes 
that the self-study report serves three fundamental purposes: (a) to guide the 
aviation program and its faculty through a critical review of program 
operations; (b) to provide information to the CAA so that a fair evaluation of 
the program can be made; and (c) to serve as an historical document for the 
aviation program (CAA, 1999b). 
Usually requiring six to nine months to complete (and required to be 
complete in one academic year), the self-study may be the one deterrent for 
many programs that would otherwise consider seeking CAA accreditation 
(CAA, 1999c). Of the CAA officers and educator trustees responding to the 
survey, only 22 percent agreed that the self-study requirement is the main 
source of discouragement for programs considering CAA accreditation. 
Admittedly, however, “attempting accreditation [specifically in the form of a 
self-study] is a demanding experience” (Eaton, 2003, p. 1). Nonetheless, as 
Hogencamp (in Knauer, 2005, p. 28) notes, “[the self-study] is very 
educational for the school. It helps bring a number of important issues to 
light.” 
Once the Self-Study Report is accepted by the CAA, the CAA visiting 
team is organized and a date for the campus visit is coordinated with the 
institution. This next major phase of the accreditation process allows a team 
of qualified professional educator peers and industry representatives to visit 
the campus to examine in detail the information submitted in the Self-Study 
Report, to assess various intangible qualities of a program, such as the 
morale of students and staff, and assist the institution in identifying various 
strengths and weaknesses. The visiting team usually arrives on a campus on 
Sunday and completes the visit by Tuesday. These three days are quite busy 
for the visiting team as they meet with program administrators, executive 
officers of the institution, faculty, staff, and students. The team is also 
responsible for touring laboratories, classrooms, offices and other physical 
plant facilities; reviewing samples of student work, textbooks, and syllabi; 
and discussing operating finances and relationships among institutional and 
program administrators. The visit culminates in an oral briefing on the final 
day with the program administrator, the administrator of the next higher unit, 
and the chief executive officer of the institution (CAA, 1998; Knauer, 2005).  
The most important product of the visiting team’s effort is the visiting 
team report. This report, which is drafted by the chair of the visiting team, 
should: (a) present an objective analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and 
undeveloped potential of the aviation program(s) being offered and make 
constructive suggestions for future development; (b) corroborate, modify, or 
repudiate the statements made in the application and the institution’s Self-
Study Report; (c) contain additional information gathered by the visiting 
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team; and (d) give the Accreditation Committee an evaluation of the 
program, as a guide for its recommendations. The “Guide to Preparation of 
the Visiting Team Report” (CAA, 1997) states that this report must stand 
alone, and will include the following sections: (a) Organization and 
Administration; (b) Curriculum; (c) Faculty; (d) Students; (e) Facilities and 
Services; (f) Relations with Industry; (g) Program Assessment; and (h) 
Summary of Strengths, Weaknesses, Suggestions, and Recommendations. 
Recommendations must be addressed by the institution prior to being 
accredited, while suggestions are considered informational. For the team to 
make a recommendation, the institution must be in non-compliance with a 
CAA standard (CAA, 1997, 1999a). 
Once finalized, the visiting team report is sent to the Chair of the 
Accreditation Committee and the Executive Director of the CAA. This final 
report is also sent to the institution for response to recommendations, and, if 
desired, to suggestions. The Accreditation Committee then prepares their 
Accreditation Committee Report after studying the visiting team report, the 
Self-Study Report, and other pertinent documents on hand. This report is 
forwarded to the CAA Board of Trustees for its consideration with a 
recommended accreditation status. Finally, the Board acts on the report and 
makes a decision. If granted, accreditation of a program is normally for a 
five-year period, with reappraisal required at the end of the period. Due to 
the time involved in this comprehensive process, institutions are urged to 
apply for re-accreditation approximately two years before an institution’s 
period of accreditation expires. Additionally, if a program fails to meet CAA 
standards during an accreditation period, it may be placed on probation for a 
period of time not to exceed the period of remaining accreditation of the 
program (CAA, 1999a, 1999b). 
CAA ENVIRONMENT 
In addition to understanding the CAA accreditation process, it is 
beneficial to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
both internal and external to the CAA. As part of the SWOT analysis of the 
CAA performed during this case analysis, expert opinion from those most 
familiar with the CAA was considered important in validating the SWOT 
findings. As a result, all CAA officers and educator trustees were invited to 
respond to a brief, on-line survey that was designed to gauge their level of 
agreement or disagreement with the findings of the SWOT analysis (see 
Table 1). 
168 Journal of Air Transportation  
  
 
Table 1: SWOT Analysis of the Council on Aviation Accreditation 
 
 
Note. Percentages represent the percent of those CAA Officers and Educator Trustees who 
responded to the survey indicating their agreement with the strengths, weakness, opportunities, 
and threats presented above.  Percentages have been rounded.    
 
The CAA is currently in a strong position within the aviation academic 
arena, as this organization is the sole, national specialized accrediting 
organization for non-engineering aviation academic programs. Even though 
the CAA is a relatively young organization, it has strong ties to the 58 year-
old UAA, which could be considered its parent organization. The UAA has a 
vast membership of over 800 total members, with 105 institutional members. 
The CAA has also developed a strong network with industry through 
regularly scheduled industry-educator forums. In addition, the CAA has 
well-developed bylaws, standards, and guidelines that provide a formal 
structure for the accomplishment of its mission. Further, the CAA has a 
sufficient staff (consisting of an Executive Director, an Accreditation and 
Meetings Services Manager, and support staff), as well as a dedicated group 
of volunteers in industry and academia that are devoted to the organization. 
As Ceci Hogencamp (in Knauer, 2005, p. 29) explains, “. . . our organization 
Strengths Agree Weaknesses Agree 
Sole, national specialized 
accrediting organization 100% 
Accredited programs at 
only 20% of UAA 
institutions 
63% 
Strong industry network 78% 
Does not accredit 
technology-based or 
graduate programs 
13% 
Capable staff and 
dedicated volunteers 78% Young organization 13% 
Well-developed bylaws, 
standards, and guidelines 56% 
Recent entrance into 
international with no 
intl accredited programs 
0% 
Strong ties to UAA 33%   
Opportunities Agree Threats Agree 
Further educate industry, 
programs, and students 100% 
Future lack of growth or 
decline in accredited 
programs 
88% 
Continue tapping into 
expertise of volunteers 78% 
Competing accrediting 
organizations 25% 
Expansion into intl realm 
of aviation accreditation 67%   
Accredit graduate 
programs 33%   
Accredit technology-based 
programs 33%   
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depends solely on volunteers. They’re dedicated and committed, and truly 
amazing and inspiring.” 
The majority of respondents to the survey of CAA officers and educator 
trustees agreed with four of the five strengths explained above. The only 
strength to which 100 percent of the respondents agreed, however, was the 
idea of the CAA being the sole, national specialized accrediting organization 
for non-engineering aviation academic programs. Conversely, only 33 
percent of respondents felt that strong ties to the UAA would be considered a 
strength. Two respondents noted two additional strengths: (a) “Robust spirit 
and active membership [with] lots of potential among members;” and (b) 
“Potential to make a critical difference in standardizing university aviation 
education and making aviation program graduates the preferred candidates 
for hiring into professional positions in both civil and military aviation.”  
To be fair, weaknesses are recognized for the CAA as well. First, the 
organization is a young organization in a specialized accreditation industry 
where the average age of specialized accrediting organizations is 65 years 
(CHEA, 2005). In addition, the organization is just recently entering the 
international accreditation arena (with no international programs having yet 
been accredited), as well as the distance education area (having established 
the ad hoc Committee on Distance Education in 1997). Lastly, although 
there are currently 21 institutions in the U.S. with CAA accredited programs, 
this amounts to one-fifth of institutions currently offering non-engineering 
aviation academic programs (based on 105 UAA institutional members). 
Although it can be argued that this is not solely the fault of the CAA (as 
there are many variables involved in deciding whether or not to pursue 
accreditation, as well as the subsequent granting or denial of such 
accreditation), this fact may possibly reflect weaknesses in the organization 
(in areas such as marketing and industry public relations, as well as student 
outreach, for example).  
Interestingly, the only weakness to which the majority of survey 
respondents (63 percent) agreed was the lack of CAA accredited programs. 
No respondents felt that having the CAA just recently entering the 
international accreditation arena was a weakness. This may highlight 
optimism held by the CAA at the many opportunities available in accrediting 
international aviation programs. Two additional weaknesses were noted by 
survey respondents: (a) “A continuing need to engage the non-participating 
UAA members in accreditation. Progress is that many are at least members 
and are learning about accreditation and its value. A concerted effort is now 
underway to improve communications on this subject;” and (b) “Lack of 
recognition, support, and patronage by business, government, and industry in 
aviation. In addition to institutional desire for program accreditation, a 
concerted effort by professional aviation to hire graduates from accredited 
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degree programs when positions become open will make all the difference in 
the world.” 
In addition to these strengths and weaknesses, the organization also 
faces various opportunities and threats (both from internal and external 
sources to the organization). First, the CAA has the opportunity to 
successfully move into the international realm of aviation accreditation 
(which it is currently pursuing). Second, the CAA has the opportunity to 
begin accrediting distance education programs, as these types of programs 
continue growing in popularity. Third, the CAA could develop standards for 
and begin accrediting graduate programs in aviation. Fourth, the CAA has 
the opportunity to further educate industry, aviation programs, and 
prospective students as to the benefits of accreditation (specifically CAA 
accreditation) and the benefits of attending and subsequently graduating 
from CAA accredited programs. The CAA also has opportunities to continue 
tapping in to the expertise and commitment of volunteers (representing both 
industry and academia) for the purpose of assisting the organization in 
growing and meeting the challenges that lie ahead.  
The majority of survey respondents agreed with three out of five 
opportunities revealed in the SWOT analysis. Understandably, 100 percent 
of respondents agreed that further educating industry, aviation programs, and 
prospective students as to the benefits of CAA accreditation was a great 
opportunity. Only 33 percent of respondents, however, felt that an 
opportunity confronted the CAA in the form of accrediting technology-based 
programs and graduate programs. This is realistic, as the number of 
technology-based programs and graduate programs is relatively low in 
comparison to the total population of aviation academic degree programs. 
One respondent also recognized the following opportunities: “Expand the 
reach of the [industry-educator] I/E Forum so that all education institutions 
benefit. Collaboration with UAA is the method being explored for this. 
Another opportunity is to create a funding source of a foundation in order to 
smooth the financial fluctuations in the budget.” 
Considering threats to the organization, if the number of accredited 
programs (or institutions with accredited programs) begins declining, or in 
fact, does not continue growing, the CAA will realize reduced revenues and 
may begin declining in strength and purpose. It is quite possible that the 
population of aviation academic programs can unintentionally drive the 
CAA out of business, so to speak, if too few programs utilize the services of 
this organization. The CAA was initially established because approximately 
75 percent of UAA member institutions supported the formation of a 
specialized accrediting organization that would accredit aviation academic 
programs (G. Kiteley, personal communication, July 28, 2005). Yet, if there 
are no programs to accredit, there will be no need for the CAA. Second, 
although it is unlikely (at least in the U.S.), a similar, competing organization 
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may be established that may draw clients away from the CAA. Some fields 
in the U.S. currently have two specialized accrediting organizations, and for 
good reason, the programs in the field are so plentiful that two organizations 
are adequately supported. Although this is unlikely in the U.S., it is possible 
that an international aviation accrediting organization (sponsored by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, for instance) could be established 
and compete with the CAA in the international academic arena. 
Of the threats to the CAA recognized by the SWOT analysis, only one 
(that of a possible future lack of growth or a decline in the number of 
accredited programs) was agreed to by the majority (88 percent) of survey 
respondents. In response, one respondent explained that, “. . . accredited 
programs will gradually increase and to increase them rapidly would place a 
strain on resources that creates undesirable consequences.” Additionally, one 
respondent felt that “a lack of strategic focus that matches very limited 
resources with objectives” could be considered a threat to the organization. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, although the CAA is a mere 17 years old, the organization has 
successfully fulfilled a need in the aviation academic community by 
introducing formal specialized accreditation of non-engineering aviation 
academic programs. Even though weaknesses and threats have been 
identified in the environment of the CAA, strengths and opportunities have 
been identified as well. However, the question remains as to why so few 
aviation programs are accredited by the CAA. Part two of this case study 
addresses this question and presents recommended strategies for the CAA to 
adopt as the organization strives to increase the number of accredited 
programs and more fully meet the needs of the collegiate aviation 
community. 
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APPENDIX 
COUNCIL ON AVIATION ACCREDITATION STEPS TO 
ACCREDITATION FORM 112 
1. The institution must be an educator member of CAA to be eligible for 
accreditation. 
2.  The institution submits an application (Form 102), application fee, three 
copies of institution catalog, three copies of the aviation program 
curriculum, and course descriptions, three copies of the classroom hour 
coverage of core topics, and three copies of a curriculum review form 
for each program submitted for candidacy. 
3. Executive Director reviews application documents and, if complete 
submits copies to Accreditation Committee Chair for review. If not 
complete, Executive Director notifies institution of additional required 
items.  
4. Accreditation Committee Chair determines the institution's status (full 
self-study or denied).  
5. Chair of the Accreditation Committee notifies Executive Director, by 
letter, of the decision regarding candidate status.  
6. Executive Director notifies the institution, by letter, advising status. If 
approved for full self-study, enclose Form 101 (Accreditation Standards 
Manual) and Form 104 (Outline for a Self-Study Report). If denied, 
advise institution of reasons for denial.  
7. Institution completes full or preliminary self-study (6-9 month process). 
Self-study should be completed in one academic year.  
8. Institution submits three copies of Self-Study Report to CAA office. If 
the institution has had a catalog change at any time since submission of 
their application, three copies of the new catalog should also be 
submitted. Executive Director reviews Self-Study Report and if 
complete mails a copy of the Self-Study Report (and new catalog, if 
applicable) to the Accreditation Committee Chair for review. If not 
complete, Executive Director notifies institution of additional required 
items.  
9. Accreditation Committee Chair advises the Executive Director, by letter, 
if the Self-Study Report is accepted. This letter may include items for 
review by Visiting Team.  
10. Executive Director notifies the institution and requests three dates for a 
team visit. A list of visiting team members is sent to the institution, 
which has the option of striking any member. 
11. When the institution responds, Executive Director selects Chair of 
Visiting Team. Executive Director, in consultation with Chair of the 
Visiting Team, selects the date of the visit and visiting team size. Team 
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members are selected. Executive Director notifies the institution of date 
of visit and visiting team members and sends Form 106 (Information 
and Procedures for the Visiting Team), Form 107 (Typical Schedule for 
a Visiting Team), Form 109 (Guide to Preparation of the Visiting Team 
Report), and Form 120 (Team Visit Checklist for Institutions).  
12. Executive Director sends a copy of Self-Study Report and catalog to the 
Visiting Team Chair. If this is a reaccredidation, the Chair is also sent 
the previous visiting team report and interim report(s). The institution 
sends a copy of Self-Study Report and catalog to the other team 
members.  
13. Executive Director sends to the visiting team a travel expense report 
(with explanation of travel procedures) to be completed and returned to 
CAA Central Office and CAA Forms 106 (Information and Procedures 
for the Visiting Team), 107 (Typical Schedule for a Visiting Team), 108 
(Aviation Program Evaluation), 109 (Guide to Preparation of the 
Visiting Team Report), and 120 (Team Visit Checklist for Institutions). 
Executive Director sends Form 114 (Team Member Assessment of the 
Performance of the Visiting Team Chairperson) to team members and 
Form 115 (Chairperson’s Assessment of the Performance of the Visiting 
Team Member) to Team Chair, to be completed and returned to CAA 
Central Office. CAA pays the expenses of the visiting team, to include a 
$50 honorarium for each team member, and invoices the institution for 
the amount.  
14. Executive Director sends to the Visiting Team Chair Form 110 (Visiting 
Team Recommendation to the Accreditation Committee and Board of 
Trustees).  
15. Executive Director notifies appropriate regional and specialized 
accreditation association(s) of visit by letter.  
16. Visiting Team Chair corresponds with institution to work out a detailed 
schedule of visit. CAA form entitled CAA Accreditation Visit 
Timetable Worksheet, leading up to accreditation action, prepared by 
the Executive Director with final schedule completed by Team Chair 
and copies sent by Team Chair to institution, team, Accreditation 
Committee Chair and CAA Central Office.  
17. Visiting team members conduct visit. (Executive Director may 
participate as an observer, if deemed necessary by Visiting Team Chair 
or Executive Director.)  
18. After visit, Chair of the Accreditation Committee and Executive 
Director receive visiting team first draft report from the Team Chair for 
review. Their comments sent to Team Chair, who will incorporate 
comments into second draft of report. 
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19. Chair of the Visiting Team completes Form 115 (Chairperson's 
Assessment of the Performance of the Visiting Team) and returns to the 
CAA Central Office to be filed in the Visiting Team members' files.  
20. Visiting Team members complete Form 114 (Team Member's 
Assessment of the Performance of the Visiting Team Chairperson) and 
return to the CAA Central Office to be filed in the Chair's file.  
21. Chair of Visiting Team sends the visiting team second draft report to the 
President of the institution for review and correction of factual errors.  
22. President reviews second draft and sends comments and draft back to 
the Chair of the Visiting Team. A final report is completed by Chair and 
sent to Chair of the Accreditation Committee and Executive Director, 
along with Form 110 (to Executive Director only).  
23. Executive Director sends final report to institution for response to 
recommendations and, if desired, to suggestions.  
24. Institution submits response to final report to Executive Director.  
25. Forty days prior to their next meeting, Executive Director sends final 
visiting team report and the institution's response to the report to all 
members of Accreditation Committee with Form 111 (Guidelines for 
Accreditation Committee Review of the Visiting Team Report and 
Preparation of the Report to the Board of Trustees) and Form 116 
(Accreditation Committee Ballot for Initial or Renewal Accreditation) 
for review and balloting. The completed Form 110 is submitted to the 
Accreditation Committee Chair.  
26. Thirty days prior to their next meeting, Executive Director sends the 
visiting team report, the institution's response to the report, and Forms 
110 to the Board of Trustees.  
27. Accreditation Committee reviews the visiting team report and the 
institution’s response to the report, and each member completes Form 
116. Upon receipt of the Forms 116, the Chair prepares for the Board of 
Trustees an Executive Summary as outlined in Form 111. Chair presents 
Executive Summary to the Board.  
28. Board acts on the report and makes decision.  
29. If accredited, an official Letter of Notification of the action is sent to the 
institution by the Executive Director within 30 days of the action.  
 
Appeal Process 
1. If not accredited, the Executive Director sends a letter, also within 30 
days of the action, notifying institution of action and basis of action.  
2. Institution may appeal action by notifying CAA within 30 days of 
receipt of Executive Director’s letter.  
3. Executive Director submits letter of appeal to CAA President.  
4. President appoints three Trustees to Appeal Committee.  
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5. Appeal Committee meets at next CAA meeting and makes 
recommendation to Board.  
6. Board reviews recommendation and makes decision.  
7. Board acts on the report and makes decision.  
8. If accredited, an official Letter of Notification of the action is sent to the 
institution by the Executive Director within 30 days of the action.  
 
Interim Report 
1. Institution is given period for interim report(s), the items required in the 
report and deadline date of submittal.  
2. Institution submits interim report(s) to CAA.  
3. Executive Director reviews report(s) and submits to Accreditation 
Committee Chair.  
4. Accreditation Committee reviews report.  
5. Accreditation Committee Chair prepares report for the Board with 
recommendations.  
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Length
Review articles should be between 750-1500 words. Reviews outside these limits may be
considered at the Editor’s discretion. Comparative reviews of two books may be somewhat 
longer, but should not exceed 3000 words. Comparative reviews of more than two books are 
discouraged.
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Editorial Policy
Reviews appearing in the JAT represent the opinions of the reviewer and are not necessarily 
those of the editorial staff. Reviewers should have some authority or experience in the subject 
area. Reviews may contain positive or negative evaluations of the book. Negative remarks 
should be objective, precise, and expressed in a constructive, respectful manner. Vague or 
unsubstantiated criticism may be offensive to an author and generally fails to persuade a 
reader. Inflammatory remarks will not be accepted.
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Solicited Reviews
The maximum time allowed for completing a solicited review will be four weeks. If a reviewer 
is unable to meet this deadline, please inform the editor of a new date for completion or return 
the book so another reviewer can be contacted. For reviewers living outside the U.S.A., reviews 
may be returned via e-mail. 
Conflict of Interest
Reviews written by the book’s author(s), publisher, distributor, or by colleagues at the same 
institution or organization will not be considered. Also, duplicate reviews (previously 
published) will not be accepted. All authors of book reviews are required to include with their 
submission the following statement signed and dated. I, author’s name, do not have any 
commercial interest in the main topic of the book under review, nor am I associated with a 
company or other organization with commercial interest in the main topic of the book.
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Sample Book Review
Sample Book Review
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In order to view the sample book review you will need Adobe Acrobat Reader. If you do 
not have a copy you may download if for free by clicking here.
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Manuscripts and Call for Papers
Authors wishing to submit original 
manuscripts for consideration should send 
two double-space paper copies and one 
electronic copy either via email at 
journal@unomaha.edu or on an IBM 
compatible three and one-half inch diskette 
to the following address:
Aviation Institute/JAT
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Allwine Hall 422
6001 Dodge Street
Omaha, NE 68182-0508
U.S.A.
JAT GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS
Format
Figures and Tables
Reference Style
Review Process
Additional Information
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Format
All papers must be written in the English language. Use a 12 point font and allow for a 1"
margin on all sides. Double-space all material including quotations, the abstract, notes, and
references. All figures and tables should be on a separate page at the end of the text. Include the
figure name and filename on the bottom of the page. Please proofread all article submissions for
punctuation, spelling, and format errors.
The cover page should include the title of the manuscript, the author's name(s), shipping and email
addresses, telephone number, and a short biographical statement summarizing the author's
education and current affiliation. Please note the primary contact person. The second page should
contain an abstract of the manuscript. The abstract should include a concise description of the
contents of the paper, the research method used, and the results. Abstracts should generally be
kept to about 100 words.
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Figures and Tables
Figures and tables should appear at the end of the paper with each item on a separate page. Indicate 
in the text the approximate location where each figure and table should be placed. Figures, tables, 
and the text should each be saved as separate files. Do not embed tables and figures in the text files. 
Include the appropriate file name at the bottom of the page for each figure and table. Figures and 
tables must be camera-ready, printed in black ink only and must fit with in a 4 inch by 7 inch area.
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Reference Style
Due to the international participation, rigid referencing style criteria are not mandated. 
Acceptable reference styles of the author's country will apply. For the U.S.A., the most
recent edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) Manual of Style is preferred.
Ensure all references are cited and all citations are referenced.
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Review Process
A rigorous double-blind review will be conducted by the JAT  Panel of Reviewers. 
Additionally, a member of the Editorial board will conduct a third review. If revisions
are necessary, the editor will determine when a revised manuscript is in compliance with reviewer
recommendations. Authors must make revisions to original documents and resubmit them to
JAT on disk in Word or Word Perfect format. All revisions must be completed within two
weeks after return to the author. Manuscripts must be original, not previously published, nor under
consideration for another journal while undergoing review by the JAT.
Copyrights: Copyrights are retained by the authors and the JAT. Permission to duplicate and
distribute for educational purposes at no charge is granted.
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Additional Information
Additional information is available on the JAT web site at
http://jat.unomaha.edu or by contacting the JAT directly at 402-554-3424 or
journal@unomaha.edu
Return
Exit
